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Accidents · NTSB CEN16IA103 · Final report

Cessna 560 incident near Dallas, Texas, February 9, 2016

On February 9, 2016 at about 2:00 pm local time, a 2005 Cessna 560, registered N774SB, was involved in an incident during takeoff near Dallas, Texas (Dallas Love Field). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The loss of aileron trim due to the lack of separation between the cannon head on the back of autopilot cannon plug and the aileron trim tab control gear. Contributing to the incident was the lack of guidance in the airplane maintenance manual to verify separation of the autopilot control head and aileron trim tab control gear before completing work on the control pedestal.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 9, 2016 · about 2:00 pm local time
Place
Dallas, Texas · Dallas Love Field · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 560 Undesignat, built 2005 · all 560s on the register
Registration
N774SB · registry record · serial 560-0684
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airline transport pilot and the copilot, who was the pilot flying, were conducting an on-demand air taxi flight with three passengers onboard. The copilot reported that, during the takeoff rotation, he had difficulty maintaining the runway heading and that the airplane experienced a right rolling tendency. He noted that, while continuing to take off and as the airspeed was increased, the pressure required on the control yoke to maintain level attitude also increased. The copilot transferred control of the airplane to the pilot who then attempted to adjust the aileron trim; however, the trim control knob would not move, and the trim indicator appeared centered. The flight crew declared an emergency to air traffic control and requested to return to the airport. When the airspeed was decreased during the approach, the right roll control pressure decreased, and the flight crew was able to free the aileron trim control and land uneventfully. Postincident examination of the aileron trim system revealed that the cannon plug on the back of the autopilot control head was contacting the aileron trim control gear within the cockpit pedestal. Additionally, the wires extending from the cannon plug exhibited chafing. The day before the incident, maintenance personnel had inspected the cockpit pedestal, which required removal of the control heads for the autopilot from the pedestal. The pedestal was then cleaned and reassembled. Therefore, it is likely that, when maintenance personnel reassembled the pedestal, they did not ensure that the cannon head on the back of the autopilot control head and the aileron trim control gear were adequately separated, which resulted in binding of the aileron trim control gear and chafing of the wiring and led to the in-flight loss of aileron trim.   A review of the airplane maintenance manual revealed that the Control Pedestal Area General Inspection procedures did not include a step to ensure that sufficient separation existed between the autopilot control head/wiring harness and the aileron trim tab control gear. The lack of guidance in the maintenance manual  to verify separation of the autopilot control head and aileron trim tab control gear before completing work on the control pedestal likely contributed to the incident. Following the incident, the airplane manufacturer implemented a change to the maintenance manual  to include a step to wrap the wiring harness in a protective sleeve and verify separation between the autopilot control head/wiring harness and the aileron trim tab control. The manufacturer also issued a mandatory service letter that provided instructions to inspect for damage and correct wire harness positioning.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Flight control sys malf/fail during takeoff defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Malfunction
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 9,025 hours in all; 300 in this make and model; 53 in the last 90 days; 13 in the last 30 days; 8,219 as pilot in command; 1,056 on instruments
  • Last flight review: October 8, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 4,031 hours in all; 23 in this make and model; 56 in the last 90 days; 13 in the last 30 days; 3,880 as pilot in command; 1,625 on instruments
  • Last flight review: January 29, 2016
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,512.3 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, February 8, 2016
  • Maximum gross weight: 16,630 lb
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW535A (turbofan); 2,512 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PW535A (turbofan); 2,512 hours total
  • Operator: Seven Bar Flying Service INC

The flight

  • Departed from: DAL Dallas TX at 2:00 pm
  • Destination: 4O4 Idabel OK
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 31R, 7,752 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 30,000 ft
  • Temperature: 37°F (3°C), dew point 12°F (-11°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.29 inHg
  • Observation at 1:53 pm from KDAL

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2
Passengers3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

6 documents, released by the NTSB on October 18, 2019. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.