Beech 1900D incident near Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June 7, 2003
On June 7, 2003 at about 7:00 pm local time, a Beech 1900D, registered N901SK, suffered minor damage in an incident near Milwaukee, Wisconsin (General Mitchell International airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 8 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Failure of the aileron sprocket assembly at the sprocket-to-shaft braze joint. Contributing factors were the improper braze procedure used by the part manufacturer at the time of fabrication which resulted in an inferior quality joint and the inadequate quality control (inspection) criteria which failed to identify the improperly brazed joint. An additional factor was the improper inspection procedure utilized by the operator's maintenance personnel, during which excessive force was applied to the control wheel in order to obtain acceptable flight data recorder readings during the functional check.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 7, 2003 · about 7:00 pm local time
- Place
- Milwaukee, Wisconsin · General Mitchell International · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 8 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech 1900D · all 1900Ds on the register
- Registration
- N901SK · no longer on the register · serial UE-90
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight crew of the incident aircraft reported lateral control problems shortly after takeoff, noting that about 45 degrees of right control wheel deflection was required to maintain straight flight. They noted no other anomalies and seemed to have full flight control authority. However, as a precaution, the flight crew elected to return and land at the departure airport. The crew reported that the landing was normal with the exception of the required control wheel offset. A post incident examination of the aileron control system revealed a 360º fracture in the silver-brazed joint between the drive sprocket and its mating shaft of the left-hand aileron control sprocket assembly. The failure of the brazed joint allowed both control wheels to be rotated approximately 45 degrees from neutral without a corresponding aileron control surface response. NTSB metallurgical examination of the left-hand sprocket assembly revealed that it was not brazed according to the referenced specifications. Specifically, the examination noted that the braze filler material had been introduced from both ends of the joint, resulting in a lack of penetration of about 20 percent of the total joint area. The applicable specification states, "the filler metal shall be introduced at one edge...and shall flow by capillary action to fill the interstice." The NTSB's review of the incident aircraft's maintenance records showed that a flight data recorder (FDR) functional check was completed the night before the incident flight. The roll control parameter, which is designed to measure the aileron surface position, was one of the parameters checked. To verify the accuracy of this parameter, the left control wheel is rotated either clockwise or counterclockwise until the ailerons contact their respective up or down stops. When the stops are contacted, the control wheel is held in position and the FDR roll control parameter value is checked against an approved maintenance manual limit. The control wheel is then rotated in the opposite direction and the FDR parameter is verified. The mechanic who conducted the functional check reported that the FDR functional check was routine. NTSB analysis of available recorded FDR data, incident flight and over 83 flights before the incident flight, showed that the maximum values recorded for the FDR roll control parameter prior to the functional check were 14.6 degrees aileron trailing edge down (TED) and 23.4 degrees aileron trailing edge up (TEU). The recorded aileron TED value was not in the range required by the approved operators B1900D maintenance inspection procedures document. The analysis also showed that, during the FDR functional check, the maximum values recorded for the roll parameter exceeded the maximum values recorded prior to the incident by 1.9 degrees in the aileron TED direction and 1.0 degree in the aileron TEU direction. This was the only time that both FDR values for the roll control parameter were in the TED range required by the functional check. The aircraft manufacturer and the NTSB tested the aileron control system on an exemplar Beechcraft 1900D aircraft in Wichita. The purpose of the test was to determine the amount of tangential force, applied to the control wheel, required to change the FDR roll control parameter value by 1.9 degrees in the aileron TED direction. Results of the testing showed that an additional tangential force of 80 pounds applied to the control wheel, after it was rotated such that an aileron was resting against its control surface stop, increased the roll parameter value by 0.7 degrees in the aileron TED direction and 1.3 degrees aileron TEU. Additional force was not applied to the control wheel because the limit load for the aileron control system is 80.4 pounds. The airplane manufacturer provided a Beechcraft 1900D Engineering report that documented tests that were conducted on the aileron control system to demonstrate compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations. Test data show that the aileron system did not yield while applying a limit tangential load of 80.4 pounds to the control wheel or fail when an ultimate tangential load of 120.6 pounds was applied to the control wheel. The aileron control system, including the brazed joint on the sprocket assembly, met all Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness standards for commuter-category aircraft. The investigation concluded that the failed sprocket assembly significantly reduced the pilots' control of the ailerons because the failure affects pilot input from both control wheels.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,400 hours in all
- Last flight review: May 7, 2003
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,920 hours in all
- Last flight review: July 16, 2002
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 20,720 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 28, 2003; 42 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 17,230 lb
- Seats: 21
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-67D (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-67D (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Operator: Skyway Airlines Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: MKE Milwaukee WI at 6:45 pm
- Destination: SAW Gwinn MI
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 130° at 11 knots
- Visibility: 4 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 6,000 ft
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
- Altimeter: 29.77 inHg
- Observation at 6:52 pm from MKE
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 6 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
