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Accidents · NTSB ERA13FA275 · Final report

Cessna 340A accident near Boynton Beach, Florida, June 8, 2013

On June 8, 2013 at about 2:02 pm local time, a Cessna 340A, registered N217JP, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Boynton Beach, Florida. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s loss of situational awareness, which resulted in an inadvertent aerodynamic stall/spin after he climbed the airplane back into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s improper decision to continue flight into IMC with malfunctioning flight instrument(s).

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 8, 2013 · about 2:02 pm local time
Place
Boynton Beach, Florida · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Cessna 340A · all 340As on the register
Registration
N217JP · no longer on the register · serial 340A0435
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Four minutes after taking off on an instrument flight rules flight, during an assigned climb to 4,000 feet, the pilot advised the departure air traffic controller that the airplane was having "instrument problems" and that he wanted to "stay VFR" (visual flight rules), which the controller acknowledged. As directed, the pilot subsequently contacted the next sector departure controller, who instructed him to climb to 8,000 feet. The pilot stated that he would climb the airplane after clearing a cloud and reiterated that the airplane was having "instrument problems." The controller told the pilot to advise when he could climb the airplane. About 30 seconds later, the pilot told the controller that he was climbing the airplane to 8,000 feet, and, shortly thereafter, the controller cleared the airplane to 11,000 feet, which the pilot acknowledged. Per instruction, the pilot later contacted a center controller, who advised him of moderate-to-heavy precipitation along his (northbound) route for the next 10 miles and told him that he could deviate either left or right and, when able, proceed direct to an intersection near his destination. The pilot acknowledged the direct-to-intersection instruction, and the controller told the pilot to climb the airplane to 13,000 feet, which the pilot acknowledged. The pilot did not advise the center controller about the instrument problems. The airplane subsequently began turning east, eventually completing about an 80-degree turn toward heavier precipitation, and the controller told the pilot to climb to 15,000 feet, but the pilot did not respond. After two more queries, the pilot stated that he was trying to maintain "VFR" and that "I have an instrument failure here." The controller then stated that he was showing the airplane turning east, which "looks like a very bad idea." He subsequently advised the pilot to turn to the west but received no further transmissions from the airplane. Radar indicated that, while the airplane was turning east, it climbed to 9,500 feet but that, during the next 24 seconds, it descended to 7,500 feet and, within the following 5 seconds, it descended to just above ground level (the ground-based radar altitude readout was 0 feet). The pilot recovered the airplane and climbed it northeast-bound to 1,500 feet during the next 20 seconds. It then likely stalled and descended northwest-bound into shallow waters of a wildlife refuge. Weather radar returns indicated that the airplane's first descent occurred in an area of moderate-to-heavy rain but that the second descent occurred in light rain. The ceiling at the nearest recording airport, located about 20 nautical miles from the accident site, was 1,500 feet, indicating that the pilot likely climbed the airplane back into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)before finally losing control. The investigation could not determine the extent to which the pilot had planned the flight. Although a flight plan was on file, the pilot did not receive a formal weather briefing but could have self-briefed via alternative means. The investigation also could not determine when the pilot first lost situational awareness, although the excessive turn to the east toward heavier precipitation raises the possibility that the turn likely wasn't intentional and that the pilot had already lost situational awareness. Earlier in the flight, when the pilot reported an instrument problem, the two departure controllers coordinated between their sectors in accordance with air traffic control procedures, allowing him to remain low and out of IMC. Although the second controller told the pilot to advise when he was able to climb, the pilot commenced a climb without further comment. The controller was likely under the impression that the instrument problem had been corrected; therefore, he communicated no information about a potential instrument problem to the center controller. The center controller then complied with the level of service required by advising the pilot of the weather conditions ahead and by approving deviations. The extent and nature of the deviation was up to the pilot with controller assistance upon pilot request. The pilot did not request further weather information or assistance with deviations and only told the center controller that the airplane was having an instrument problem after the controller pointed out that the airplane was heading into worsening weather. Due to impact forces, only minimal autopsy results could be determined. Federal Aviation Administration medical records indicated that the 16,560-hour former military pilot did not have any significant health issues, and the pilot's wife was unaware of any preexisting significant medical conditions. The wreckage was extremely fractured, which precluded thorough examination. However, evidence indicated that all flight control surfaces were accounted for at the accident scene and that the engines were under power at the time of impact. The airplane was equipped with redundant pilot and copilot flight instruments, redundant instrument air sources, onboard weather radar, and a storm scope. The pilot did not advise any of the air traffic controllers about the extent or type of instrument problem, and the investigation could not determine which instrument(s) might have failed or how redundant systems could have been failed at the same time. Although the pilot stated on several occasions that the airplane was having instrument problems, he opted to continue flight into IMC. By doing so, he eventually lost situational awareness and then control of airplane but regained both when he acquired visual ground contact. Then, for unknown reasons, he climbed the airplane back into IMC where he again lost situational awareness and airplane control but was then unable to regain them before the airplane impacted the water.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Flight instrument malf/fail during enroute (climb to cruise)
  2. Loss of control in flight during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
  3. Miscellaneous/other during uncontrolled descent
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Indicating/recording systems › Instrument panel › Failure
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Effect on operation
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Situational awareness › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 16,561 hours in all; 56 in this make and model; 44 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,209 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, September 1, 2012
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Continental TSIO-520 SER (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Continental TSIO-520 SER (piston); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Paul S. Soule Enterprises, Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: FXE Fort Lauderdale FL at 1:45 pm
  • Destination: LEE Leesburg FL
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 120° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 2 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 1,500 ft
  • Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.06 inHg
  • Observation at 1:53 pm from PBI, 20 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.