DJI Phantom and Sikorsky UH60 mid-air collision near Hoffman Island, New York, September 21, 2017
On September 21, 2017 at about 11:20 pm local time, 2 aircraft, DJI Phantom (UNREG) and Sikorsky UH60 (R20087), were involved in a mid-air collision near Hoffman Island, New York. No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the failure of the sUAS pilot to see and avoid the helicopter due to his intentional flight beyond visual line of sight. Contributing to the incident was the sUAS pilot's incomplete knowledge of the regulations and safe operating practices.
the failure of the sUAS pilot to see and avoid the helicopter due to his intentional flight beyond visual line of sight. Contributing to the incident was the sUAS pilot's incomplete knowledge of the regulations and safe operating practices.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 21, 2017 · about 11:20 pm local time
- Place
- Hoffman Island, New York · map
- Type
- Incident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- DJI Phantom 4, built 2016
- Registration
- UNREG · no longer on the register · serial 07DDD640B11457
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight · small-drone rules (Part 107)
- Aircraft 2
- Sikorsky UH60 · all UH60s on the register
- Registration
- R20087 · no longer on the register · serial Unknown
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · military rules
The NTSB's narrative for the DJI Phantom final · quoted from the NTSB record
The United States Army UH-60M helicopter was operating under visual flight rules within Class G airspace about 300 ft above mean sea level (msl) when it collided with a privately owned and operated DJI Phantom 4 small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS). The helicopter sustained minor damage and landed uneventfully; the sUAS was destroyed. Although the pilot flying the helicopter saw the sUAS before impact and immediately applied flight control inputs, there was insufficient time to avoid the collision. The sUAS pilot was operating the aircraft recreationally and did not hold a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Remote Pilot certificate. Hobby and recreational pilots are expected to operate their aircraft in accordance with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 101, which includes maintaining visual contact with the aircraft at all times and not interfering with any manned aircraft. There are no training or certification requirements for model aircraft pilots. During the incident flight, the pilot of the sUAS intentionally flew the aircraft 2.5 miles away, well beyond visual line of sight and was just referencing the map on his tablet; therefore, he was not aware that the helicopter was in close proximity to the sUAS. Although the pilot stated that he knew that the sUAS should be operated at an altitude below 400 ft, flight logs revealed that he had conducted a flight earlier on the evening of the incident, in which he exceeded 547 ft altitude at a distance of 1.8 miles, which was unlikely to be within visual line of sight. In addition, even though the sUAS pilot indicated that he knew there were frequently helicopters in the area, he still elected to fly his sUAS beyond visual line of sight, demonstrating his lack of understanding of the potential hazard of collision with other aircraft. In his interview, the sUAS pilot indicated that he was not concerned with flying beyond visual line of sight, and he expressed only a general cursory awareness of regulations and good operating practices. A Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) was in effect for the area of the flight; the helicopter was authorized for flight within this area. The helicopter was operating over water and not in the vicinity of any vessels; therefore, its operating altitude was in accordance with FAA regulations and Army guidance. The sUAS pilot was unaware of the active TFRs in the area that specifically prohibited both model aircraft and UAS flight. Further, the sUAS pilot relied only on the DJI GO4 app for airspace awareness. Although the TFR airspace awareness functionality in the DJI app (GEO) was not active at the time of the incident, this feature is intended for advisory use only, and sUAS pilots are responsible at all times to comply with FAA airspace restrictions. Sole reliance on advisory functions of a non-certified app is not sufficient to ensure that correct airspace information is obtained. Had the functionality been active, the sUAS pilot would still have needed to connect his tablet to the internet before the flight in order to receive the TFR information. Since the sUAS pilot's tablet did not have cellular connection capability, it is unlikely that he would have been able to obtain TFR information at the time of the flight. Because the pilot solely relied on the app to provide airspace restriction information; he was unaware of other, more reliable methods to maintain awareness. The collision occurred 2 minutes before the end of civil twilight. Although modeler (recreational) sUAS pilots may fly at night under certain conditions, when asked about night flight, the incident pilot only stated that he had built-in position lights; thus he was likely unaware of any guidelines or practices for night operations. There was no evidence of any mechanical or software problems with the sUAS relevant to the flight. The pilot did not report any anomalies, and stated the recorded information on the flight logs accurately reflected the incident flight. The sUAS operated as expected at all times. Although the recorded data showed a 9-second gap in telemetry, this was likely due to distance from the remote controller.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Sikorsky UH60 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The United States Army UH-60M helicopter was operating under visual flight rules within Class G airspace about 300 ft above mean sea level (msl) when it collided with a privately owned and operated DJI Phantom 4 small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS). The helicopter sustained minor damage and landed uneventfully; the sUAS was destroyed. Although the pilot flying the helicopter saw the sUAS before impact and immediately applied flight control inputs, there was insufficient time to avoid the collision. The sUAS pilot was operating the aircraft recreationally and did not hold a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Remote Pilot certificate. Hobby and recreational pilots are expected to operate their aircraft in accordance with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 101, which includes maintaining visual contact with the aircraft at all times and not interfering with any manned aircraft. There are no training or certification requirements for model aircraft pilots. During the incident flight, the pilot of the sUAS intentionally flew the aircraft 2.5 miles away, well beyond visual line of sight and was just referencing the map on his tablet; therefore, he was not aware that the helicopter was in close proximity to the sUAS. Although the pilot stated that he knew that the sUAS should be operated at an altitude below 400 ft, flight logs revealed that he had conducted a flight earlier on the evening of the incident, in which he exceeded 547 ft altitude at a distance of 1.8 miles, which was unlikely to be within visual line of sight. In addition, even though the sUAS pilot indicated that he knew there were frequently helicopters in the area, he still elected to fly his sUAS beyond visual line of sight, demonstrating his lack of understanding of the potential hazard of collision with other aircraft. In his interview, the sUAS pilot indicated that he was not concerned with flying beyond visual line of sight, and he expressed only a general cursory awareness of regulations and good operating practices. A Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) was in effect for the area of the flight; the helicopter was authorized for flight within this area. The helicopter was operating over water and not in the vicinity of any vessels; therefore, its operating altitude was in accordance with FAA regulations and Army guidance. The sUAS pilot was unaware of the active TFRs in the area that specifically prohibited both model aircraft and UAS flight. Further, the sUAS pilot relied only on the DJI GO4 app for airspace awareness. Although the TFR airspace awareness functionality in the DJI app (GEO) was not active at the time of the incident, this feature is intended for advisory use only, and sUAS pilots are responsible at all times to comply with FAA airspace restrictions. Sole reliance on advisory functions of a non-certified app is not sufficient to ensure that correct airspace information is obtained. Had the functionality been active, the sUAS pilot would still have needed to connect his tablet to the internet before the flight in order to receive the TFR information. Since the sUAS pilot's tablet did not have cellular connection capability, it is unlikely that he would have been able to obtain TFR information at the time of the flight. Because the pilot solely relied on the app to provide airspace restriction information; he was unaware of other, more reliable methods to maintain awareness. The collision occurred 2 minutes before the end of civil twilight. Although modeler (recreational) sUAS pilots may fly at night under certain conditions, when asked about night flight, the incident pilot only stated that he had built-in position lights; thus he was likely unaware of any guidelines or practices for night operations. There was no evidence of any mechanical or software problems with the sUAS relevant to the flight. The pilot did not report any anomalies, and stated the recorded information on the flight logs accurately reflected the incident flight. The sUAS operated as expected at all times. Although the recorded data showed a 9-second gap in telemetry, this was likely due to distance from the remote controller.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the DJI Phantom from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of regulatory reqs › Pilot
Pilot
- Flight time: 100 hours in all; 38 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: None
- Seat: none
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Maximum gross weight: 4 lb
- Seats: 0
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: DJI (electric); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: DJI (electric); 0 hours total
- Engine 3: DJI (electric); 0 hours total
- Engine 4: DJI (electric); 0 hours total
- Not recorded
The flight
- Departed from: Brooklyn NY at 11:11 pm
- Destination: Brooklyn NY
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: dusk
- Wind: from 040° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 12°F (-11°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 11:15 pm from KLDJ, 10 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
The factual record for the Sikorsky UH60 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot of other aircraft
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Aircraft › Effect on equipment
The aircraft
- Landing gear: fixed
The flight
- Departed from: KLDJ Linden NJ at 10:45 pm
- Destination: KLDJ Linden NJ
- Flight plan: VFR
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 4 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under UNREG the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
