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Accidents · NTSB DCA11FA004 · Final report

Boeing 757-223 accident near Miami, Florida, October 27, 2010

On October 27, 2010 at about 1:30 am local time, a Boeing 757-223, registered N626AA, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Miami, Florida. It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 160 people were on board or involved.

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Fatigue failure of the fuselage crown skin due to incorrect manufacturing of the crown skin panel that resulted in a skin thickness less than the manufacturer-specified thickness.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 27, 2010 · about 1:30 am local time
Place
Miami, Florida · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 160 people were on board or involved.
Weather
not recorded
Aircraft
Boeing 757-223 · all 757-223s on the register
Registration
N626AA · registry record · serial 24584
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Flight data recorder data revealed that, after takeoff from Miami International Airport (MIA), Miami, Florida, the airplane climbed for about 16 minutes and was passing through an altitude of approximately 32,000 feet when the rapid decompression occurred. The flight crew declared an emergency (the first officer was the pilot flying) and returned to MIA. Post accident examination of the airplane revealed fatigue cracking of the upper fuselage skin above the forward left passenger (L1) door. The fatigue cracking penetrated the fuselage skin, leading to a rupture and an approximate 18-inch-by-7-inch hole that depressurized the airplane. NTSB examinations of a section of the fuselage crown skin (from body station 374 to body station 439) where the rupture occurred revealed fatigue cracking along the lower longitudinal step of the chemically milled pocket just above the stringer S-4L (left) lap joint. The fatigue cracking initiated on the interior surface of the skin at multiple locations and propagated through the skin thickness. The skin thickness at the base of the chemically milled step measured 0.035 to 0.037 inch—which is less than the 0.039-inch minimum thickness specified by Boeing. Calculations from an NTSB study of the fatigue striation density and propagation in the fatigue region indicate that it would take an average of 3,709 total cycles for a crack to grow through skin with 0.035-inch thickness and an average interval of 917 cycles for a crack to grow from a minimally detectable size and penetrate a 0.035-inch skin thickness. The area of cracking and rupture on the accident airplane was not subject to any specific inspections, service bulletins (SB), or airworthiness directives (AD) at the time of the accident. Following the accident, on November 22, 2010, Boeing issued SB 757-53-0097, which called for repetitive external inspections (every 30, 200 cycles, or 300 hours depending on the inspection method) to detect cracks in the fuselage skin along the chemically milled step at stringers S-4L (left) and S 4R (right) between body station 297 and body station 439. On January 10, 2011, the Federal Aviation Administration issued AD 2011-01-15 (effective January 25, 2011) mandating the inspections recommended in SB 757-53-0097. During its investigation, the NTSB learned of a United Airlines 757 and a second American Airlines 757 that exhibited cracking in the fuselage skin similar to the accident airplane; both had nonconforming thickness at the base of the chemically milled step at the stringer location specified in the SB. Records of manufacture for the skin panels on the accident airplane and the other airplanes with fuselage skin cracking were not retained, and were not required to be retained; therefore, a cause for the manufacturing nonconformance could not be identified.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft structural failure during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Fuselage › Plates/skins (aux fuselage) › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • cause Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Equipment manufacture › Manufacturer

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 63,010 hours
  • Seats: 178
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: Rolls-Royc RB.211 SERIES (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Rolls-Royc RB.211 SERIES (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Operator: American Airlines INC

The flight

  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi4
Flight crew2
Passengers154

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.