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Accidents · NTSB CEN25LA117 · Final report

Amateur-built RV-7A accident near Plainview, Texas, March 10, 2025

On March 10, 2025 at about 5:40 pm local time, a 2010 amateur-built RV-7A, registered N923ZA, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Plainview, Texas (Hale County airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The improper machining of the propeller blade bearing seat, which resulted in an inflight propeller blade fatigue failure. Contributing to the accident was the improper machining of the propeller hub and propeller blade root and machining surface quality control.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 10, 2025 · about 5:40 pm local time
Place
Plainview, Texas · Hale County · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Amateur-built RV-7A, built 2010
Registration
N923ZA · registry record · serial 72007
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

During the initial climb when the airplane reached 800 ft above ground level (agl), the airplane shuddered and shook violently. The pilot reduced the throttle, which reduced the shaking, then completed a forced landing in a field. After landing, he noticed that one of the three propeller blades had separated from the hub and was found nearby in the field. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the engine mount. Examination of the propeller assembly revealed that the No. 2 propeller blade likely failed due to fitment issues within the propeller hub, leading to operational vibrations to be transferred directly and unevenly into the blade root, which resulted in fatigue cracking and catastrophic failure. The primary feature that initiated the failure was a likely improperly machined bearing seat in the No. 2 blade slot. The initiation point of the primary fatigue crack of the blade root correlated with the missing region of the bearing seat. The missing bearing seat allowed the blade root fillet to contact the hub. The bearing seat inside the blade slot was the surface that the cartridge bearing radially interfaces with, permitting the centripetal load of the propeller blade to evenly transfer into the hub. In the slots for blade Nos. 1 and 3, this surface was present and appeared mostly consistent around the circumference of the lip. However, the No. 2 blade seat vanished at the 12 and 6 o’clock positions. This would concentrate the centripetal forces generated by the propeller blade to the corners of the housing shells, where cracking was evident in three of the four locations. It is unknown why the No. 2 blade slot would be machined differently than the Nos. 1 and 3 slots. Additionally, the fact that this feature was observed on both the forward and rear shells, which are different parts and would be run on different processes, suggested issues may be related to programming or fixturing of the parts. The fact that two occurrences were not detected before release of the product raises questions about the presence of a quality control system issue for the manufacturer. The propeller hub exhibited several additional features that exhibited undesirable machining characteristics. The internal threaded section of the blade root exhibited chatter marks running along its length. Chatter marks are typically undesirable machining marks that form when running a given cutting tool through a material faster or with more force than its ability to evenly cut through the material. This can lead to resonant vibrations in the tool piece and cause a wavy or uneven pattern in the work piece. In high performance components, these may create unaccounted for stress concentrations leading to fracture initiation and growth. While there was no evidence that these were a primary driver of the failure, they appeared to contribute to the fracture propagation. Additionally, horizontal machined features were observed on several of the slots, consistent with tooling damage or features occurring during the roughing process of the machining the shell. Similar features were present on both rear and forward shells to varying degrees of severity. It was unclear whether there was an intended purpose for them in the design, but their inconsistency suggested a machining disconformity. While there was no evidence that any of them directly contributed to the failure of the propeller blade, their presence raised questions about the manufacturers machining quality control processes. Machining surface quality control of both the components of the blade roots and the hub assembly was also a contributing factor. Initiation of the primary crack along a single machining mark suggested its coarseness created stress raisers leading to fatigue crack initiation. While no information was provided about what design requirements exist for these specific components, certificated aircraft propellers have strict machining and finishing requirements due to their high vibration environments and critical risks.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Part(s) separation from AC during initial climb defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Equipment manufacture › Manufacturer
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Failure
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller hub section › Failure

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 186 hours in all; 136 in this make and model; 146 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: December 28, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 260 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, March 1, 2025
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,800 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-360 (piston); 200 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: PVW Plainview TX at 5:40 pm
  • Destination: 44M Cookson OK
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 04/2, 5,997 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 250° at 12 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 19°F (-7°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.06 inHg
  • Observation at 12:50 pm from KPVW, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KPVW 101750Z AUTO 25012KT 10SM CLR 20/M07 A3006 RMK AO2 T02021067 10203 21020=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

5 documents, released by the NTSB on August 19, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN25LA117.