Beech P35 accident near Chadron, Nebraska, October 6, 2015
On October 6, 2015 at about 5:25 pm local time, a 1963 Beech P35, registered N877DM, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Chadron, Nebraska. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's continued visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into rising terrain during cruise flight.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 6, 2015 · about 5:25 pm local time
- Place
- Chadron, Nebraska · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Beech P35, built 1963 · all P35s on the register
- Registration
- N877DM · registry record · serial D-7238
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airline transport pilot departed in the single-engine airplane on a cross-country flight under visual flight rules (VFR) in visual meteorological conditions (visibility 9 miles and ceiling broken at 1,500 ft above ground level); however, instrument meteorological conditions existed along the planned route of flight. Shortly after departure, the pilot established radio communications with air traffic control and requested activation of the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan he had previously filed. The flight was issued a discrete transponder code; however, due to other workload in his airspace sector, the controller did not immediately confirm radar contact or issue an IFR clearance to the pilot. Because the pilot had not received an IFR clearance, he remained under VFR and responsible for maintaining terrain, obstacle, and cloud clearance. According to track data and topographic elevation data, the airplane encountered rising terrain as it flew south from the departure airport. The airplane subsequently impacted treetops and a ridgeline about 10 miles south of the departure airport at 4,200 ft msl. The height of the ridgeline was about 900 ft above the departure airport elevation. An individual working outside near the accident site reported that weather conditions included light precipitation, mist, fog, and low clouds that obscured the surrounding ridgelines. Thus, the airplane likely encountered instrument meteorological conditions before it collided with the ridgeline during cruise flight. Further, a postaccident wreckage examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane during the flight. Although the departure airport was equipped with a remote communication outlet, it was out of service at the time of the accident and could not be used to obtain an IFR clearance. However, the pilot could have obtained an IFR clearance on the ground by telephoning a flight service station. Alternatively, the pilot could have departed under VFR and maneuvered over the airport in visual meteorological conditions until he received an IFR clearance. The pilot's decision to attempt VFR flight into instrument meteorological conditions resulted in controlled flight into rising terrain during cruise flight.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- VFR encounter with IMC during enroute (cruise)
- Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Fire/smoke (post-impact) during post (impact)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Effect on operation
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Mountainous/hilly terrain › Effect on operation
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Mountainous/hilly terrain › Awareness of condition
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Flight planning/navigation › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Situational awareness › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 19,010 hours in all; 195 in this make and model
- Last flight review: June 20, 2015
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,078.9 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, June 11, 2015
- Maximum gross weight: 3,300 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental IO-520-CB-C-B (piston); 1,953 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: CDR Chadron NE at 5:21 pm
- Destination: AIA Alliance NE
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 9 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 1,500 ft
- Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
- Altimeter: 30.25 inHg
- Observation at 4:53 pm from CDR, 10 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
20 documents, released by the NTSB on October 6, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
