Cessna 172H and Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2 mid-air collision near Weyers Cave, Virginia, December 31, 2010
On December 31, 2010 at about 7:26 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Cessna 172H (N2876L) and Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2 (N312PH), were involved in a mid-air collision near Weyers Cave, Virginia. 2 people were killed; 3 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, which made it difficult for the helicopter pilot to see the airplane before the collision. Contributing to the accident was the airplane pilot’s non-standard entry to the airport traffic pattern, which, contrary to published Federal Aviation Administration guidance, was conducted 500 feet below the airport's published traffic pattern altitude and in a direction that conflicted with the established flow of traffic.
The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, which made it difficult for the helicopter pilot to see the airplane before the collision. Contributing to the accident was the airplane pilot’s non-standard entry to the airport traffic pattern, which, contrary to published Federal Aviation Administration guidance, was conducted 500 feet below the airport's published traffic pattern altitude and in a direction that conflicted with the established flow of traffic.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 31, 2010 · about 7:26 pm local time
- Place
- Weyers Cave, Virginia · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed; 3 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Cessna 172H · all 172Hs on the register
- Registration
- N2876L · no longer on the register · serial 17256076
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2
- Registration
- N312PH · registry record · serial 404
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 172H final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot and both crewmembers of the helicopter recalled routine radio communication as the helicopter approached the destination airport. They established visual contact with two airplanes that had announced their positions in the traffic pattern; one on the downwind leg and one on short final. The airplanes were also identified by the traffic avoidance system onboard the helicopter. The pilot followed behind and north of the second airplane and continued to the west side of the airport to complete a landing at the helipad. During the descent, about 500 feet above ground level (agl), the pilot "saw about 2 feet of white wing right outside." He "pulled power" and then felt contact with an airplane. The airplane's right wing separated before it departed controlled flight and descended to the ground, fatally injuring both occupants. The helicopter subsequently landed with minor damage and no injuries to the 3 occupants. Interpolation of radar data revealed that the accident airplane departed from the same airport about 21 minutes prior to the accident and completed a right downwind departure, contrary to the established left traffic pattern. The airplane’s transponder appeared to be off for about 3 minutes after takeoff before transmitting the visual flight rules transponder code (1200) for the remainder of the observed flight; the transponder appeared to be on and functioning at the time of the collision. The airplane proceeded north of the airport before reversing course and returning to approach the airport from the northeast. The last target was observed about 1.2 nautical miles north of the airport on a track leading toward the west side of the landing runway at an altitude of 500 feet agl. About 25 seconds later, the helicopter passed northeast of the airport on a modified left base, about 500 feet above traffic pattern altitude (1,500 feet agl), crossed the final approach course, and turned parallel to and on the west side of the runway. Although only the helicopter was observed by radar at the time of the collision, extrapolation of the accident airplane’s previously observed targets and flight path placed the airplane at the accident site about the same time the helicopter was observed there. An analysis of the relative positions of the airplane and helicopter based on radar data indicated that the airplane remained below the helicopter pilot's field of view as the helicopter overtook the airplane from behind and descended upon it from above. Although the data indicated that the airplane would likely have been visible to the pilot of the helicopter, it is important to note that the onboard traffic avoidance system (TAS) did not provide the pilot with any alert of its presence because the system operated on line-of-sight principles. If an intruder aircraft’s antenna was shielded from the TAS antenna, the ability of the TAS to track the target would be affected. If a TAS equipped aircraft was located directly above an intruder, the airframe of one or both of the aircraft could cause the TAS’s interrogations to be shielded, depending on antenna location (either bottom or top-mounted). All other airplanes in the traffic pattern were acquired visually by the pilot and crew as their positions were confirmed by the helicopter's onboard traffic avoidance system and the position reports provided by the pilots of each airplane. Because of the high-wing structure of the airplane, and its relative position and altitude, the helicopter's image was either blocked from the airplane pilot's view by the left wing, or was above and behind the airplane in the seconds before collision. Further, no radio position reports from the accident airplane were confirmed. The helicopter pilot’s unalerted detection of the airplane against a complex background of ground objects would have been difficult because of both the lack of apparent contrast between the airplane and the ground, its size in the windscreen, its relative lack of movement within the pilot’s field of view, and the position and angle of the sun. In addition, the helicopter pilot’s familiarity with the customary routes used by fixed-wing pilots to fly into and out of the airport also made detection of the airplane less likely, because the airplane was not in a location that normally contained conflicting traffic. Finally, before the helicopter turned and overtook the airplane, the helicopter pilot’s visual attention would have likely been directed toward the landing area, which would also have limited opportunities for detection of the airplane. The airplane's departure and arrival were contrary to published Federal Aviation Administration guidance, the airplane owner's guidance, and the airplane pilot's guidance to his own students with regard to pattern entry at the destination airport.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot and both crewmembers of the helicopter recalled routine radio communication as the helicopter approached the destination airport. They established visual contact with two airplanes that had announced their positions in the traffic pattern; one on the downwind leg and one on short final. The airplanes were also identified by the traffic avoidance system onboard the helicopter. The pilot followed behind and north of the second airplane and continued to the west side of the airport to complete a landing at the helipad. During the descent, about 500 feet above ground level (agl), the pilot "saw about 2 feet of white wing right outside." He "pulled power" and then felt contact with an airplane. The airplane's right wing separated before it departed controlled flight and descended to the ground, fatally injuring both occupants. The helicopter subsequently landed with minor damage and no injuries to the 3 occupants. Interpolation of radar data revealed that the accident airplane departed from the same airport about 21 minutes prior to the accident and completed a right downwind departure, contrary to the established left traffic pattern. The airplane’s transponder appeared to be off for about 3 minutes after takeoff before transmitting the visual flight rules transponder code (1200) for the remainder of the observed flight; the transponder appeared to be on and functioning at the time of the collision. The airplane proceeded north of the airport before reversing course and returning to approach the airport from the northeast. The last target was observed about 1.2 nautical miles north of the airport on a track leading toward the west side of the landing runway at an altitude of 500 feet agl. About 25 seconds later, the helicopter passed northeast of the airport on a modified left base, about 500 feet above traffic pattern altitude (1,500 feet agl), crossed the final approach course, and turned parallel to and on the west side of the runway. Although only the helicopter was observed by radar at the time of the collision, extrapolation of the accident airplane’s previously observed targets and flight path placed the airplane at the accident site about the same time the helicopter was observed there. An analysis of the relative positions of the airplane and helicopter based on radar data indicated that the airplane remained below the helicopter pilot's field of view as the helicopter overtook the airplane from behind and descended upon it from above. Although the data indicated that the airplane would likely have been visible to the pilot of the helicopter, it is important to note that the onboard traffic avoidance system (TAS) did not provide the pilot with any alert of its presence because the system operated on line-of-sight principles. If an intruder aircraft’s antenna was shielded from the TAS antenna, the ability of the TAS to track the target would be affected. If a TAS-equipped aircraft was located directly above an intruder, the airframe of one or both of the aircraft could cause the TAS’s interrogations to be shielded, depending on antenna location (either bottom or top-mounted). All other airplanes in the traffic pattern were acquired visually by the pilot and crew as their positions were confirmed by the helicopter's onboard traffic avoidance system and the position reports provided by the pilots of each airplane. Because of the high-wing structure of the airplane, and its relative position and altitude, the helicopter's image was either blocked from the airplane pilot's view by the left wing, or was above and behind the airplane in the seconds before collision. Further, no radio position reports from the accident airplane were confirmed. The helicopter pilot’s unalerted detection of the airplane against a complex background of ground objects would have been difficult because of both the lack of apparent contrast between the airplane and the ground, its size in the windscreen, its relative lack of movement within the pilot’s field of view, and the position and angle of the sun. In addition, the helicopter pilot’s familiarity with the customary routes used by fixed-wing pilots to fly into and out of the airport also made detection of the airplane less likely, because the airplane was not in a location that normally contained conflicting traffic. Finally, before the helicopter turned and overtook the airplane, the helicopter pilot’s visual attention would have likely been directed toward the landing area, which would also have limited opportunities for detection of the airplane. The airplane's departure and arrival were contrary to published Federal Aviation Administration guidance, the airplane owner's guidance, and the airplane pilot's guidance to his own students with regard to pattern entry at the destination airport.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Cessna 172H from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during maneuvering defining event
The NTSB's findings
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Incorrect use/operation
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Not specified
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,300 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 7,366 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, November 18, 2010
- Maximum gross weight: 2,300 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Cont Motor O-300 SER (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: SHD Weyers Cave VA at 7:02 pm
- Destination: SHD Weyers Cave VA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 23, 6,002 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 220° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 63°F (17°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
- Altimeter: 30.13 inHg
- Observation at 7:20 pm from SHD, 1 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
The factual record for the Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC 135 P2 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during approach (VFR pattern base) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Not specified
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot of other aircraft
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 6,803 hours in all; 743 in this make and model; 31 in the last 90 days; 11 in the last 30 days; 5,409 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 26, 2010
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,209 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, December 31, 2010
- Maximum gross weight: 6,265 lb
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: P&W Canada PW206B SERIES (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: P&W Canada PW206B SERIES (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Operator: Phi Inc
The flight
- Departed from: 8VA5 Charlottesville VA at 7:11 pm
- Destination: SHD Weyers Cave VA
- Runway 23, 6,002 ft by 150 ft
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.