Gulfstream Am CORP Comm Div 690 accident near Bellevue, Tennessee, February 3, 2014
On February 3, 2014 at about 10:55 pm local time, a 1982 Gulfstream Am CORP Comm Div 690, registered N840V, was destroyed in an accident during approach (IFR final approach) near Bellevue, Tennessee (John C Tune airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed with one engine inoperative, which resulted in a loss of control while on approach. Contributing to the accident were airframe ice accumulation due to conditions conducive to icing and the loss of engine power on one engine for reasons that could not be determined due to the extent of damage to the airplane.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 3, 2014 · about 10:55 pm local time
- Place
- Bellevue, Tennessee · John C Tune · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Gulfstream Am CORP Comm Div 690 C, built 1982 · all 690s on the register
- Registration
- N840V · no longer on the register · serial 11727
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The instrument-rated private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane under instrument flight rules (IFR). As the flight neared its destination, the controller issued clearance for a GPS approach, and, shortly thereafter, the pilot informed the controller that he needed to review the approach procedure before continuing the approach. The controller acknowledged, and, after the pilot reported that he was ready to proceed with the approach, the controller again issued clearance for the GPS approach. Radar data showed that, during the approach, the airplane tracked a course that was offset about 0.5 miles right of the final approach course until it was about 1 mile from the runway threshold. The airplane then turned left towards the threshold and descended to an altitude of about 145 ft above ground level over the runway threshold before the pilot performed a missed approach. It is likely that the pilot performed the missed approach because he was unable to align the airplane with the runway before it crossed the threshold. The controller provided radar vectors for the airplane to return to the approach course and cleared the airplane a third time for the GPS approach to the runway. Radar data showed that the airplane was established on the final approach course as it passed the initial approach fix; however, before it reached the final approach fix, its airspeed slowed to about 111 knots, and it began a left turn with a 25 degree bank angle. About 18 seconds later, while still in the turn, the airplane slowed to 108 knots and began descending rapidly. The airplane's rate of descent exceeded 10,000 feet per minute, and it impacted the ground about 9 miles from the destination airport. Examination of the accident site showed that the airplane was severely fragmented and fire damaged with debris scattered for about 450 feet. Postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures; however, damage to the left engine indicated that it was not producing power at the time of the accident. The severity of impact and fire damage to the airplane and engine precluded determination of the reason for the loss of left engine power. Weather conditions present at the time of the accident were conducive to super cooled liquid water droplets, and the airplane likely encountered moderate or greater icing conditions. Several pilot reports (PIREPs) for moderate, light, trace, and negative icing were reported to air traffic control but were not distributed publicly into the national airspace system, and there was no airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) issued for icing. However, the pilot received standard and abbreviated weather briefings for the flight, and his most recent weather briefing included three PIREPs for icing conditions in the area of the accident site. Given the weather information provided, the pilot should have known icing conditions were possible. Even so, the public distribution of additional PIREPs would have likely increased the weather situational awareness by the pilot, weather forecasters, and air traffic controllers. The airplane was equipped with deicing and anti-icing systems that included wing and empennage deice boots and engine inlet heaters. Due to impact damage to the cockpit, the positions of the switches for the ice protection systems at the time of the accident could not be determined. Although the airplane's airspeed of 108 knots when the steep descent began was above its published stall speed of 77 knots, both bank angle and ice accretion would have increased the stall speed. In addition, the published minimum control airspeed was 93 knots. It is likely that, after the airplane passed the initial approach fix, the left engine lost power, the airplane's airspeed began to decay, and the asymmetric thrust resulted in a left turn. As the airspeed continued to decay, it decreased below either stall speed or minimum control airspeed, and the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Structural icing during approach
- Loss of engine power (partial) during approach
- Loss of control in flight during approach (IFR final approach) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
- factor Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to structural icing › Contributed to outcome
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › (general) › Not specified
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,205 hours in all; 719 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: unk
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,460 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, February 1, 2014; 5 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 10,325 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Garrett TPE331-5-511 (turboprop); 4,460 hours total
- Engine 2: Garrett TPE331-5-511 (turboprop); 4,460 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: GBD Great Bend KS at 8:45 pm
- Destination: JWN Nashville TN
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 02, 5,500 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 360° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 5 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 800 ft
- Temperature: 41°F (5°C), dew point 25°F (-4°C)
- Altimeter: 30.29 inHg
- Observation at 10:55 pm from JWN, 9 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
30 documents, released by the NTSB on March 7, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N840V the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
