Hiller UH 12E accident near Cape May Court House, New Jersey, August 25, 2014
On August 25, 2014 at about 2:26 pm local time, a 1982 Hiller UH 12E (helicopter), registered N4035A, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Cape May Court House, New Jersey. It was an aerial observation flight under public-use (government) rules. 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The mechanic’s failure to detect excessive wear on the engine’s lateral snubber vibration mount during the latest annual inspection, which resulted in an in-flight engine failure and a subsequent forced landing.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 25, 2014 · about 2:26 pm local time
- Place
- Cape May Court House, New Jersey · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Hiller UH 12E, built 1982 · all UH 12Es on the register
- Registration
- N4035A · no longer on the register · serial 5195
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Aerial observation flight · public-use (government) rules
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot reported that, at 300 ft above the ground while climbing the helicopter out of a marshy area during mosquito control operations, he heard a loud, metallic "bang" and then felt an "immediate significant rhythmic vibration." He immediately performed an autorotation to the nearest clear area. The helicopter collided with trees and then the ground and came to rest on its right side. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the engine's antivibration snubbers were fractured. Subsequent examination of the snubbers revealed that the vibration reported by the pilot was likely due to a fracture of the lateral snubber assembly's vibration mount outboard of the mounting plate. The location of the fracture combined with the deformed outboard edge of the circumferential band indicate that the lateral snubber assembly moved both outboard and inboard relative to the mounting plate and, thus, that the fracture likely did not result from motion in one direction when the helicopter came to rest on its side. Additionally, dark red oxide was found on the steel surfaces that should have been encapsulated by elastomer, which indicates that relatively long-term oxidation of the surfaces had occurred due to environmental exposure. Further, areas of the lateral snubber vibration mount were separated from the elastomer, and only a little elastomer was adhered to the surface. The oxidation and lack of adhered elastomer suggest that preexisting cracks were present at or near the interface between the elastomer and the mounting plate. Circumferential cracks with a slight opening displacement were also observed at the inboard face of the elastomer, indicating that the elastomer was degraded. According to the helicopter manufacturer, specific inspections of the vibration mount assemblies are required at 50- and 100-hour intervals. An annual/100-hour inspection of the airframe and engine was completed about 6 weeks before the accident; the engine had operated about 18 hours since the inspection. The mechanic who performed the inspection stated that the snubber assemblies appeared airworthy at the time of the inspection. However, given the condition of the lateral snubber vibration mount, the mechanic should have been able to detect the wear on the mount and then replaced the vibration mount assembly.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
- Autorotation Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › (general) › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › (general) › Inadequate inspection
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 2,043 hours in all; 106 in this make and model; 77 in the last 90 days; 22 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: April 24, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,845 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 15, 2014; 18 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,100 lb
- Seats: 3
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming VO-540-C2A (piston); 0 hours total
- Operator: Cape May County Mosquito
The flight
- Departed from: H309 Cape May Ch NJ at 12:45 pm
- Destination: H309 Cape May Ch NJ
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 050° at 11 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
- Altimeter: 30.18 inHg
- Observation at 2:35 pm from WWD, 6 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
