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Accidents · NTSB DCA25LA139 · Preliminary: the investigation is not finished

Boeing 717 incident near Atlanta, Georgia, February 24, 2025

On February 24, 2025 at about 1:48 pm local time, a 1999 Boeing 717, registered N942AT, suffered minor damage in an incident during takeoff near Atlanta, Georgia (Hartsfield/Jackson Atlanta Int). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 2 people had minor injuries; 97 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The NTSB has not yet published a probable cause for this incident. Investigations usually take one to two years; this page updates when the final report is released.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 24, 2025 · about 1:48 pm local time
Place
Atlanta, Georgia · Hartsfield/Jackson Atlanta Int · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries; 97 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Boeing 717 200, built 1999 · all 717s on the register
Registration
N942AT · registry record · serial 55005
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On February 24, 2025, at 0848 eastern standard time, Delta Air Lines flight 876, a Boeing 717-200, N942AT, experienced smoke in the cabin and cockpit during takeoff from Atlanta Hartsfield/Jackson International Airport (ATL), Atlanta Georgia. The airplane returned to the airport, landed safely, and the crew conducted an emergency evacuation. There were 99 passengers and crew on board, and two passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger flight from ATL to Columbia Metro Airport (CAE), Columbia, South Carolina. During the takeoff roll, flight attendants (FA) in both the forward and aft areas of the cabin saw smoke. The two FAs in the forward section first noticed it emanating from the area over the L1 door. The FA In the aft section first noticed it “coming out of all the vents”. Both the FA in the aft section and the lead FA in the forward section attempted to contact the pilots using the emergency call button but did not get a response. They also took turns using the interphone to try and announce to the pilots that there was smoke in the cabin. After takeoff, the lead FA also knocked on the cockpit door. The aft flight attendant made a public address announcement to the passengers, advised that they were aware of and trained for the situation and to remain calm. The lead FA recalled that the smoke was very thick, and that he was unable to see past the first row of seats. A non-revenue flight attendant who had been in a jumpseat, self-deployed to the exit row to prevent an unanticipated evacuation, or assist in evacuation if one ensued. The pilots reported that just as the airplane rotated for takeoff, they heard the flight attendant call chime and knocking on the flight deck door. Shortly thereafter smoke was visible rising from the floor near the rear of the cockpit. They donned their oxygen masks and initially delayed responding to the flight attendant calls, as the captain focused on flying the airplane while first officer declared an emergency with air traffic control. Shortly after takeoff, a master caution alert for smoke detected in the forward lavatory occurred. The first officer began the quick reference handbook (QRH) checklist for this alert and then attempted to communicate with the cabin crew using the handset phone. He recalled that he could hear the cabin crew, but when he spoke, they could not hear him. As the lead FA began to unlock the cockpit door, he was able to hear the first officer on the interphone advise that the pilots were aware and returning to the airport. The lead FA then relayed that information to the other cabin crew and passengers. Soon after, an alarm warning of low oil pressure for the right engine occurred in the cockpit. The crew performed the QRH procedure which ultimately led them to shut down the right engine. As the airplane was returning to the airport, the captain elected to change the approach from runway 27R to 27L “in order to get glidepath guidance since our visibility was restricted due to the smoke and the facemask”. The remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful. The crew stopped the airplane on the runway after landing and the airport rescue and fire fighting vehicles arrived soon after. The pilots opened the flight deck door, noticed a “tremendous” amount of smoke in the cabin, and the captain immediately ordered an evacuation. The aft FA coordinated the evacuation through the tailcone door with no anomalies. The lead FA managed door 1L, which he initially had some difficulty opening but succeeded on his 3rd attempt. The 3rd FA managed the evacuation through the 1R door with no anomalies. The non-revenue FA managed the overwing emergency exits evacuation. She remained on the wing with some passengers who were unable to jump from the wing to the ground. The airplane does not have evacuation slides for the overwing exits, the egress path is to slide down the trailing edge of the wing. The wing flaps were extended to 25° prior to the evacuation (in accordance with the checklist) to reduce the height from the wing to ground. She coordinated with the other three FAs and they determined at that time, because there were no remaining risks inside or outside the cabin, the passengers remaining on both wings could reenter the cabin and evacuate using the 3 usable deployed doors slides. The airplane was equipped with Rolls Royce model BR715-C1 engines. During a post incident examination, maintenance personnel found no oil visible in the sight glass of the right engine oil reservoir, indicating the quantity was at or near zero. Examination of the right engine’s components continues. Qualified parties were invited to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Delta Air Lines, and Boeing Commercial Airplanes. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, an Accredited Representative from the Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU) of Germany, the State of Manufacture for the engines, was appointed to support the investigation with Rolls Royce as a technical advisor. An NTSB flight data recorder specialist has been assigned. The investigation continues.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during takeoff defining event

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 65,634 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, February 22, 2025
  • Maximum gross weight: 122,000 lb
  • Seats: 100
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Operator: Delta Air Lines INC

The flight

  • Destination: CAE Columbia SC
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 09R/, 9,000 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 320° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 9,500 ft
  • Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.11 inHg
  • Observation at 8:52 am from KATL, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KATL 241352Z 32005KT 10SM FEW095 FEW120 08/M03 A3011 RMK AO2 SLP199 T00831028

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi3
Flight crew2
Passengers292

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.