Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19 accident near Chicago, Illinois, February 2, 2025
On February 2, 2025 at about 1:02 am local time, a 2002 Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19, registered N420AW, was substantially damaged in an accident during taxi (from runway) near Chicago, Illinois (Chicago O'Hare International A airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 13 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The tug driver’s failure to ensure the taxiway was clear of aircraft prior to crossing, resulting in a collision with the left wing of the taxiing aircraft. Contributing to the accident was the limited visibility of the aircraft due to ambient lighting conditions and the absence of the aircraft’s nose-gear light, which reduced the tug driver’s ability to detect the aircraft’s presence in time to avoid the collision.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 2, 2025 · about 1:02 am local time
- Place
- Chicago, Illinois · Chicago O'Hare International A · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 13 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19, built 2002
- Registration
- N420AW · registry record · serial 7640
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
A serious injury was sustained by a tug driver following a collision with the left wing of Air Wisconsin flight 6181, a CRJ-200, during taxi operations at Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD). No injuries were reported among the airplane’s crew or passengers. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident. Flight 6181 landed at ORD and was initially held at the B Pad for an open gate (see Figure 1). Once cleared, the aircraft proceeded southbound on Taxiway A under a standard clearance. The first officer was actively monitoring both ramp and ground control frequencies during the taxi. The captain reported first observing the tug on Taxiway B as the tug began crossing at the access road. The tug appeared to be slowing down suggesting an intent to stop. The captain could not recall whether the tug’s headlights were illuminated and believed he saw the vehicle using ambient lighting. After briefly diverting attention toward the gate area, the captain looked back and recognized an imminent collision with the tug. Braking was initiated immediately by the captain, but the impact occurred shortly thereafter. The captain described the impact as “not that bad” and believed the tug had struck the wingtip. The flight crew then communicated with the flight attendants, followed by dispatch via the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS). According to the tug driver, while returning from the international terminal, the vehicle approached the service road leading to the L gates. Before entering the road and crossing taxiway B, the tug came to a complete stop at the designated stop sign and the driver observed an airplane taxiing outbound on Taxiway B. The driver checked both directions and waited until the outbound aircraft cleared the taxiway. The driver also verified that no aircraft were approaching from behind or the opposite direction before proceeding to cross the taxiways (A&B). The driver stated that as the tug was crossing the taxiways, the left wing of flight 6181, approaching on taxiway A, was not visible until the last moment, leaving insufficient time to react. He also noted the absence of a nose-gear light on flight 6181, which may have contributed to the tug driver not detecting the presence of flight 6181 before the collision. Figure 1. Ground position tracks for flight 6181 with respect to taxiways A & B. The collision resulted in the tug overturning and trapping the driver, leading to serious injury. Post-flight inspection revealed substantial damage to the leading-edge front spar of the airplane’s left wing. The tug driver emphasized that had he been aware of the airplane’s presence, he would not have entered the intersection. Figure 2. Damage to the aircraft (Source FAA). Figure 3. Damage to the tug (Source FAA). According to the Chicago Department of Aviation (CDA) ground motor vehicle operating regulations manual, dated August 2023, a driver must stop prior to initiating the crossing of the taxiways A, B, and V to determine if the crossing could be accomplished without stopping in the islands between the taxiways. Vehicles on service roads must yield to vehicles crossing taxiways.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during taxi (from runway) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Ground crew
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Ground crew
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 17,000 hours in all; 14,500 in this make and model; 132 in the last 90 days; 37 in the last 30 days; 15,000 as pilot in command; 600 on instruments
- Last flight review: December 15, 2024
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,190 hours in all; 259 in this make and model; 57 in the last 90 days; 25 in the last 30 days; 745 as pilot in command; 486 on instruments
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 45,460 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 5, 2023
- Maximum gross weight: 53,000 lb
- Seats: 53
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Ge CF34 SERIES (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Ge CF34 SERIES (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Air Wisconsin Airlines LLC
The flight
- Departed from: AZO Kalamozoo MI at 11:29 pm
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 120° at 11 knots
- Visibility: 11.5 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 21,000 ft
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 1 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 10 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
3 documents, released by the NTSB on September 10, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 10 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Flight Crew Report | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 3 | Tug Driver Statement | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
