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Accidents · NTSB ERA14FA075 · Final report

Beech A36TC accident near Chatlottesville, Virginia, December 18, 2013

On December 18, 2013 at about 4:10 pm local time, a 1980 Beech A36TC, registered N3705Z, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach near Chatlottesville, Virginia (Charlottesville-Albemarle Arpt airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to position the fuel selector handle in a fuel tank detent, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the pilot’s fatal injuries was the separation of his shoulder harness due to overload in an area of excessive fraying.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 18, 2013 · about 4:10 pm local time · cases in 2013
Place
Chatlottesville, Virginia · Charlottesville-Albemarle Arpt · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech A36TC, built 1980 · all A36TCs on the register
Registration
N3705Z · no longer on the register · serial EA-146
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

About 1 hour 30 minutes into the cross-country flight and while on approach to the destination airport, the pilot reported a loss of engine power. The pilot was unable to glide the airplane to the airport, and it subsequently impacted trees and the ground in a residential area about 3 miles from the airport. The pilot had completely fueled the airplane before departure, and adequate fuel remained onboard at the time of the engine power loss. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the three-position fuel selector handle was positioned in between the left and right tank detents, which would have restricted fuel flow to the engine. A subsequent test run of the engine was performed successfully, and no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures was found that would have precluded normal engine operation. The airplane's before landing checklist instructed the pilot to move the fuel selector valve to the fuller fuel tank for landing. It is likely that, while on approach and preparing the airplane to land, the pilot switched fuel tanks and then inadvertently failed to ensure that the fuel selector handle was fully positioned in the detent of the fuel tank he intended to select. During the impact sequence, the pilot's shoulder harness separated, and his cause of death was attributed to blunt force trauma to the torso. The autopsy also reported a near-complete transection of the thoracic aorta. If the pilot's shoulder harness had remained intact, the risk of traumatic transection of the aorta would have been significantly reduced and, thus, the pilot likely would only have incurred serious, not fatal, injuries. Examination of the shoulder harness revealed that the belt had separated about 31 inches from where the fastener connected to the lapbelt. The location of the separation corresponded approximately to where the belt would pass through the D-ring behind the pilot's shoulder. The belt separation area exhibited about 0.25-inch fraying on one edge and 1.25-inch fraying on the other edge along a total area of about 7.75 inches. The shoulder harness manufacturer's component maintenance manual states that the acceptable limit for webbing fraying was a 6-inch area. Microscopic examination of the separated fibers revealed that they had separated in overload. The airplane's maintenance manual and a Federal Aviation Administration advisory circular contained information pertaining to the inspection of shoulder harnesses during 100-hour or annual inspections. The accident airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed about 1 month before the accident. Although the pilot's toxicology report was positive for pain medication, the medication was not detected in his blood; thus, it is likely that the pilot took the medication many hours before the accident flight and was not impaired during the flight.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel starvation during approach defining event
  2. Loss of engine power (total) during approach
  3. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,185 hours in all; 999,999 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,554.6 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, November 23, 2013
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,651 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Continental TSIO-520 (piston); 864 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: OBI Woodbine NJ at 2:45 pm
  • Destination: CHO Charlottesville VA
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 230° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 39°F (4°C), dew point 18°F (-8°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.17 inHg
  • Observation at 4:18 pm from CHO, 3 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

26 documents, released by the NTSB on March 12, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Air Traffic Control Flight Progress Strip PDF, 1 page View Download
2 Air Traffic Control radar Graphic PDF, 1 page View Download
3 radar Plots PDF, 2 pages View Download
4 Materials Laboratory Factual Report PDF, 9 pages View Download
5 Engine Data Monitor (EDM) and GPS Factual Report PDF, 8 pages View Download
6 Attachment 1 - Engine Data Monitor (EDM) and GPS Factual Report data file Download
7 Attachment 2 - Engine Data Monitor (EDM) and GPS Factual Report data file Download
8 Map of Accident Site PDF, 1 page View Download
9 Excerpts from Maintenance Records PDF, 2 pages View Download
10 Excerpt from Pilot Operating Handbook PDF, 1 page View Download
11 Excerpt from Airplane Manufacturer Maintenance Manual PDF, 1 page View Download
12 Excerpt from Shoulder Harness Manufacturer Component Maintenance Manual PDF, 1 page View Download
13 Excerpt from Ac 43 13-1B PDF, 1 page View Download
14 Engine Operational Test Report PDF, 11 pages View Download
15 Fuel Receipts PDF, 2 pages View Download
16 Weather Report PDF, 1 page View Download
17 ATC Audio PDF, 1 page View Download
18 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page View Download
19 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 16 pages View Download
20 Evidence Control Forms PDF, 3 pages View Download
21 Release of Aircraft Wreckage Form PDF, 1 page View Download
22 Photo 1 - Front View of Wreckage PDF, 1 page View Download
23 Photo 2 - Side View of Wreckage PDF, 1 page View Download
24 Photo 3 - Engine and Propeller PDF, 1 page View Download
25 Photo 4 - Instrument Panel PDF, 1 page View Download
26 Photo 5 - Fuel Selector PDF, 1 page View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA14FA075.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.