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Accidents · NTSB CEN11IA379 · Final report

Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19 incident near Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June 7, 2011

On June 7, 2011 at about 2:32 am local time, a 2001 Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19, registered N866AS, suffered minor damage in an incident during landing near Milwaukee, Wisconsin (General Mitchell Intl airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 44 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The failure of the right main landing gear (MLG) to extend normally, which resulted from the combination of a slightly worn uplock pin, the operation of the hydraulic pumps below their specified operating pressures, and contamination within the landing gear hydraulic system. Also causal to the accident was the failure of the right MLG to extend manually using the alternate gear selector handle due to the improper use of lubricant within the alternate release handle assembly, which prevented the handle from remaining in its fully extended position.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 7, 2011 · about 2:32 am local time
Place
Milwaukee, Wisconsin · General Mitchell Intl · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 44 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19, built 2001
Registration
N866AS · no longer on the register · serial 7517
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

During final approach, the transport-category airplane's right main landing gear (MLG) did not extend when the landing gear selector was placed in the "down" position. Shortly after, the flight crew noted a "gear disagree" warning message displayed on the engine indication and crew alerting system showing that the nose gear and the left MLG were down and locked but that the right MLG was in transit. The flight crew followed the quick reference handbook directions to troubleshoot the landing gear issue without success. The flight crewmembers then tried to manually extend the landing gear by pulling the landing gear alternate release handle multiple times; however, the right MLG failed to extend, and they subsequently landed the airplane with the right MLG retracted. During postincident activities, the airplane was lifted and an examination revealed that the right MLG remained in its full-up position within the wheel well. The airplane's right MLG uplock pin exhibited signs of slight wear, consistent with in-service usage, and no abnormalities were found with the right MLG uplock assembly. Normal wear patterns were observed on the uplock latch with no discernable depth at the pin contact locations. The uplock pin's slight wear indicates that it might not have always rotated freely when it was in contact with the upper and lower surfaces of the uplock assembly latch as it should have per the system's design. Further, the worn pin could have increased the friction forces between the pin and the latch. Functional testing of the incident airplane's 3A and 3B hydraulic system pumps showed that their output pressures were lower than specified. Analysis of hydraulic fluid samples taken from the No. 3 hydraulic system, including the right sidestay actuator and selected landing gear components, revealed that some of the fluid samples contained particles and fibers that exceeded the in-service size limits specified in the airplane's maintenance manual, and these contaminants likely restricted the hydraulic flow within the hydraulic assembly. It is unlikely that any of these factors (the slightly worn uplock pin, the operation of the hydraulic pumps below their specified operating pressures, or the contamination within the landing gear hydraulic system) would have individually prevented the right MLG from extending; however, it is likely that the combination of these factors prevented the right MLG from extending. In addition, the overall landing gear system design, including modifications made in accordance with an airworthiness directive, did not preclude the consequence that the intermittent combination of these factors prevented the right MLG from extending normally. Postincident examination of the cockpit revealed that the landing gear alternate release handle remained extended about 7 inches. Pulling up on the handle resulted in it moving about 3 additional inches to its fully extended position. The additional handle displacement resulted in the right MLG extending out of its wheel well. When the handle was released from its fully extended position, the handle automatically began to slowly retract, which caused the right MLG to stop extending. The handle had to be pulled and manually held in its fully extended position for the right MLG to extend to its down-and-locked position. During postincident functional testing of the landing gear alternate release handle assembly, the handle's locking mechanism failed to maintain the handle in its fully extended position when a specified retract load was applied to the assembly. Disassembly of the handle assembly did not reveal any mechanical discrepancies. However, the assembly's inner housing and outer slider were found coated with an oily material consistent with lubricant; the origin of the oily material could not be determined. The alternate release handle assembly design specifications do not call for the application of lubricant on the inner housing or the outer slider; therefore, it is likely that the lubricant prevented the handle from remaining in its fully extended position.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during approach
  2. Landing gear not configured during landing defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Gear extension and retract sys › Malfunction
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Gear extension and retract sys › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Gear extension and retract sys › Design
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Hydraulic fluid › Fluid condition
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › (general) › Incorrect use/operation
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system › Pump, main › Damaged/degraded
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Gear extension and retract sys › Incorrect service/maintenance

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 8,618 hours in all; 438 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: May 19, 2011
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 5,156 hours in all; 2,997 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: October 11, 2010
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 24,969 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, June 1, 2011
  • Maximum gross weight: 53,000 lb
  • Seats: 55
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Ge CF34-3B1 (turbofan); 22,207 hours total
  • Engine 2: Ge CF34-3B1 (turbofan); 19,778 hours total
  • Operator: Skywest Airlines INC

The flight

  • Departed from: CVG Covington KY
  • Destination: MKE Milwaukee WI
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 19R, 9,690 ft by 200 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 230° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 9 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 5,500 ft
  • Temperature: 88°F (31°C), dew point 68°F (20°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.77 inHg
  • Observation at 1:52 am from KMKE

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi1
Flight crew2
Passengers41

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.