Piper PA-46-310P accident near Danville, Arkansas, April 23, 2021
On April 23, 2021 at about 10:01 pm local time, a 1985 Piper PA-46-310P, registered N461DK, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Danville, Arkansas. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s improper decision to continue flight in an area of moderate-to-heavy icing conditions, which resulted in exceedance of the airplane’s anti-icing system capabilities, a degradation of aircraft performance, and subsequent aerodynamic stall.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- April 23, 2021 · about 10:01 pm local time
- Place
- Danville, Arkansas · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA-46-310P, built 1985 · all PA-46-310Ps on the register
- Registration
- N461DK · registry record · serial 46-8508102
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was conducting an instrument flight rules cross-country flight and climbing to a planned altitude of 23,000 ft mean sea level (msl). According to air traffic control data, as the airplane climbed through 18,600 ft msl, its groundspeed was 171 knots, and a gradual reduction in groundspeed began. After reaching an altitude of about 20,200 ft msl, the airplane began a descent on a southeast heading. Just before the descent began, the airplane’s groundspeed had decreased to 145 knots. About 2 minutes after the descent began, the airplane turned right to a northeast heading on which it continued for about 30 seconds. The flightpath then became erratic before the data ended. The pilot made no distress calls and did not respond to repeated calls from the controller. The main wreckage of the airplane was located in densely forested terrain at an elevation of about 930 ft about 1,000 ft south of the last radar return. The outboard portion of the right wing, right aileron, right horizontal stabilizer, and right elevator were not located with the main wreckage and, despite ground and aerial searches with a small unmanned aircraft system, were not found. Examination of the wreckage indicated that the missing wing and tail sections separated in flight due to overload. Examination of the recovered airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any pre-existing mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Weather forecasts indicated that the accident site was in an area where moderate icing conditions up to 25,000 ft msl, embedded thunderstorms, and 2-inch hail were forecasted. Review of preflight weather information received by the pilot indicated that he was aware of the conditions forecast on the route of flight before initiating the flight. Meteorological data revealed that the airplane likely entered icing conditions that ranged from light to heavy as it climbed through 14,000 ft msl about 23 minutes after takeoff and remained in icing conditions for the remaining 16-minute duration of the flight. Freezing drizzle conditions were likely present along the flightpath. Although the airplane was equipped for flight in icing conditions, the pilot’s operating handbook contained a warning about flight into severe icing conditions, which stated that flight in freezing drizzle could result in ice build-up on protected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system. The airplane’s gradual loss of groundspeed as it climbed was consistent with ice accumulating on the airplane. It is likely that during the 16 minutes the airplane was operating in icing conditions, the capability of the ice protection system was exceeded, which resulted in a degradation of aircraft performance and subsequent aerodynamic stall. During the ensuing uncontrolled descent, the structural capability of the airplane was exceeded, which resulted in an inflight break up. A review of the pilot’s records revealed multiple certificate application failures for reasons that included inadequate knowledge of cross-country flight planning, aircraft performance, and stalls. Review of the pilot’s airman knowledge written tests found areas answered incorrectly over multiple exams included meteorology, aircraft performance, aeronautical decisionmaking, and stalls. The ethanol identified in the pilot’s cavity blood was most likely the result of postmortem production. Therefore, effects from ethanol did not play any role in this accident. The cargo was documented as it was removed from the airplane and remained secure until after it was weighed. Based upon the weight of the cargo, passengers, airplane, and fuel from the filed flight plan, at the time of departure, the airplane would have been about 361 lbs over maximum gross weight. According to the FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, an overloaded airplane “may exhibit unexpected and unusually poor flight characteristics,” which include reduced maneuverability and an increased stall speed.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Structural icing during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
- Loss of control in flight during enroute (climb to cruise)
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Capability exceeded
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › (general) › Effect on equipment
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of meteorologic cond › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Aeronautical knowledge › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,431 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Other crew
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 81 hours in all; 35 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Maximum gross weight: 4,100 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental TSIO550 (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: MKO Muskogee OK at 9:22 pm
- Destination: X60 Williston FL
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 080° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 5 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 700 ft
- Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
- Altimeter: 29.86 inHg
- Observation at 3:55 pm from KMEZ, 38 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KMEZ 232055Z AUTO 08006KT 5SM OVC007 14/13 A2986 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT SW
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
34 documents, released by the NTSB on September 1, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
