Boeing 717-231 incident near Milwaukee, Wisconsin, February 19, 2001
On February 19, 2001 at about 1:30 pm local time, a Boeing 717-231, registered N2410W, was involved in an incident near Milwaukee, Wisconsin (General Mitchell International airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 67 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the operator to provide complete and comprehensive thrust reverser lock-out maintenance procedures and guidance to the contract maintenance personnel resulting in a partial and inadequate securing of the faulty thrust reverser and a subsequent inadvertent deployment following takeoff. Contributing to the incident is the failure of the contract maintenance personnel to verify that the maintenance instructions received where complete, accurate, and up to date.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 19, 2001 · about 1:30 pm local time
- Place
- Milwaukee, Wisconsin · General Mitchell International · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 67 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 717-231 · all 717-231s on the register
- Registration
- N2410W · no longer on the register · serial 55077
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
A Boeing 717 sustained an in-flight thrust reverser deployment following a takeoff. The flight returned without further incident. After the prior flight the reverser was unlocked but not deployed. The flightcrew found the reverser unlock light during preflight. The crew could not clear the indication and contract maintenance was contacted to lock out the reverser. The contractor was not familiar and asked for the procedure to be faxed to him. The contractor used an incomplete set of procedures to lock out the reverser. Post incident inspection revealed the thrust reverser doors had over deployed. Four locking pins and their fork shaped locking triggers showed nicks and gouges on their mating surfaces. Subsequently Boeing revised their dispatch guide to include that maintenance would have to verify that "no more than one Thrust Reverser Proximity Sensor indicates Open" and that operators verify that the thrust reverser unlock indication is not present and red lockout pins are present on the inoperative reverser. Subsequent to the incident the overcenter links were redesigned. Boeing and the thrust reverser manufacturer issued service bulletins (SB) to retrofit the existing engines with the new link's design change, the link's associated hardware, and rub plates. Airplanes in production will incorporate the SB items as a production change. Boeing's SB 717-78-004 stated, "Operators have reported five instances of thrust reversers failing to deploy and ten instances of side beam gouging. Inspections revealed that gouging had occurred between the over center link bolts and side beam assembly. One recent event resulted in a relatively new thrust reverser having side beam gouging so deep, it required a doubler to restore airworthiness. Rohr Incorporated Service Bulletin R715.78-008 provides instructions to modify the thrust reverser actuation system. The purpose of modifying the thrust reverser actuation system is to minimize the possibility of gouging and inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment procedures given in this service bulletin."
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 15,744 hours in all; 335 in this make and model; 181 in the last 90 days; 62 in the last 30 days; 10,326 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: February 1, 2001
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,372 hours in all; 271 in this make and model; 139 in the last 90 days; 78 in the last 30 days; 2,000 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: December 20, 2000
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 770.3 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, February 17, 2001
- Maximum gross weight: 118,000 lb
- Seats: 117
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Rolls-Royce BR715-A1-30 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Rolls-Royce BR715-A1-30 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Trans World Airlines INC
The flight
- Departed from: MKE Milwaukee WI at 1:20 pm
- Destination: STL St Louis MO
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 19R, 9,690 ft by 200 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 210° at 12 knots, gusting 19
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 4,900 ft
- Temperature: 28°F (-2°C), dew point 19°F (-7°C)
- Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
- Observation at 10:52 am from MKE
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 5 | |||
| Passengers | 62 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.