Beech A36 accident near Flat Rock, North Carolina, September 10, 2009
On September 10, 2009 at about 6:15 pm local time, a Beech A36, registered N888WD, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Flat Rock, North Carolina. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s attempt to maintain visual flight during instrument meteorological conditions, resulting in controlled flight into mountainous terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to advise the controller of the weather conditions encountered, and his failure to request minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) monitoring before departure.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 10, 2009 · about 6:15 pm local time
- Place
- Flat Rock, North Carolina · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Beech A36 · all A36s on the register
- Registration
- N888WD · registry record · serial E-3004
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Although the pilot was instrument rated, the investigation found no record that his rating was current. The pilot advised the air traffic controller before departure that he did not want to execute any instrument landing system (ILS) approaches even though they were in use at the time, and neither transceiver was configured to the localizer frequency. Due to the mountainous terrain surrounding the airport, local air traffic control (ATC) had designated certain mode 3 transponder codes that inhibit minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) processing for a controller. This was accomplished to prevent repeated nuisance alarms for aircraft operating under visual flight rules (VFR) and not requesting MSAW processing. The pilot did not request MSAW monitoring before departure or at any time during the flight; therefore, the assigned VFR transponder code (0210) inhibited the MSAW. The pilot departed the flight with a reported ceiling of 1,500 feet and 10 miles visibility before proceeding south of the departure airport and electing to return, remaining in constant contact with ATC. While operating only several hundred feet above mountainous terrain, in instrument flight rules conditions due to fog, the pilot did not advise the controller of the weather encountered. While being vectored towards the airport, the airplane impacted trees then terrain at an elevation of approximately 2,809 feet mean sea level. The pilot made no distress call and the controller did not provide a MSAW warning to the pilot. Postaccident examination of the airplane, engine, and engine systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. While testing of avionics revealed that the “Trim” light bulbs of the autopilot remote mode annunciator and the autopilot and flight director computer were illuminated at the moment of impact, the left pitch trim actuator was found in the neutral position and the circumstances of the accident do not support a pitch trim malfunction. Additionally, the autopilot was not activated at the moment of impact.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Environmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc › (general) › Not specified
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low ceiling › Contributed to outcome
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low visibility › Contributed to outcome
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › (general) › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,220 hours in all
- Last flight review: April 29, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,239 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 13, 2009; 2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,650 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Cont Motor IO-550-B (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: AVL Asheville NC at 6:05 pm
- Destination: AVL Asheville NC
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 170° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 1,500 ft
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
- Altimeter: 30.25 inHg
- Observation at 5:54 pm from AVL, 11 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA09FA514.