Airbus A220 incident near Perrigny-Sur-Armançon, Fr, July 25, 2019
On July 25, 2019 at about 11:05 am local time, a 2018 Airbus A220, registered HBJCM, suffered minor damage in an incident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Perrigny-Sur-Armançon (Charles De Gaulle airport). It was flown under non-U.S. commercial rules. No one was hurt; 121 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A No. 1 (left) engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) separation due to a high cycle fatigue crack (HCF) that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. The HCF crack developed as a result of a mechanically coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR mode excitation and blade flutter response. The excitation was driven by an acoustic tone generated by turbulent airflow passing over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity while the engine was operating at high speeds in specific flight conditions. A primary contributor to the failure mode was an electronic engine control (EEC) software update that changed the LPC vane schedule and increased the likelihood of LPC stage 1 IBR blade flutter onset within the engine operating range.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 25, 2019 · about 11:05 am local time
- Place
- Perrigny-Sur-Armançon, France · Charles De Gaulle · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 121 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus A220 300, built 2018
- Registration
- HBJCM · no longer on the register · serial 55030
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · non-U.S. commercial rules
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The No. 1 (left) engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) separation was caused by a high cycle fatigue (HCF) crack that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. Acoustic tests, instrumented flight tests, and multiple analytical methods were completed and identified a mechanically coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR mode excitation driven by an acoustic coincidence with the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity. At high engine speeds in specific flight conditions, unsteady or turbulent airflow generated by the LPC IBR blade tips created an acoustic tone as it passed over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity, located immediately aft of the LPC (Figure 1). The acoustic tone excited a LPC stage 3 IBR blade 1st bending mode that was mechanically transferred through the LPC module to the LPC stage 1 IBR where a stiffwise bending mode was excited. The resultant stresses on the LPC stage 1 IBR blades exceeded material limits and subsequently led to crack formation and eventual progression to overload failure. Figure 1- Engine LPC Diagram Identifying the stage 3 IBR / 2.5 Bleed Valve Acoustic Interaction Factors that contributed to the LPC acoustic coincidence within the engine operating range were installation of electronic engine control (EEC) Software V2.11.7.2 and low engine operating hours. EEC Software V2.11.7.2 modified the LPC inlet guide vane (IGV) schedule to improve engine surge/stall margin in high power flight phases such as top of climb, by rotating the vanes in the closed direction. The revised vane schedule inadvertently created conditions that were favorable for LPC IBR 3 and IBR 1 flutter onset. New engines have tighter clearances between the LPC IBR blade tips and the outer air seals. The tighter clearances created unsteady loading at the blade tip region and resulted in stronger acoustic coupling and flutter response. Flight test data confirmed that acoustic coincidence and flutter response within the engine operating range was significantly reduced following an engine rub in period. The Powerplant Group Chairman’s Factual Report available in the investigation docket includes additional information on the LPC acoustic coincidence and the testing and analytical methods used to identify the failure mode.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Engine shutdown during enroute (climb to cruise)
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Compressor section › Failure
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Compressor section › Design
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,954 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, July 24, 2019
- Maximum gross weight: 143,301 lb
- Seats: 152
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney PW1524G-3 (gtfn); 212 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney PW1524G-3 (gtfn); 2,229 hours total
- Operator: Swiss International Air Lines
The flight
- Departed from: GVA Geneva OF at 1:50 pm
- Destination: LHR London OF
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 180° at 9 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds
- Temperature: -42°F (-41°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
- Altimeter: 29.91 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 5 | |||
| Passengers | 116 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
4 documents, released by the NTSB on February 8, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report | PDF, 37 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Metallurgical Investigation of Swiss PW1524G-3 Engine No. 736195 | PDF, 21 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Flight Data Recorder - Specialists' Factual Report | PDF, 26 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 1 (FDR Tabular Data for Event Flight) | data file | Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.