The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB DCA12IA113 · Final report

Boeing 737-3H4 incident near El Paso, Texas, July 27, 2012

On July 27, 2012 at about 8:14 pm local time, a Boeing 737-3H4, registered N379SW, suffered minor damage in an incident during approach near El Paso, Texas (El Paso International Airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 76 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

the rupture of the nose landing gear hydraulic line that resulted from abrasions due to contact with the nose landing gear tire. Contributing to the incident was the incorrect installation of union and restrictor on the actuator.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 27, 2012 · about 8:14 pm local time
Place
El Paso, Texas · El Paso International Airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 76 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Boeing 737-3H4 · all 737-3H4s on the register
Registration
N379SW · no longer on the register · serial 26586
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The aircraft experienced a structural failure of the nose landing gear (NLG) actuator retract beam when the landing gear was selected down during approach. The flight crew heard a loud noise during gear actuation, performed a go-around, and then returned to land uneventfully. Examination of the aircraft revealed a fracture across the horizontal leg of the actuator retract beam that propagated into the radius of the vertical leg. The fracture surface features were consistent with overstress failure with no sign of fatigue. The NLG hydraulic line to the actuator was found ruptured with abrasion damage aligned coincident with the NLG tire. Disassembly of the actuator revealed the restrictor fitting was installed in the head end of the actuator and the union fitting was installed on the rod end cap although engineering documentation requires the restrictor fitting to be installed in the rod end cap and the union fitting to be installed in the head end. The union and restrictor are normally placed in the actuator prior to installing the actuator on the airplane. Hydraulic fluid leaking from the actuator through the ruptured line allowed air to fill the actuator cavity on the head end of the actuator while hydraulic system pressure remained on the rod end. When the landing gear was selected down, air in the actuator allowed the actuator piston to move rapidly toward the head end. Due to the union rather than the restrictor being installed on the piston end, higher than normal hydraulic flow was permitted in the rod end of the actuator increasing the rate of piston movement. When the piston reached the end of range of motion, the resulting force was transferred to the NLG retract actuator beam.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft structural failure during approach defining event
  2. Miscellaneous/other during approach

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › Scheduled maint checks › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Hoses and tubes › Incorrect use/operation
  • factor Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Hoses and tubes › Incorrect use/operation

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: airship
  • Flight time: 15,110 hours in all; 9,960 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: September 9, 2011
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 9,500 hours in all
  • Last flight review: June 23, 2012
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 59,940 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, November 5, 2011
  • Maximum gross weight: 138,500 lb
  • Seats: 145
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Cfm Intl. CFM56 SERIES (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Cfm Intl. CFM56 SERIES (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Southwest Airlines CO

The flight

  • Departed from: KLAS Las Vegas NV at 6:41 pm
  • Destination: KELP El Paso TX
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 08R, 9,028 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 110° at 16 knots, gusting 23
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 15,000 ft; a few clouds at 5,500 ft
  • Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.09 inHg
  • Observation at 7:51 pm from KELP, 13 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi3
Flight crew2
Passengers71

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.