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Accidents · NTSB CEN13FA174 · Final report

Eurocopter AS 350 B2 accident near Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, February 22, 2013

On February 22, 2013 at about 11:42 am local time, a Eurocopter AS 350 B2 (helicopter), registered N917EM, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The loss of engine power due to engine ice ingestion during initial climb after takeoff in dark night light conditions. Contributing to the accident were the lack of an installed engine air inlet cover while the helicopter was parked outside, exposed to precipitation and freezing temperatures before the accident, and the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection that failed to detect ice accumulation in the area of the air inlet.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 22, 2013 · about 11:42 am local time
Place
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Eurocopter AS 350 B2 · all AS 350 B2s on the register
Registration
N917EM · no longer on the register · serial 3865
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The emergency medical services helicopter departed a hospital helipad in dark night visual flight rules conditions and proceeded on its mission. Satellite data showed that, after takeoff, the helicopter began a gradual climb toward its planned destination. The data stopped about 3 minutes and 30 seconds into the flight. No distress calls were heard from the pilot. Fixed video surveillance cameras located near the accident site showed the last few seconds of the helicopter descending toward the ground. The helicopter impacted a parking lot, and a postimpact fire occurred. Examination of the wreckage revealed that three of the engine's first-stage axial compressor blades exhibited deformation consistent with soft body foreign object damage. The remainder of the engine and airframe exhibited no evidence of malfunction that would have contributed to an in-flight loss of engine power. The helicopter's air intake design, which had been modified to accommodate a different engine than that originally supplied by the helicopter's manufacturer, incorporated a blanking plate attached to the top side of the engine cowling that covered a portion of the air inlet screen. A gap in the area where the blanking plate and the screen overlapped made it possible, in certain meteorological conditions, for water or snow to pass through the screen, accumulate on the blanking plate, and freeze into ice. Ice accumulation in this area, if left undetected, could result in the ice detaching from the blanking plate and entering the engine during operation, causing soft body foreign object damage and a loss of engine power. Precipitation and outside temperatures ranging from 35 to 19 degrees F occurred during the 12-hour period preceding the accident. The combination of these meteorological conditions was conducive to the formation and accumulation of ice in the area between the air inlet screen and the blanking plate. Although the helicopter's flight manual supplement for cold weather operations recommended installation of an air inlet cover after the last flight of the day, during the day and night before the flight, the helicopter was parked outside on the helipad without an air inlet cover installed. According to the helicopter's mechanic, he inspected the helicopter on the afternoon before the flight and noted that some snow had accumulated on it. It is likely that the lack of an engine air inlet cover allowed precipitation to accumulate in the vicinity of the engine air intake. The helicopter's flight manual cold weather operations supplement also contained instructions for the pilot to perform a visual and manual (tactile) inspection of the air intake duct up to the first-stage compressor for evidence of snow and ice. Furthermore, the manufacturer and the Federal Aviation Administration had previously released information notices regarding inflight loss of engine power due to snow or ice ingestion caused by inadequate inspection or removal of snow or ice from the engine air inlet. These notices recommended a thorough inspection in and around the engine inlet area in order to detect and remove any snow or ice accumulation before flight. The initial on-scene examination found no remnants of ice or snow on these components because exposure to the postcrash fire would have melted such evidence. Surveillance video of the helipad showed that most of the helipad lights were off at the time of the pilot's preflight inspection immediately before the flight, making it difficult for him to detect any ice or snow accumulation in the area of the engine air intake. Thus, the ice accumulation between the air inlet screen and the blanking plate remained undetected, and shortly after takeoff, the ice detached from the blanking plate, slid into the air inlet, and was subsequently ingested by the engine, resulting in an in-flight loss of engine power. .

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft inspection event during prior to flight
  2. Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb defining event
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Powerplant parameters › Attain/maintain not possible
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to structural icing › Effect on equipment
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Effect on personnel
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Ice/rain protection system › Intake anti › ice, deice › Not used/operated
  • factor Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Low temperature › Effect on equipment
  • factor Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Snow › Effect on equipment
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 4,960 hours in all; 202 in this make and model; 17 in the last 90 days; 6 in the last 30 days; 3,702 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
  • Last flight review: March 14, 2012
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,474 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,961 lb
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Honeywell LTS-101-700D (turboshaft); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Eaglemed LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: OK19 Oklahoma City OK at 11:38 am
  • Destination: Watonga OK

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 340° at 10 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 66°F (19°C), dew point 54°F (12°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
  • Observation at 10:53 am from PWA, 3 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew21

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.