Beech C90A accident near Yeehaw Junction, Florida, May 25, 2009
On May 25, 2009 at about 3:46 pm local time, a Beech C90A, registered N8001V, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (descent) near Yeehaw Junction, Florida. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the flightcrew to recognize that both engines were being supplied fuel only from the right wing fuel tanks resulting in loss of power in both engine due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the accident were the inoperative the left auxiliary fuel pump, the inoperative right no fuel transfer time delay relay, and inadequate manufacturing of the electrical wires associated with the left and right no fuel transfer time delay relays.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 25, 2009 · about 3:46 pm local time
- Place
- Yeehaw Junction, Florida · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech C90A · all C90As on the register
- Registration
- N8001V · no longer on the register · serial LJ-1265
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Approximately 4 days before the accident the left boost pump was noted by the accident pilot to be intermittent. Maintenance checked the pump but could not duplicate the intermittent discrepancy and the airplane was approved for return to service. Shortly after takeoff during the accident flight while operating with the crossfeed switch in the "Auto" position, the left boost pump became inoperative and the "Fuel Crossfeed" annunciator correctly illuminated alerting the flightcrew that the right boost pump was supplying fuel from the right fuel tanks to both engines. An adequate supply of fuel was available in the left fuel tanks which could have directly supplied the left engine had the flightcrew closed the crossfeed valve, but the pilot in command (PIC) continued the flight with fuel only supplied from the right fuel tanks. While descending, both engines lost power due to fuel starvation. The PIC maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing in an open field and landed hard, bounced, and came to rest upright. Postaccident inspection of the airplane revealed internal components of the left boost pump were worn resulting in an inoperative boost pump and the right no fuel transfer time delay relay was inoperative due to a broken terminal at the relay. Had the right no fuel transfer annunciation system been operative, it is likely that the flightcrew would have diverted earlier for an uneventful landing at a suitable airport. While inspection of the electrical wiring and components in the cockpit (includes the fuel control panel) occurs during a Phase 3 inspection required to be performed every 800 hours, the failures of the wires and terminal at the right no fuel transfer time delay relay was due to bending which occurred with repeated opening and closing of the panel. Postaccident inspection of 2 production airplanes of the same make and model revealed discrepancies with chafing of the relay wires against a nearby structural member.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during initial climb
- Fuel starvation during enroute (descent) defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (descent)
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Flight crew
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel pumps › Inoperative
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › Electrical pwr sys wiring › Inoperative
- factor Organizational issues › Development › Design › Equipment design › Manufacturer
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,789 hours in all; 725 in this make and model; 111 in the last 90 days; 36 in the last 30 days; 5,331 as pilot in command; 2,012 on instruments
- Last flight review: February 17, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,500 hours in all; 690 in this make and model; 25 in the last 90 days; 9 in the last 30 days; 2,160 as pilot in command; 1,050 on instruments
- Last flight review: March 23, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 8,252 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, December 10, 2008; 163 hours since
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: P&W PT6A-35 (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: P&W PT6A SER (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Operator: Executive Airlink INC
The flight
- Departed from: 07FA Key Largo FL at 3:04 pm
- Destination: ORL Orlando FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 110° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 3,600 ft
- Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
- Altimeter: 29.94 inHg
- Observation at 3:53 pm from VRB, 31 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.