Bombardier DHC8 accident near Newark, New Jersey, May 18, 2013
On May 18, 2013 at about 5:04 am local time, a Bombardier DHC8, registered N934HA, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Newark, New Jersey (Newark Liberty International airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 34 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the frozen left main landing gear (MLG) uplock roller due to lack of lubrication and the uplock latch that had worn beyond acceptable tolerances, which prevented the flight crew from extending the left MLG using the alternate extension system. Contributing to the accident were the operator's improper maintenance practices, which did not detect the lubrication issue with the roller and the wear of the latch.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 18, 2013 · about 5:04 am local time
- Place
- Newark, New Jersey · Newark Liberty International · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 34 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bombardier DHC8 102 · all DHC8s on the register
- Registration
- N934HA · no longer on the register · serial 139
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
While on an instrument approach to the airport, when the flight crew attempted to lower the landing gear, they received an unsafe indication on the left main landing gear (MLG). They conducted a fly by of the airport control tower, and the controller verified that the left MLG was only partially extended. The flight crew performed the alternate landing gear extension procedure and worked with company maintenance to troubleshoot the failure, however, the left MLG would not extend after multiple attempts. Although the first officer indicated that he became confused after the sixth step of the alternate landing gear extension procedure, post accident testing determined that this did not have any effect on the outcome Because the left MLG would not extend, the captain elected to conduct the landing with all gear retracted to minimize the likelihood of a loss of directional control after touchdown. All passengers and crew successfully evacuated after the airplane came to a rest on the runway. Postaccident testing confirmed that the left MLG would not deploy using the normal or alternate gear extension systems. Examination of the landing gear components found that the left MLG uplock roller was seized and the groove on the left uplock latch was out of tolerance. The seized uplock roller and worn latch caused the forces to exceed the crews capability to release the landing gear by use of the alternate gear extension system. Examination of the operators maintenance records indicated that the uplock rollers were to be inspected every 220 flight hours and that they were to be lubricated only on condition. The accident airplanes left MLG uplock was inspected 11 times in year prior to the accident. In all instances, the inspection paperwork indicated that the roller rotated freely and did not require lubrication for the last. Further, the uplock latches were to be visually inspected every 440 flight hours. The latches were not required to be measured and were replaced only on condition. The last measurement of the left MLG latch on the accident airplane occurred 10 years prior to the accident. After the accident, the operator modified the maintenance procedures to include regular lubrication of the rollers and to measure the wear of the uplock latch.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during approach
- Abnormal runway contact during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear › Malfunction
- factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Operator
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 26,000 hours in all; 20,000 in this make and model; 158 in the last 90 days; 39 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: April 30, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,000 hours in all; 1,684 in this make and model; 203 in the last 90 days; 73 in the last 30 days; 240 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: February 18, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 61,671 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 11, 2013
- Maximum gross weight: 34,500 lb
- Seats: 41
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney PW120A (turboprop); 61,486 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney PW120A (turboprop); 57,585 hours total
- Operator: Piedmont Airlines
The flight
- Departed from: PHL Philadelphia PA at 10:52 pm
- Destination: EWR Newark NJ
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 04L, 11,000 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 320° at 13 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Observation at 4:51 pm from EWR
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 1 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 31 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.