Hughes 369 accident near Childress, Texas, November 27, 2012
On November 27, 2012 at about 9:58 pm local time, a Hughes 369 (helicopter), registered N28MP, was substantially damaged in an accident during prior to flight near Childress, Texas. It was an external-load flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The improper maintenance of the helicopter fuel system that resulted in erroneous fuel gauge indications and the pilot’s inadequate fuel management, both of which resulted in fuel exhaustion during a long-line hover. Also causal was the lack of company procedures to ensure adequate maintenance and fuel planning.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 27, 2012 · about 9:58 pm local time
- Place
- Childress, Texas · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Hughes 369 D · all 369s on the register
- Registration
- N28MP · no longer on the register · serial 970191D
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- External-load flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The helicopter was in a hover about 120-150 feet above the ground while a utility worker performing a long-line operation worked on a transmission tower. After the loss of power, the helicopter spun and descended during which the worker was pulled off the tower by the attached long line. The pilot performed an autorotation that resulted in a hard landing. The pilot sustained serious injuries and the worker sustained fatal injuries. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed no usable fuel on board, and fuel quantities between the fuel tank and engine were consistent with fuel exhaustion. The examination revealed that the electrical wire to the start pump was not secured, which allowed for the possibility of it interfering with the fuel quantity transmitter float mechanism, thus providing erroneous cockpit fuel quantity indications to the pilot. The examination also revealed that the low fuel quantity annunciator was inoperative due to separation of the fuel quantity transmitter's low-level fuel whisker. Recent maintenance of the helicopter's fuel system by the operator's maintenance personnel included the replacement of the start pump and testing of the low-level fuel light by electrically grounding the top of the fuel quantity transmitter using safety wire. A vacuum check of the fuel system was not performed after the fuel system had been opened. The method for testing the low-level fuel light and the lack of a vacuum check were not in accordance with the maintenance manual and the helicopter manufacturer's service bulletin relating to the start pump installation. Postaccident examination of the helicopter also revealed a nonstandard installation of an engine mounted fuel filter petcock drain valve. No written company procedures and/or fueling records were available that required pilots to track fuel loading and time-based fuel consumption in order to determine time remaining for flights and their termination. The pilot stated that he would have the helicopter refueled when the fuel gauge indicated about 100 lbs. However, had the operator and/or pilot calculated the flight time remaining based on known fuel quantities that were independent of fuel gauge indications, then any fuel gauge inaccuracies would be have become apparent.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during prior to flight
- Fuel exhaustion during maneuvering (hover)
- Loss of engine power (total) during maneuvering (hover)
- Loss of control in flight during maneuvering (hover)
- Autorotation External load event (Rotorcraft) defining event
- Autorotation Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel indication system › Incorrect service/maintenance
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of available resources › Pilot
- factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Availability of policy/proc › Operator
- Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › (general) › FAA/Regulator
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 2,700 hours in all; 800 in this make and model; 60 in the last 90 days; 10 in the last 30 days; 2,500 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
- Last flight review: June 14, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 2
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Seats: 3
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Allison Engine Company 250-C20B (turboshaft); 14,655 hours total
- Operator: Brim Equipment Leasing Inc
The flight
- Departed from: Childress TX
- Destination: Childress TX
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 170° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 54°F (12°C), dew point 25°F (-4°C)
- Altimeter: 30.28 inHg
- Observation at 9:53 pm from CDS, 6 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.