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Accidents · NTSB CEN14LA127 · Final report

Piaggio P180 - AVANTI II accident near Springfield, Illinois, January 31, 2014

On January 31, 2014 at about 7:12 pm local time, a 2013 Piaggio P180 - AVANTI II, registered N700FE, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Springfield, Illinois (Abraham Lincoln Capital airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's decision to reengage the hydraulic system following the successful extension of the landing gear using the emergency extension procedures. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the directional control valve in the gear-up position and the release of the gear down locks for undetermined reasons.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 31, 2014 · about 7:12 pm local time
Place
Springfield, Illinois · Abraham Lincoln Capital · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Piaggio P180 - AVANTI II, built 2013 · all P180 - AVANTI IIs on the register
Registration
N700FE · registry record · serial 1232
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The landing gear did not extend when the copilot selected gear-down during the initial instrument approach to the destination airport. The flight crew was able to extend the landing gear using the emergency extension procedure; however, following the emergency extension, the pilot decided to reengage the hydraulic system to have power-assisted braking and nosewheel steering during landing. The pilot stated that the wheel brakes were less effective than normal and the nosewheel steering was inoperative during the landing roll, which he concluded was because the emergency landing gear selector valve handle was still extended. The pilot reported that in an attempt to resolve the braking and steering issues he reached for the emergency landing gear selector valve, but the landing gear collapsed before his hand touched the valve handle. Postaccident testing determined the directional control valve that controls the flow of hydraulic fluid to the landing gear actuators was stuck in the gear-up position. Examination of the directional control valve revealed a metallic particle trapped between one of the spool lands and the valve housing, which prevented the spool from moving into the gear-down position. The source of the trapped particle could not be conclusively determined. A teardown examination did not reveal any mechanical anomalies that would have resulted in a malfunction of the hydraulic pump package. The airplane flight manual specified that the hydraulic system be turned off before the landing gear was manually extended using the emergency procedures. The flight manual did not include a provision for the hydraulic system to be reengaged following the emergency landing gear extension. As such, the hydraulic system should have remained off during landing. Postaccident testing concluded that the landing gear would immediately retract if the emergency landing gear selector valve was in the stowed position with the hydraulic system turned on. Consequently, because the airplane landed with its gear extended, the emergency landing gear selector valve handle had to be in the extended position upon touchdown. One scenario for the unintended landing gear retraction was if the pilot repositioned the emergency landing gear selector valve to its normal (retracted) position during the landing roll. This would have allowed the unintended pressure in the normal hydraulic system lines to retract the landing gear. Although this scenario is consistent with the reported sequence-of-events, the pilot stated that he did not touch the emergency landing gear selector valve handle during the landing roll. Additionally, the emergency valve handle was found extended after the accident. Another possible scenario was if the pressure in the emergency extension line decreased below that necessary to hold the gear down locks in position. Postaccident testing completed on an exemplar airplane with a simulated failure of the directional control valve and the hydraulic system turned on, concluded that the down locks could release and allow the landing gear to retract if the line pressure in the emergency system decreased sufficiently. After considering the test data and the variables involved, the investigation was unable to conclusively determine which scenario had triggered the down locks to release during landing roll. However, the landing gear would not have retracted had the pilot not reengaged the hydraulic system following the successful extension of the landing gear using the emergency extension procedures. The hydraulic system being turned on, in combination with the failure of the directional control valve in the gear-up position, resulted in unintended pressure within the hydraulic lines associated with gear retraction and created the means for the gear to retract when the gear locks released for undetermined reasons.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
  2. Landing gear collapse during landing (landing roll) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system › Hydraulic, main system › Incorrect use/operation
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Gear extension and retract sys › Failure

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 5,040 hours in all; 1,164 in this make and model; 30 in the last 90 days; 30 in the last 30 days; 832 as pilot in command; 153 on instruments
  • Last flight review: December 13, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 5,270 hours in all; 1,900 in this make and model; 52 in the last 90 days; 19 in the last 30 days; 3,388 as pilot in command; 1,039 on instruments
  • Last flight review: September 27, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 45.5 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, December 20, 2013
  • Maximum gross weight: 12,100 lb
  • Seats: 10
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-66B (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-66B (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Mountain Aviation, Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: MSN Madison WI at 5:56 pm
  • Destination: SPI Springfield IL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 04, 8,001 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 010° at 3 knots
  • Visibility: 2.5 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 1,000 ft
  • Temperature: 25°F (-4°C), dew point 18°F (-8°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.13 inHg
  • Observation at 7:02 pm from SPI

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2
Passengers3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.