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Accidents · NTSB DFW05FA188 · Final report

Cessna 310Q accident near Ada, Oklahoma, July 24, 2005

On July 24, 2005 at about 10:52 pm local time, a Cessna 310Q, registered N1971W, was destroyed in an accident near Ada, Oklahoma (Ada Municipal Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The loss of engine power as a result of a fatigue fracture in one of the crankshaft gear teeth for undetermined reasons. Also causal was the pilot's failure to maintain control of the twin-engine airplane after the power loss, which resulted in an inadvertent stall and subsequent collision with terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 24, 2005 · about 10:52 pm local time
Place
Ada, Oklahoma · Ada Municipal Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
3 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 310Q · all 310Qs on the register
Registration
N1971W · no longer on the register · serial 310Q0278
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The 1,500-hour airline transport rated pilot had just departed a 6,305-foot-long runway when, based on a viewing of security camera footage, a puff of white smoke exiting the back of the right engine shortly after the airplane became airborne. The airplane then began a right turn and flew on a westerly heading at a low altitude before it disappeared behind a tree line. A witness saw the airplane as it was in a right turn toward the north. He thought the airplane was going to land on a closed highway, but the nose of the airplane dropped and the airplane cartwheeled on the grass median west of the road. Examination of the right engine revealed that the crankshaft gear had failed due to a fatigue fracture in one of the teeth. The fatigue emanated from the pressure face of the tooth and intersected another crack emanating from the non-pressure face of the tooth, thereby producing separation of the tooth from the rim. Near the origin, post-fracture damage prevented the ability to determine if the crack initiated in fatigue or if a crack propagated in overstress through the case and then continued propagating through the core in fatigue. Upon completion of the materials examination it was evident that the microstructure of the gear was inadequate and more research into the manufacturing process was required. A review of manufacturing records indicated that approximately 2,400 crankshaft gears were made from the same batch of material as the accident gears, and were heat-treated in two groups. A review of the heat treatment records confirmed that furnace temperatures during the hardening step in each heat-treating process were not high enough to fully austenitize the material. Furthermore, the quantity and orientation of gears loaded in the furnace were greater when compared to other jobs completed for TCM. In addition, initial data from a test load similar to that used in the heat-treating process from the accident serial number gear, indicated that under these conditions, the gears might not have been fully equilibrated at temperature during the hardening step. As a result, TCM manufactured several other gears at different hardnesses and conducted failure testing to see if they could reproduce a similar failure. Even though some of the hardness levels were well below TCM standards, they were unable to produce a similar failure. In addition, there was evidence to suggest that the gear teeth may have been exposed to an excessive load at some point during its operation. The cause of the gear tooth failure could not be determined.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 1,500 hours in all
  • Last flight review: June 1, 2005
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,944.7 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, November 1, 2004; 175.3 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 5,300 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Continental IO-470-VO (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Teledyne Continental IO-470-VO (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: ADH Ada OK at 10:51 pm
  • Destination: CUH Cushing OK
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 160° at 10 knots, gusting 18
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 6,000 ft
  • Temperature: 97°F (36°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 10:52 pm from ADH, 1 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.