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Accidents · NTSB ENG25LA053 · Preliminary: the investigation is not finished

Boeing 767 incident near Honolulu, Hawaii, April 26, 2025

On April 26, 2025 at about 4:14 am local time, a 1994 Boeing 767, registered N347AZ, was involved in an incident during enroute (descent) near Honolulu, Hawaii. It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The NTSB has not yet published a probable cause for this incident. Investigations usually take one to two years; this page updates when the final report is released.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 26, 2025 · about 4:14 am local time
Place
Honolulu, Hawaii · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Boeing 767 319, built 1994 · all 767s on the register
Registration
N347AZ · registry record · serial 26264
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On April 25, 2025, about 1814 Hawaii standard time, an Amazon Prime Air Boeing 767-319 operated by Air Transport International departed from Ontario International Airport (ONT), Ontario, California and intended to land at Lihue Airport (LIH), Lihue, Hawaii but diverted to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, Hawaii due to an inoperative horizontal stabilizer and the need for a longer runway. The airplane landed at HNL without issue. There were two flight crew members on board, and the flight was conducted as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 cargo flight. History of Flight On descent into LIH, the autopilot repeatedly disconnected. The crew ran the autopilot disconnect checklist, which did not resolve the issue. The crew started hand-flying the airplane at about 10,000 feet and reported that “noticeable down pressure on [the] yoke [was required] to keep [the] airplane descending.” The crew noticed the horizontal stabilizer was inoperative at 3.4 units on the stabilizer position indicator. They tried to use the alternate electric trim switches, but the stabilizer remained stuck. The crew leveled off the airplane at 3,000 feet. They selected flaps 5 to reduce the control column force required to maintain the desired pitch. Next, they performed the stabilizer trim checklist per the quick reference handbook (QRH), but the issue persisted. The crew also performed the unscheduled stabilizer trim checklist, with no improvement. The crew reported that they did not receive a “STAB TRIM” engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS) message or the associated cockpit warning light at any point during the flight. The crew declared an emergency and diverted to HNL, where they landed safely with flaps 25 selected. Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Control System Description The horizontal stabilizer is a moveable airfoil at the back of the airplane which trims the airplane longitudinally. Its overall function is to alter its angle of attack during flight, as necessary, to keep the airplane in a condition of maneuvering and speed stability. The stabilizer control system on the incident airplane is controlled by electrical inputs. These inputs are received by two Stabilizer Trim Control Modules (STCMs). The STCMs direct left and center hydraulic system pressure to the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator (HSTA). The HSTA is located forward and above the stabilizer center section and is attached to bulkhead structure at the top and to stabilizer structure at the bottom (figure 1). The HSTA includes two drive hydraulic motors and two hydraulically released secondary brakes. These work together to rotate the ballscrew, thereby moving the horizontal stabilizer about its center section pivot points and changing its angle of attack. Figure 1. HSTA location and components labeled (Source: Boeing, modified. Image copyright © Boeing. Reproduced with permission). Investigation The NTSB was notified of this incident on April 29, 2025, and it was originally graded as a class 5 investigation. After initial investigation, it was upgraded to a class 3 investigation on September 8, 2025. The airplane had undergone scheduled maintenance about one month before the incident flight during which an overhauled HSTA was installed. At the time of the incident flight, the overhauled HSTA had been installed on the aircraft for 11 cycles and 31 flight hours. The HSTA was removed after landing and sent to the component manufacturer for examination under the direction of the NTSB. The flight data from the incident is being reviewed, and the investigation is ongoing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Flight control sys malf/fail during enroute (descent) defining event

The aircraft

  • Maximum gross weight: 412,000 lb
  • Seats: 300
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Operator: Air Transport International

The flight

  • Departed from: ONT Ontario CA
  • Destination: LIH Lahui HI
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 150° at 10 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 3,000 ft
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.01 inHg
  • Observation at 5:53 pm from PHNL, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR PHNL 260353Z 15010KT 10SM FEW030 FEW045 SCT150 SCT250 27/19 A3001 RMK AO2 SLP160 T02720194 PNO VISNO RWY04R $=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.