American Eurocopter LLC AS350B2 accident near Canton, Mississippi, September 20, 2013
On September 20, 2013 at about 2:27 am local time, a 2010 American Eurocopter LLC AS350B2 (helicopter), registered N810LE, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Canton, Mississippi. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 1 person was seriously injured and 3 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s improper decision to continue flight with a low engine oil pressure warning light instead of landing immediately in accordance with the flight manual emergency checklist. Contributing to the accident was the maintenance technician’s failure to clean the rear bearing in accordance with the engine manufacturer’s guidance when replacing the 2nd-stage turbine wheel, which resulted in an obstruction of solidified oil carbon in the rear bearing chip detector housing union, subsequent oil exhaustion, and engine failure.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 20, 2013 · about 2:27 am local time
- Place
- Canton, Mississippi · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured and 3 people had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- American Eurocopter LLC AS350B2, built 2010
- Registration
- N810LE · registry record · serial 4924
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
As the helicopter departed the helipad, a witness saw dark black smoke coming out of the engine exhaust. (This smoke would not have been visible to the pilot.) The pilot reported that, about 10 minutes after departure, he noticed the illumination of the low engine oil pressure warning light. He noted that the oil pressure gauge was also showing low pressure but that there was no rise in the oil temperature or the exhaust gas temperature. Because the pilot had recently experienced an intermittent oil pressure gauge problem in another helicopter, he assumed the accident helicopter was experiencing a similar problem and continued toward the intended destination while attempting to verify the loss of engine oil pressure. Several minutes later, the pilot noticed a low-torque indication but no rise in the oil temperature or exhaust gas temperature. About 25 minutes after departure, the pilot saw a rise in the exhaust gas temperature and lowered the collective to reduce power. After briefly decreasing, the exhaust gas temperature began rising again, and the pilot located an open field to perform an off-airport landing. The engine experienced a total loss of power before the helicopter reached the open field; the pilot performed an autorotation, and the helicopter landed hard. Postaccident examination revealed that the engine oil tank was empty and that the engine had sustained heat damage consistent with overtemperature due to oil exhaustion. An obstruction of solidified oil carbon was found in the rear bearing chip detector housing union, which would have restricted the oil scavenge of the rear bearing. According to the engine manufacturer, failure to scavenge the oil in the rear bearing would cause overpressurization of the rear bearing housing area, which would force engine oil out of the rear bearing vent line. In addition, oil overpressurization could overcome the labyrinth seal of the piston shaft, which would allow oil to flow into the gas exhaust path. It is likely that this occurred because oil flowing into the exhaust path would result in black smoke coming from the engine exhaust as was observed by the witness. The continued operation of the engine in this condition likely resulted in the depletion of the oil reservoir, the illumination of the low engine oil pressure warning light, and, subsequently, as the flight continued, a total loss of engine power. A review of data recovered from a flight recorder installed in the helicopter indicated that, about 2 minutes after departure (about 26 minutes before the accident), the oil pressure dropped from about 4 bars to about 0.2 bar, which would have illuminated the low engine oil pressure warning light. The flight manual and the cockpit emergency checklist both directed that, when the low engine oil pressure warning light was illuminated and the engine oil pressure gauge indicated low oil pressure (as reported by the pilot), the procedure was to land immediately. If the pilot had followed this procedure instead of continuing the flight with the warning light illuminated, it is likely that the accident would have been prevented. Review of the helicopter's maintenance records indicated that, about 12 flight hours before the accident flight, the engine's 2nd-stage turbine disk (T2) was replaced. During the replacement of the T2, the maintenance technician determined that the rear bearing was "clean"; therefore, he did not clean the rear bearing even though the maintenance procedures required a systematic cleaning when the T2 was replaced regardless of the condition of the bearing. If the cleaning had been performed, as called for in the maintenance procedures, it is likely that the oil carbon deposit in the rear bearing chip detector housing union would have been discovered and removed, thus averting the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Hard landing during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Oil system › Damaged/degraded
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Maintenance personnel
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Oil › Fluid level
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument airplane; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,380 hours in all; 77 in this make and model
- Last flight review: April 24, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,219 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, September 12, 2013; 12 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 4,960 lb
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Turbomeca Arriel 1D1 (turboshaft); 2,231 hours total
- Operator: Metro Aviation INC
The flight
- Departed from: Ackerman MS at 1:54 am
- Destination: Jackson MS
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 160° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
- Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
- Observation at 1:54 am from JAN, 20 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
