Bell 407 and Bell 407 mid-air collision near Flagstaff, Arizona, June 29, 2008
On June 29, 2008 at about 10:47 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Bell 407 (N407GA) and Bell 407 (N407MJ), were involved in a mid-air collision near Flagstaff, Arizona (Flagstaff Medical Center East airport). 7 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Both helicopter pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other helicopter on approach to the helipad. Contributing to the accident were the failure of N407GA’s pilot to follow flight arrival route guidelines, and the failure of N407MJ’s pilot to follow communications guidelines requiring him to report his position within a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad.
Both helicopter pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other helicopter on approach to the helipad. Contributing to the accident were the failure of N407GA’s pilot to follow flight arrival route guidelines, and the failure of N407MJ’s pilot to follow communications guidelines requiring him to report his position within a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 29, 2008 · about 10:47 pm local time
- Place
- Flagstaff, Arizona · Flagstaff Medical Center East · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 7 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Bell 407 · all 407s on the register
- Registration
- N407GA · no longer on the register · serial 53104
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
- Aircraft 2
- Bell 407 · all 407s on the register
- Registration
- N407MJ · registry record · serial 53079
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative for the Bell 407 final · quoted from the NTSB record
Both Emergency Medical Services (EMS) helicopters were on approach to the Flagstaff Medical Center (FMC) helipad to drop off patients. During the flights, the N407MJ pilot had established two-way communications with his communications center and provided position reports, and the N407GA pilot had established two-way communications with FMC's communications center (which was his company's communication center and which also monitored and advised all traffic at the helipad) and provided position reports. The FMC communications center transportation coordinator advised the N407GA pilot that N407MJ would also be dropping off a patient at FMC. The coordinator also advised N407MJ's communication center that N407GA would be landing at FMC, but the N407MJ's communication center did not inform the N407MJ pilot nor was it required to do so. Established arrival and departure procedures for the FMC helipad required pilots to contact the FMC communications center at the earliest opportunity or at a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad. According to the FMC communications center's staff, N407MJ's pilot did not make the required contact with the communications center at any time during the flight. About 3 minutes before the collision, N407GA dropped off a medical crewmember at the local airport (about 5 miles south of the medical center) to reduce the weight on the aircraft and to improve aircraft performance during landing at the medical center. According to witness information, flight-track data, and a hospital surveillance video, N407GA approached the helipad from the south, flying past or slightly inside the southeast tip of the noise abatement area on a direct line toward a final approach position just east of the helipad. However, according to helipad arrival guidelines and company procedures, N407GA should have approached the helipad from farther to the east. (After the on-scene accident site investigation, the Air Methods regional chief pilot, accompanied by NTSB investigators, flew the accident route in another Air Methods Bell 407 using GPS data retrieved from N407GA. According to the regional chief pilot, the “trained route” was much farther to the east and not in a direct line to the hospital.) N407MJ approached the helipad from the northeast, and it is likely that the pilot would have been visually scanning the typical flight paths, as described in the noise abatement and helipad arrival guidelines, that other aircraft approaching the medical center would have used. Thus, if N407GA had approached from a more typical direction, the pilot of N407MJ may have been more likely to see and avoid it. At the time of the collision, both pilots were at a point in the approach where their visual attention typically would have been more focused on the helipad in preparation for landing, rather than on scanning the surrounding area for other traffic. The helicopters collided approximately 1/4 mile east of the helipad. There were no communications from either helicopter just prior to or after the collision. Neither helicopter was equipped with a traffic collision avoidance system, nor was such a system required. Had such a system been on board, it likely would have alerted the pilots to the traffic conflict so they could take evasive action before collision. No radar or air traffic control services were available for the helipad operations to ensure separation. However, if N407MJ's pilot had contacted the FMC communications center, as required, the FMC transportation coordinator likely would have told him directly that another aircraft was expected at the helipad. If the pilot had known to expect another aircraft in the area, he would have been more likely to look for the other aircraft. Nevertheless, the pilots were responsible for maintaining vigilance and to see and avoid other aircraft at all times. Under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Sections 91.111 and 91.113, all pilots are responsible for keeping a safe distance from other aircraft and for maintaining vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft. Advisory Circular 90-48C, "Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance," amplifies the see-and-avoid concept by stating that all pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within their field of vision and that they should scan the entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure that conflicting traffic would be detected. Examination of the wreckages revealed that N407MJ's tail rotor contacted the forward fuselage of N407GA, and N407GA's main rotor blades contacted and separated N407MJ's tail boom. The recovered wreckages showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Bell 407 final · quoted from the NTSB record
Both Emergency Medical Services (EMS) helicopters were on approach to the Flagstaff Medical Center (FMC) helipad to drop off patients. During the flights, the N407MJ pilot had established two-way communications with his communications center and provided position reports, and the N407GA pilot had established two-way communications with FMC's communications center (which was his company's communication center and which also monitored and advised all traffic at the helipad) and provided position reports. The FMC communications center transportation coordinator advised the N407GA pilot that N407MJ would also be dropping off a patient at FMC. The coordinator also advised N407MJ's communication center that N407GA would be landing at FMC, but the N407MJ's communication center did not inform the N407MJ pilot nor was it required to do so. Established arrival and departure procedures for the FMC helipad required pilots to contact the FMC communications center at the earliest opportunity or at a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad. According to the FMC communications center's staff, N407MJ's pilot did not make the required contact with the communications center at any time during the flight. About 3 minutes before the collision, N407GA dropped off a medical crewmember at the local airport (about 5 miles south of the medical center) to reduce the weight on the aircraft and to improve aircraft performance during landing at the medical center. According to witness information, flight-track data, and a hospital surveillance video, N407GA approached the helipad from the south, flying past or slightly inside the southeast tip of the noise abatement area on a direct line toward a final approach position just east of the helipad. However, according to helipad arrival guidelines and company procedures, N407GA should have approached the helipad from farther to the east. (After the on-scene accident site investigation, the Air Methods regional chief pilot, accompanied by NTSB investigators, flew the accident route in another Air Methods Bell 407 using GPS data retrieved from N407GA. According to the regional chief pilot, the “trained route” was much farther to the east and not in a direct line to the hospital.) N407MJ approached the helipad from the northeast, and it is likely that the pilot would have been visually scanning the typical flight paths, as described in the noise abatement and helipad arrival guidelines, that other aircraft approaching the medical center would have used. Thus, if N407GA had approached from a more typical direction, the pilot of N407MJ may have been more likely to see and avoid it. At the time of the collision, both pilots were at a point in the approach where their visual attention typically would have been more focused on the helipad in preparation for landing, rather than on scanning the surrounding area for other traffic. The helicopters collided approximately 1/4 mile east of the helipad. There were no communications from either helicopter just prior to or after the collision. Neither helicopter was equipped with a traffic collision avoidance system, nor was such a system required. Had such a system been on board, it likely would have alerted the pilots to the traffic conflict so they could take evasive action before collision. No radar or air traffic control services were available for the helipad operations to ensure separation. However, if N407MJ's pilot had contacted the FMC communications center, as required, the FMC transportation coordinator likely would have told him directly that another aircraft was expected at the helipad. If the pilot had known to expect another aircraft in the area, he would have been more likely to look for the other aircraft. Nevertheless, the pilots were responsible for maintaining vigilance and to see and avoid other aircraft at all times. Under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Sections 91.111 and 91.113, all pilots are responsible for keeping a safe distance from other aircraft and for maintaining vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft. Advisory Circular 90-48C, "Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance," amplifies the see-and-avoid concept by stating that all pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within their field of vision and that they should scan the entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure that conflicting traffic would be detected. Examination of the wreckages revealed that N407MJ's tail rotor contacted the forward fuselage of N407GA, and N407GA's main rotor blades contacted and separated N407MJ's tail boom. The recovered wreckages showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Bell 407 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during approach defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 5,245 hours in all; 1,313 in this make and model; 150 in the last 90 days; 51 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: December 15, 2007
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 9,372.6 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, June 20, 2008
- Maximum gross weight: 5,000 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rolls-Royce 250B-C47B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Air Methods Corp.
The flight
- Departed from: FLG Flagstaff AZ at 10:44 pm
- Destination: 3AZ0 Flagstaff AZ
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 240° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
- Altimeter: 30.32 inHg
- Observation at 10:56 pm from FLG, 5 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
The factual record for the Bell 407 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during approach defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 14,500 hours in all; 4,241 in this make and model
- Last flight review: May 31, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,503 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, June 19, 2008
- Maximum gross weight: 5,000 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rolls-Royce 250B-C47B (turboshaft); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: Tusayan AZ at 10:17 pm
- Destination: 3AZ0 Flagstaff AZ
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 3 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.