Beech 95-B55 accident near Lagrange, Georgia, February 22, 2014
On February 22, 2014 at about 7:05 pm local time, a 1980 Beech 95-B55, registered N36638, was destroyed in an accident during approach (VFR go-around) near Lagrange, Georgia (Lagrange-Callaway Airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's overreaction to a perceived conflict with a tow plane and glider on an intersecting runway, which resulted in a loss of control during an attempted aborted landing. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the glider tow operator to follow and the airport operator to ensure compliance with published airport rules and regulations for glider tow operations.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 22, 2014 · about 7:05 pm local time
- Place
- Lagrange, Georgia · Lagrange-Callaway Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 3 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech 95-B55, built 1980 · all 95-B55s on the register
- Registration
- N36638 · no longer on the register · serial TC-2325
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The accident airplane was inbound to the airport, conducting an instrument approach in visual meteorological conditions, when the pilot announced its position over the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). Witnesses described the accident airplane's approach as fast and stated that the airplane never touched down. The accident airplane's engines then rapidly accelerated to full power before the airplane pitched up into a steep climb, banked left, rolled inverted, and struck the ground in a nearly vertical nose-down attitude, about 3,600 feet down the 5,599-foot-long runway. Throughout the morning of the accident, glider operations were being conducted on an intersecting runway. As the accident airplane floated down the runway, witnesses observed a tow plane accelerating down the intersecting runway with a glider in tow; The tow plane pilot then announced over the CTAF, "abort abort abort." The glider was then released from the tow plane and landed undamaged on the runway prior to the intersection of the two runways, while the tow plane crossed over the intersecting runway before taxiing back to the ramp. Examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies. According to witnesses on the airport, neither the glider nor tow plane appeared to be in immediate conflict with the accident airplane just before the accident; they stated that the accident pilot could have safely continued the landing. Additionally, the three pilots onboard the accident airplane had flown into the airport earlier in the day and were aware of the glider operations being conducted on the other runway. However, the accident pilot's observed reaction, as evidenced by the sudden application of full engine power followed by the airplane's abrupt increase in both pitch attitude and bank angle, suggest that he may have been surprised by the appearance of the glider and tow plane in his field of vision and perceived an imminent collision. The FAA airport manual contained advisories for glider operations at the accident airport. Examination of the airport rules and regulations, published on the airport website, revealed that a local notice to airmen (NOTAM) was required to be filed prior to the conduct of glider operations. Additionally, a "spotter" was prescribed to be used during glider operations, positioned in a location from which the entire length of the intersecting runway could be viewed, in order to avoid conflicts with other aircraft. According to the airport rules and regulations, the tow plane and glider were prohibited from taking off without approval from the spotter. On the day of the accident, no NOTAM had been filed regarding the day's glider operations, nor was a spotter being used. Interviews with the glider operator revealed a widespread lack of knowledge regarding these published rules. Furthermore, while airport management was aware of the rules with regard to glider operations, there was no method in place to ensure compliance with the published risk management practices.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Abrupt maneuver during approach (VFR go-around)
- Aerodynamic stall/spin during approach (VFR go-around)
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR go-around) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Perception › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Unneccessary action › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Capability exceeded
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Following instructions › Pilot of other aircraft
- factor Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of operation › Airport
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,642 hours in all; 73 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Flight instructor
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
- Flight time: 12,100 hours in all; 0 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: (piston); 0 hours total
- Operator: Executive Aircraft Storage LLC
The flight
- Departed from: LGC Lagrange GA at 7:00 pm
- Destination: LGC Lagrange GA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 31, 5,599 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 66°F (19°C), dew point 25°F (-4°C)
- Altimeter: 30.09 inHg
- Observation at 6:55 pm from LGC
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N36638 the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
1986-02-27NYC86LA080 · accident near Rochester, NY · substantial damage · no injuries
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.