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Accidents · NTSB ERA13LA252 · Final report

Beech A36 accident near Atlanta, Georgia, May 23, 2013

On May 23, 2013 at about 6:56 pm local time, a 1993 Beech A36, registered N8225T, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Atlanta, Georgia (Dekalb-Peachtree Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's inadequate preflight planning, which resulted in the airplane being loaded in excess of its maximum gross weight at an aft center of gravity for a takeoff with a quartering tailwind and high-density altitude conditions, all of which degraded the airplane’s climb performance and led to the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 23, 2013 · about 6:56 pm local time
Place
Atlanta, Georgia · Dekalb-Peachtree Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech A36, built 1993 · all A36s on the register
Registration
N8225T · no longer on the register · serial E-2801
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that, before the flight, he checked the weather and obtained a full weather briefing from flight service. After he boarded the passengers and loaded the luggage into the airplane, the pilot conducted a preflight inspection and noted that everything was "good." During taxi, he asked the air traffic controller if he could take off from runway 3R because it was the longest runway. He then conducted an engine run-up and noted that everything was normal. While holding short of the runway, the pilot heard another pilot ask the controller for a wind check, and the controller replied that the wind was from 300 degrees. Because that would result in a direct crosswind for runway 3R, the pilot asked if runway 34 was available, and the controller replied that it was closed. While waiting for departure, the pilot noted that the windsock seemed to be indicating a slight quartering tailwind. During the takeoff, he applied left aileron because of the crosswind. As he rotated the airplane, "something didn't feel right." The stall warning horn then started "chirping," and the airplane turned into the wind and did not take off with "its usual vigor." He leveled off to stop the stall horn and stated that the engine didn't sound right. He decided to abort the takeoff when the airplane was about 30 ft above ground level (agl). He reduced power and tried to glide the airplane to land. However, shortly thereafter, the stall warning horn "blared," and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall and impacted the runway. Examination of the wreckage and recorded engine monitor data revealed no evidence of failures or malfunctions. One of the passengers recorded the takeoff and accident sequence on his cell phone. The video showed that, after the pilot rotated the airplane for takeoff, the stall warning horn sounded; the airplane was in a nose-high attitude and had reached an altitude of between 50 and 100 feet agl when the pilot reduced the power. The video then showed the airplane descending until the sound of impact was heard. During the takeoff, the engine sounded constant and normal. The reported wind about the time of the accident was 290 degrees at 13 knots gusting to 18 knots. According to the Aircraft Flight Manual/Pilot's Operating Handbook (AFM/POH), these conditions would have resulted in a crosswind component that, during portions of the takeoff and initial climb, would have exceeded the airplane's maximum demonstrated crosswind of 17 knots and would have resulted in a 2- to 4-knot tailwind component. Further, two pilots reported low-level windshear at the airport about the time of the accident. No convective echoes existed in the local area about the time of the accident; therefore, a microburst event did not occur at the airport at the time of the accident. High-density altitude conditions existed around the time of the accident, which would also have degraded the airplane's performance and increased the distance needed for the takeoff roll. The pilot should have accounted for the crosswind, the tailwind, and the high-density altitude conditions in his preflight planning, but he did not do so. A review of the pilot's weight and balance calculations revealed that he underestimated the occupant and baggage weights in his calculations and used an inaccurate airplane empty weight. Recalculations using accurate weights revealed that the airplane was operating at least 100 pounds over the published maximum takeoff weight at the time of the accident and that the center of gravity (CG) was farther aft than the pilot had calculated. The AFM/POH performance charts only provide data for operating up to the airplane's maximum takeoff weight; it cautions that if loaded above the maximum takeoff weight, the takeoff distance will be longer, the stall speed will be higher, and the climb rate will be lower than that shown in the performance charts. Pilots are expected to perform airplane performance calculations and determine takeoff distances using accurate weight and balance information and taking into account other important factors, such as wind and pressure conditions, that can affect climb performance and takeoff distance. However, the accident pilot did not properly calculate the airplane's weight and balance during his preflight calculations, and he overloaded the airplane at an aft CG, which would have degraded the airplane's performance. Further, he did not account for the high-density altitude or wind conditions at the airport at the time of the accident, which would have further degraded the airplane's performance. Therefore, it is likely that the airplane was not able to achieve a positive climb rate and that its nose was pitched up due to the combined effects of these conditions, which led it to exceed its critical angle-of-attack and subsequently stall.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft loading event during prior to flight
  2. Aerodynamic stall/spin during initial climb defining event
  3. Loss of control in flight during initial climb
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of manual › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weight/balance calculations › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Performance calculations › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › CG/weight distribution › Incorrect use/operation
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Climb rate › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Maximum weight › Capability exceeded
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Maximum crosswind component › Capability exceeded
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › High density altitude › Effect on equipment
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind › Crosswind › Effect on equipment

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 613 hours in all; 306 in this make and model; 9 in the last 90 days; 3 in the last 30 days; 547 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: December 20, 2012
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,763 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, March 4, 2013; 55 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Cont Motor IO-550-B (piston); 1,935 hours total
  • Operator: Bonanza Five INC

The flight

  • Departed from: PDK Atlanta GA at 6:56 pm
  • Destination: VNC Venice FL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 03R, 6,001 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 290° at 13 knots, gusting 18
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 5,000 ft
  • Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.97 inHg
  • Observation at 6:56 pm from PDK

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers4

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.