Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-51 and Airbus Industrie A-319-114 accident near Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 11, 2005
On May 11, 2005, 2 aircraft, Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-51 (N763NC) and Airbus Industrie A-319-114 (N368NB), were involved in the same accident near Minneapolis, Minnesota (Minneapolis-St Paul Intl/Wold- airport). 1 person was seriously injured and 4 people had minor injuries; 137 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the Captain's decision to shutdown the left engine during taxi with no hydraulic pressure on the right side hydraulic system to effectively operate the brakes, steering, or thrust reversers. A factor was the fatigue fracture of the rudder shutoff valve which resulted in the loss of right side hydraulic pressure.
the Captain of the other aircraft's decision to shutdown the left engine during taxi with no hydraulic pressure on the right side hydraulic system to effectively operate the brakes, steering, or thrust reversers. A factor was the fatigue fracture of the rudder shutoff valve which resulted in the loss of right side hydraulic pressure of the other aircraft.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 11, 2005
- Place
- Minneapolis, Minnesota · Minneapolis-St Paul Intl/Wold- · map
- Type
- Accident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured and 4 people had minor injuries; 137 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-51 · all DC-9-51s on the register
- Registration
- N763NC · no longer on the register · serial 47716
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
- Aircraft 2
- Airbus Industrie A-319-114 · all A-319-114s on the register
- Registration
- N368NB · registry record
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative for the Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-51 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The DC-9 was taxiing to the gate area when it collided with a company A-319 that was being pushed back from the gate. Prior to arriving at the destination airport, the DC-9 experienced a loss of hydraulic fluid from a fractured rudder shutoff valve located in the DC-9's right side hydraulic system. The left side hydraulic system had normal hydraulic pressure and quantity throughout the flight. The flightcrew elected to continue to the scheduled destination and declared an emergency while on approach to the destination airport. After landing, the emergency was negated by the flight crew and the airplane taxied to the gate. Flight data recorder information indicates the left engine, which provides power for the left hydraulic system, was shut down during taxi. The captain stated he did not remember shutting the left engine down, and that if he had, it would have been after clearing all runways. The first officer stated that he was unaware that the left engine was shut down. Upon arrival at the gate with the left engine shut down and no hydraulic pressure from the left system and a failure of the right hydraulic system, the airplane experienced a loss of steering and a loss of brakes. The flightcrew requested company maintenance to chock the airplane since they were unable to use brakes to stop the airplane. The crew said they were going to keep the "...engines running in case we have to use reversers..." The airplane began to roll forward and the captain applied reverse thrust but the reversers did not deploy. The airplane impacted the A-319 with a speed of approximately 15.65 miles per hour to 16.34 miles per hour. Evacuation of the DC-9 was completed approximately 5:22 minutes after the collision and evacuation of the A-319 occurred approximately 13:08 minutes after the collision. Examination of the left hydraulic system revealed no anomalies and examination of the right hydraulic system revealed a fractured rudder shutoff valve that displayed features consistent with fatigue. Following the accident, the airplane manufacturer issued a service letter pertaining to the replacement of the rudder shutoff valve based upon reliability information that was reported to them. The number of reports was greater than that of the Federal Aviation Administration's Service Difficulty Reports database, and less than the operators records.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus Industrie A-319-114 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The A-319 was being pushed back from the gate when it collided with a company DC-9 that was taxiing to the gate area. Prior to arriving at the destination airport, the DC-9 experienced a loss of hydraulic fluid from a fractured rudder shutoff valve located in the DC-9's right side hydraulic system. The left side hydraulic system had normal hydraulic pressure and quantity throughout the flight. The flightcrew elected to continue to the scheduled destination and declared an emergency while on approach to the destination airport. After landing, the emergency was negated by the flight crew and the airplane taxied to the gate. Flight data recorder information indicates the left engine, which provides power for the left hydraulic system, was shut down during taxi. The captain stated he did not remember shutting the left engine down, and that if he had, it would have been after clearing all runways. The first officer stated that he was unaware that the left engine was shut down. Upon arrival at the gate with the left engine shut down and no hydraulic pressure from the left system and a failure of the right hydraulic system, the airplane experienced a loss of steering and a loss of brakes. The flightcrew requested company maintenance to chock the airplane since they were unable to use brakes to stop the airplane. The crew said they were going to keep the "...engines running in case we have to use reversers..." The airplane began to roll forward and the captain applied reverse thrust but the reversers did not deploy. The airplane impacted the A-319 with a speed of approximately 15.65 miles per hour to 16.34 miles per hour. Evacuation of the DC-9 was completed approximately 5:22 minutes after the collision and evacuation of the A-319 occurred approximately 13:08 minutes after the collision. Examination of the left hydraulic system revealed no anomalies and examination of the right hydraulic system revealed a fractured rudder shutoff valve that displayed features consistent with fatigue. Following the accident, the airplane manufacturer issued a service letter pertaining to the replacement of the rudder shutoff valve based upon reliability information that was reported to them. The number of reports was greater than that of the Federal Aviation Administration's Service Difficulty Reports database, and less than the operators records.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Mcdonnell Douglas DC-9-51 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,811 hours in all; 6,709 in this make and model; 6,709 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: July 1, 2003
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,985 hours in all; 3,985 in this make and model
- Last flight review: July 1, 2004
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 67,268 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, August 1, 2004
- Maximum gross weight: 123,200 lb
- Seats: 131
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney JT8D-17 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: CMH Columbus OH at 10:26 pm
- Destination: MSP Minneapolis MN
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 22, 10,006 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 230° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 3,900 ft; clear
- Temperature: 61°F (16°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
- Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
- Observation at 11:53 pm from MSP
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | 3 | 1 | |
| Passengers | 94 |
The factual record for the Airbus Industrie A-319-114 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Crew member
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 16,288 hours in all; 4,750 in this make and model
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Cfm International CFM 56-5A5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Northwest Airlines Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: MSP Minneapolis MN
- Destination: SAT San Antonio TX
- Flight plan: IFR
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | 4 | ||
| Passengers | 38 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.