Airbus A380 and Bombardier CRJ accident near Jamaica, New York, April 12, 2011
On April 12, 2011, 2 aircraft, Airbus A380 (FHPJD) and Bombardier CRJ (N641CA), were involved in the same accident near Jamaica, New York (John F Kennedy Iap airport). No one was hurt; 576 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the A380 flight crew's inability to identify that the wingtip path of their airplane would not maintain safe clearance from the CRJ701. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the CRJ701 flight crew to advise ATC that they were stopped with a portion of their airplane still extending onto the taxiway.
the A380 flight crew's inability to identify that the wingtip path of their airplane would not maintain safe clearance from the CRJ701. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the CRJ701 flight crew to advise ATC that they were stopped with a portion of their airplane still extending onto the taxiway.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- April 12, 2011
- Place
- Jamaica, New York · John F Kennedy Iap · map
- Type
- Accident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 576 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Airbus A380
- Registration
- FHPJD · no longer on the register · serial 49
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · foreign airline rules (Part 129)
- Aircraft 2
- Bombardier CRJ 701
- Registration
- N641CA · registry record · serial 10122
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus A380 final · quoted from the NTSB record
Information provided by Airbus indicates that the view from the A380 cockpit looking sideways to the left was limited to about 121 degrees that did not allow the pilot to see the wingtip. Interviews with the Air France accident pilots indicated that they did not receive any guidance or training on wingtip clearance in the airplane. The pilots indicated that, during simulator training, forward visual lines were projected, cuing where the wingtips would pass but there was nothing in the airplane to provide an indication of wingtip clearance. The pilots did receive information about the A380 wingspan, restrictions on certain taxiways, and were advised to use caution during taxi. When the Comair crew contacted the ground controller, they were given a clearance to their ramp. Upon contacting their ramp controller, they were advised to hold at the Diamond 2 spot. This was due to ramp traffic that blocked access to their gate. When stopped at the Diamond 2 spot, the CRJ701's tail extended out of the ramp onto taxiway M. Neither the accident flight crew nor the Comair ramp controller advised ATC that a portion of the airplane was extended onto an active taxiway. The area where the CRJ701 was stopped was not visible from the JFK control tower. The AIM advises that a pilot "promptly complies with an air traffic clearance upon receipt except as necessary to cope with an emergency" and "advises ATC as soon as possible and obtains an amended clearance, if deviation is necessary". Therefore, the CRJ701 did not complete its clearance to the Comair ramp and should have advised ATC of this fact, which allowed a portion of the airplane to remain on an active taxiway. Although having a portion of the stopped airplane remain on an active taxiway was a factor in this accident, the primary responsibility to see and avoid contact between the two airplanes was with the A380. The CRJ captain stated that he saw the A380 approaching and moved his airplane forward to try to give the A380 more clearance. Examination of the A380 Flight Crew binocular vision chart and the relative positions of the airplanes show that as the Air France A380 airplane was making the turn onto taxiway A, a 10 degree cone of vision obstruction may have momentarily blocked the left seat pilot's vision of the CRJ. However, once the A380 was established on taxiway A, the view of the CRJ should have been within the binocular vision of both the Air France left seat and right seat pilots, however, the two A380 pilots stated that they did not notice the CRJ on M taxiway. The A380 captain in the right seat may have been momentarily distracted when he checked his taxi map for an intersection shortly before the collision occurred. The A380 pilot in the jumpseat said that he saw the CRJ but did not think there was a danger of collision with it.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Bombardier CRJ final · quoted from the NTSB record
Information provided by Airbus indicates that the view from the A380 cockpit looking sideways to the left was limited to about 121 degrees that did not allow the pilot to see the wingtip. Interviews with the Air France accident pilots indicated that they did not receive any guidance or training on wingtip clearance in the airplane. The pilots indicated that, during simulator training, forward visual lines were projected, cuing where the wingtips would pass but there was nothing in the airplane to provide an indication of wingtip clearance. The pilots did receive information about the A380 wingspan, restrictions on certain taxiways, and were advised to use caution during taxi. When the Comair crew contacted the ground controller, they were given a clearance to their ramp. Upon contacting their ramp controller, they were advised to hold at the Diamond 2 spot. This was due to ramp traffic that blocked access to their gate. When stopped at the Diamond 2 spot, the CRJ701's tail extended out of the ramp onto taxiway M. Neither the accident flight crew nor the Comair ramp controller advised ATC that a portion of the airplane was extended onto an active taxiway. The area where the CRJ701 was stopped was not visible from the JFK control tower. The AIM advises that a pilot "promptly complies with an air traffic clearance upon receipt except as necessary to cope with an emergency" and "advises ATC as soon as possible and obtains an amended clearance, if deviation is necessary". Therefore, the CRJ701 did not complete its clearance to the Comair ramp and should have advised ATC of this fact, which allowed a portion of the airplane to remain on an active taxiway. Although having a portion of the stopped airplane remain on an active taxiway was a factor in this accident, the primary responsibility to see and avoid contact between the two airplanes was with the A380. The CRJ captain stated that he saw the A380 approaching and moved his airplane forward to try to give the A380 more clearance. Examination of the A380 Flight Crew binocular vision chart and the relative positions of the airplanes show that as the Air France A380 airplane was making the turn onto taxiway A, a 10 degree cone of vision obstruction may have momentarily blocked the left seat pilot's vision of the CRJ. However, once the A380 was established on taxiway A, the view of the CRJ should have been within the binocular vision of both the Air France left seat and right seat pilots, however, the two A380 pilots stated that they did not notice the CRJ on M taxiway. The A380 captain in the right seat may have been momentarily distracted when he checked his taxi map for an intersection shortly before the collision occurred. The A380 pilot in the jumpseat said that he saw the CRJ but did not think there was a danger of collision with it.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Airbus A380 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during taxi (to runway) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Environmental issues › Task environment › Physical workspace › Visibility › Ability to respond/compensate
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Flight crew
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incomplete action › Pilot of other aircraft
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 14,695 hours in all; 24 in this make and model; 24 in the last 90 days; 8,765 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: left
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 13,389 hours in all; 450 in this make and model; 91 in the last 90 days; 6,600 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: rgt
The aircraft
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Engine Alliance GP7270 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Engine Alliance GP7270 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 3: Engine Alliance GP7270 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 4: Engine Alliance GP7270 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Air France
The flight
- Departed from: JFK Jamaica NY
- Destination: CDG Paris
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: at 3 knots
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; a few clouds at 10,000 ft
- Temperature: 54°F (12°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
- Altimeter: 29.56 inHg
- Observation at 11:51 pm from JFK, 1 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 23 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 485 |
The factual record for the Bombardier CRJ from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during taxi (from runway) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Environmental issues › Task environment › Physical workspace › Visibility › Ability to respond/compensate
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Pilot of other aircraft
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incomplete action › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 23,000 hours in all; 3,000 in this make and model
- Last flight review: November 12, 2010
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 7,500 hours in all; 3,000 in this make and model; 222 in the last 90 days; 65 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: March 16, 2011
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Ge CF34 SERIES (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Ge CF34 SERIES (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Comair, Inc
The flight
- Departed from: BOS Boston MA
- Destination: JFK Jamaica NY
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 2 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 62 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.