The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB DCA23LA133 · Final report

Boeing 777-222 and Cessna 208B incident near Honolulu, Hawaii, January 24, 2023

On January 24, 2023 at about 2:10 am local time, 2 aircraft, Boeing 777-222 (N774UA) and Cessna 208B (N145KA), were involved in the same incident near Honolulu, Hawaii (Daniel K. Inouye International airport). No one was hurt; 303 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The airport’s continued use of taxiway Kilo, despite an identified risk of pilots repeatedly failing to stop at a hold short line prior to two intersecting runways. Contributing were 1) the operator’s moving map display, which omitted a published restriction on the use of taxiway Kilo for widebody airplanes, 2) the Captain’s resulting inadvertent continuance through the hold-short line, and 3) the FAA’s delayed action to remediate the airport’s legacy design, which did not conform with current airport design standards. .
The airport’s continued use of taxiway Kilo, despite an identified risk of pilots repeatedly failing to stop at a hold short line prior to two intersecting runways. Contributing were 1) the operator’s moving map display, which omitted a published restriction on the use of taxiway Kilo for widebody airplanes, 2) the Captain’s resulting inadvertent continuance through the hold-short line, and 3) the FAA’s delayed action to remediate the airport’s legacy design, which did not conform with current airport design standards. .

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 24, 2023 · about 2:10 am local time · cases in 2023
Place
Honolulu, Hawaii · Daniel K. Inouye International · cases near this airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 303 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Boeing 777-222, built 1996 · all 777-222s on the register
Registration
N774UA · registry record · serial 26936
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
Aircraft 2
Cessna 208B, built 2008 · all 208Bs on the register
Registration
N145KA · registry record · serial 208B2019
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing 777-222 final · quoted from the NTSB record

This incident occurred when United Airlines (UAL) flight 384, a Boeing 777, landed on runway 4R at Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, Hawaii, and subsequently crossed runway 4L as a Kamaka Air (KMK145) Cessna 208B was landing on runway 4L, resulting in a runway incursion. KMK145 turned left onto taxiway E, which was before taxiway K and the closest distance between the two airplanes was 1,173 ft. According to postincident flight crewmember statements, the UAL first officer was the pilot flying and landed the airplane on runway 4R. Subsequently, there was a transfer of aircraft control to the captain, as they had briefed during the approach. In his statement, the captain indicated that after taking control of the airplane, he asked the first officer to notify the tower that they were turning onto “K”. However, before the first officer could notify the tower of their exit plan, the controller contacted UAL and asked the flight crew, “have you got [taxiway] Kilo?”. The first officer responded, “turn left on Kilo.” The controller then instructed the UAL flight crew to hold-short of runway 4L (which was parallel to runway 4R) on taxiway K, and the first officer acknowledged the hold-short instruction. However, by the time the captain realized the airplane had passed the hold-short line, they were already crossing runway 8L, which intersected runways 4R and 4L, see figure 1. Figure 1. Overhead view showing HNL airport. The blue line shows UAL384’s ground track and the orange line shows KMK145’s ground track. According to the captain’s postincident statement, he was “startled by how quickly” the airplane reached runways 4L and 8L after exiting runway 4R. The captain also thought there would not be “enough room” for the airplane to “be fully clear of” runway 4R and “still hold-short of” runway 4L. Similar to the captain, the first officer “found it confusing that there was no way to be clear of 4R without being on 8L/4L.” The hold-short line for runway 4L was located less than 200 ft from the edge of runway 4R at the widest point (the west side of the hold-short line to the runway 4R centerline), which would not have accommodated a Boeing 777 airplane clearing the active landing runway. According to the post incident interview with the local controller, controllers were aware that airplanes may still be on runway 4R when they must hold short of runways 4L and 8L on taxiway K and to account for this the controllers increase the spacing between approaching aircraft for runway 4R. The area in which runways 4L, 4R, and 8L and taxiway K converge was designated as a runway incursion hot spot because aircraft landing on runway 4R and exiting left onto taxiway K “sometimes fail to hold short” of runways 4L and 8L. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the hot spot area, which was considered to be a “legacy complex airfield layout,” did not conform with current airport design standards. The FAA stated that it intended to “continue to work with airport operators to bring non-standard geometry into compliance with future airport development opportunities, wherever possible.” Even though the captain stated he lost situational awareness after the airplane entered taxiway K, the nonconformance of the area in which runways 4L, 4R, and 8L and taxiway K converge contributed to his misjudgment of the distance to the hold-short line and his failure to stop the airplane. The captain also stated they were busy setting up for the new approach and he failed to open the hot spot (HS2) note and read that “aircraft landing on runway 4R and exiting left onto taxiway K sometimes fail to hold short of runway 4L/22R and runway 8L/26R”. He also indicated that the first officer mentioned this HS2 note during the approach briefing but it didn’t register with him. He stated that his expectation bias was that they would probably be too fast to exit at taxiway K and that they would most likely roll to the end and exit at taxiway C. Additionally, both flight crewmembers stated that, unlike the Jeppesen 10-9 chart, there was not a ball note in the airport moving map (AMM) stating, ”Wide body and four engine turbojets landing runway 4R roll to end of runway, no left turn at taxiway K without tower approval” located on the AMM version of the airport diagram and that the AMM was used for the briefing and flying/taxiing of the airplane. If the ball note had been in the AMM, it likely would have raised the crew’s awareness of their susceptibility to the risk and likely affected their decision to use taxiway “K”. The local controller had cleared KMK145 to land on runway 4L and therefore was aware he was required to hold UAL384 short of runway 4L on taxiway K. This inadvertently set the stage for the runway incursion. Had the local controller instead cleared UAL384 to continue their landing rollout to the end of runway 4R, the incursion likely would have been prevented. The investigation of this incident found that the local controller provided an incorrect instruction to the KMK pilot by stating that the airplane should turn “right” at taxiway E and cross “runway 4R.” The controller most likely made that transmission about the same time that he recognized that the UAL airplane had not stopped at the hold-short line, as instructed. The controller realized his mistake and immediately provided the correct instruction to the KMK pilot, which was to turn left on taxiway E and hold short of runway 8L, and the pilot acknowledged those instructions. The controller’s incorrect transmission was not a factor in this incident because the KMK and UAL airplanes were no longer in danger of a collision at that point.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 208B final · quoted from the NTSB record

This incident occurred when United Airlines (UAL) flight 384, a Boeing 777, landed on runway 4R at Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, Hawaii, and subsequently crossed runway 4L as a Kamaka Air (KMK145) Cessna 208B was landing on runway 4L, resulting in a runway incursion. KMK145 turned left onto taxiway E, which was before taxiway K and the closest distance between the two airplanes was 1,173 ft. According to postincident flight crewmember statements, the UAL first officer was the pilot flying and landed the airplane on runway 4R. Subsequently, there was a transfer of aircraft control to the captain, as they had briefed during the approach. In his statement, the captain indicated that after taking control of the airplane, he asked the first officer to notify the tower that they were turning onto “K”. However, before the first officer could notify the tower of their exit plan, the controller contacted UAL and asked the flight crew, “have you got [taxiway] Kilo?”. The first officer responded, “turn left on Kilo.” The controller then instructed the UAL flight crew to hold-short of runway 4L (which was parallel to runway 4R) on taxiway K, and the first officer acknowledged the hold-short instruction. However, by the time the captain realized the airplane had passed the hold-short line, they were already crossing runway 8L, which intersected runways 4R and 4L, see figure 1. Figure 1. Overhead view showing HNL airport. The blue line shows UAL384’s ground track and the orange line shows KMK145’s ground track. According to the captain’s postincident statement, he was “startled by how quickly” the airplane reached runways 4L and 8L after exiting runway 4R. The captain also thought there would not be “enough room” for the airplane to “be fully clear of” runway 4R and “still hold-short of” runway 4L. Similar to the captain, the first officer “found it confusing that there was no way to be clear of 4R without being on 8L/4L.” The hold-short line for runway 4L was located less than 200 ft from the edge of runway 4R at the widest point (the west side of the hold-short line to the runway 4R centerline), which would not have accommodated a Boeing 777 airplane clearing the active landing runway. According to the post incident interview with the local controller, controllers were aware that airplanes may still be on runway 4R when they must hold short of runways 4L and 8L on taxiway K and to account for this the controllers increase the spacing between approaching aircraft for runway 4R. The area in which runways 4L, 4R, and 8L and taxiway K converge was designated as a runway incursion hot spot because aircraft landing on runway 4R and exiting left onto taxiway K “sometimes fail to hold short” of runways 4L and 8L. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the hot spot area, which was considered to be a “legacy complex airfield layout,” did not conform with current airport design standards. The FAA stated that it intended to “continue to work with airport operators to bring non-standard geometry into compliance with future airport development opportunities, wherever possible.” Even though the captain stated he lost situational awareness after the airplane entered taxiway K, the nonconformance of the area in which runways 4L, 4R, and 8L and taxiway K converge contributed to his misjudgment of the distance to the hold-short line and his failure to stop the airplane. The captain also stated they were busy setting up for the new approach and he failed to open the hot spot (HS2) note and read that “aircraft landing on runway 4R and exiting left onto taxiway K sometimes fail to hold short of runway 4L/22R and runway 8L/26R”. He also indicated that the first officer mentioned this HS2 note during the approach briefing but it didn’t register with him. He stated that his expectation bias was that they would probably be too fast to exit at taxiway K and that they would most likely roll to the end and exit at taxiway C. Additionally, both flight crewmembers stated that, unlike the Jeppesen 10-9 chart, there was not a ball note in the airport moving map (AMM) stating, ”Wide body and four engine turbojets landing runway 4R roll to end of runway, no left turn at taxiway K without tower approval” located on the AMM version of the airport diagram and that the AMM was used for the briefing and flying/taxiing of the airplane. If the ball note had been in the AMM, it likely would have raised the crew’s awareness of their susceptibility to the risk and likely affected their decision to use taxiway “K”. The local controller had cleared KMK145 to land on runway 4L and therefore was aware he was required to hold UAL384 short of runway 4L on taxiway K. This inadvertently set the stage for the runway incursion. Had the local controller instead cleared UAL384 to continue their landing rollout to the end of runway 4R, the incursion likely would have been prevented. The investigation of this incident found that the local controller provided an incorrect instruction to the KMK pilot by stating that the airplane should turn “right” at taxiway E and cross “runway 4R.” The controller most likely made that transmission about the same time that he recognized that the UAL airplane had not stopped at the hold-short line, as instructed. The controller realized his mistake and immediately provided the correct instruction to the KMK pilot, which was to turn left on taxiway E and hold short of runway 8L, and the pilot acknowledged those instructions. The controller’s incorrect transmission was not a factor in this incident because the KMK and UAL airplanes were no longer in danger of a collision at that point.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Boeing 777-222 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway incursion veh/AC/person during taxi (from runway) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
  • Organizational issues › Development › Design › (general) › Airport
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › (general) › (general) › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, flight engineer
  • Ratings: single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 12,000 hours in all; 1,020 in this make and model; 9,700 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: February 24, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 7,128 hours in all; 907 in this make and model; 195 in the last 90 days; 85 in the last 30 days; 3,000 as pilot in command; 2,500 on instruments
  • Last flight review: November 21, 2021
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 99,096 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, December 4, 2021
  • Maximum gross weight: 547,000 lb
  • Seats: 381
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney PW4077 (turbofan); 65,028 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney PW4077 (turbofan); 66,038 hours total
  • Operator: United Airlines INC

The flight

  • Departed from: DEN Denver CO at 7:20 pm
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 04R, 9,002 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 210° at 10 knots
  • Visibility: 11.5 statute miles
  • Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 68°F (20°C)
  • Altimeter: 2997.00 inHg
  • Observation at 4:09 am from PHNL

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi8
Flight crew2
Passengers291

The factual record for the Cessna 208B from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway incursion veh/AC/person during landing defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › (general) › Pilot of other aircraft

The aircraft

  • Seats: 12
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: P&W Canada PT6A-114A (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Kamaka Air LLC

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

22 documents, released by the NTSB on February 26, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 15 pages View Download
2 Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 1 (Csv Data for Incident Flight) zip file Download
3 Operational Factors - Specialist Report PDF, 22 pages View Download
4 Operational Factors - Attachment 1 - United 384 Crew Statements PDF, 11 pages View Download
5 Operational Factors - Attachment 2 - Kamka Air Flight 145 Pilot Interview Summary PDF, 2 pages View Download
6 Operational Factors - Attachment 3 - Jeppesen Airport Chart Symbols [excerpts] PDF, 6 pages View Download
7 Operational Factors - Attachment 4 - FAA Advisory Circular 150-5300-13A (Cancelled) PDF, 323 pages View Download
8 Operational Factors - Attachment 5 - FAA Response to Request 23-189 PDF, 3 pages View Download
9 Air Traffic Control Factual Report PDF, 24 pages View Download
10 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 1 Interview Transcripts PDF, 213 pages View Download
11 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 2 Local Control 1 (LC1) Audio audio View Download
12 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 3 Ground Control (Gc) Audio audio View Download
13 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 4 Cab Coordinator (Cs) Audio audio View Download
14 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 5 Operations Manager in Charge (Omic) Audio audio View Download
15 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 6 radar Controller (V) Audio audio View Download
16 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 7 radar Controller (H) Audio audio View Download
17 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 8 Atis Recording audio View Download
18 Air Traffic Control Attachment 9 ADS-B Data zip file Download
19 Air Traffic Control - Attachment 10 - Administrative and Training Documents PDF, 89 pages View Download
20 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 25 pages View Download
21 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages View Download
22 Cockpit Voice Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 5 pages View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
  • N774UA on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
  • Boeing 777 359 registered today · the model family and its accident history
  • Boeing 6,678 aircraft on the register
  • N145KA on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
  • Cessna 208 Caravan 1,020 registered today · the model family and its accident history
  • Cessna 72,677 aircraft on the register
  • Engine: Pratt & Whitney PW4077 · as the NTSB recorded it
  • Engine: Pratt & Whitney PW4077 · as the NTSB recorded it
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/DCA23LA133.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.