Hawker Beechcraft 390 accident near Oshkosh, Wisconsin, July 27, 2010
On July 27, 2010 at about 11:16 pm local time, a Hawker Beechcraft 390, registered N6JR, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR go-around) near Oshkosh, Wisconsin (Wittman Regional Airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's decision not to advance the engines to takeoff power during the go-around, as stipulated by the airplane flight manual, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 27, 2010 · about 11:16 pm local time · cases in 2010
- Place
- Oshkosh, Wisconsin · Wittman Regional Airport · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Hawker Beechcraft 390
- Registration
- N6JR · registry record · serial RB-161
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The accident occurred during the Experimental Aircraft Association's Airventure 2010 fly-in convention. Because of the high density of aircraft operations during the fly-in, the Federal Aviation Administration implemented special air traffic control procedures to accommodate traffic demand and maximize runway capacity. Arriving aircraft were issued landing instructions and clearances by a tower controller using a specified tower radio frequency. Departing aircraft were handled by another team of controllers operating on a separate radio frequency that was associated with a mobile operations unit located near the runway. Air traffic control data indicated that the accident airplane established contact with the tower controller and entered a left traffic pattern for runway 18R. As the accident airplane was turning from downwind to base leg, the controller handling departures cleared a Piper Cub for an immediate takeoff and angled departure (a procedure used by slower aircraft to clear the runway immediately after liftoff by turning across the runway edge). The accident pilot was not monitoring the departure frequency, and, therefore, he did not hear the radio transmissions indicating that the departing Piper Cub was going to offset to the left of the runway after liftoff. The accident pilot reported that, while on base leg, he became concerned that his descent path to the runway would conflict with the Piper Cub that was on takeoff roll. He stated that he overshot the runway centerline during his turn from base to final, and, when he completed the turn, his airplane was offset to the right of the runway. The pilot stated that, at this point, he decided not to land because of a perceived conflict with the departing Piper Cub that was ahead and to the left of his position. The pilot reported that he initiated a go-around, increasing engine power slightly, but not to takeoff power, as he looked for additional traffic to avoid. He estimated that he advanced the throttle levers "probably a third of the way to the stop," and, as he looked for traffic, the stall warning stick-shaker and stick-pusher systems activated almost simultaneously as the right wing stalled. The airplane subsequently collided with terrain in a nose down, right wing low attitude. A postaccident review of available air traffic control communications, amateur video of the accident sequence, controller and witness statements, and position data recovered from the accident airplane indicated that the Piper Cub was already airborne, had turned left, and was clear of runway 18R when the accident airplane turned from base to final. The postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The airplane flight manual states that, in the event of a go-around, the pilot should first advance engine thrust to takeoff power and then establish Vref (reference landing approach speed). The pilot's decision not to select takeoff power during the go-around directly contributed to the development of the aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR go-around) defining event
- Aerodynamic stall/spin during approach (VFR go-around)
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Powerplant parameters › Incorrect use/operation
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Flight crew
- Environmental issues › Operating environment › Air traffic/operating proc › Traffic congestion › Effect on operation
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 9,095 hours in all; 1,406 in this make and model; 62 in the last 90 days; 17 in the last 30 days; 8,464 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: December 9, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,265 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, February 16, 2010
- Maximum gross weight: 12,500 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Williams International FJ44-2A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Williams International FJ44-2A (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Roush Fenway Racing, LLC.
The flight
- Departed from: YIP Ypsilanti MI at 10:29 pm
- Destination: OSH Oshkosh WI
- Flight plan: VFR then IFR
- Runway 18R, 6,700 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 200° at 11 knots, gusting 16
- Visibility: 9 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
- Altimeter: 29.88 inHg
- Observation at 11:15 pm from OSH
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
24 documents, released by the NTSB on May 15, 2012. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N6JR on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Engine: Williams International FJ44-2A 118 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Engine: Williams International FJ44-2A 118 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Wittman Regional · nearest airport
- Willow Run Airport · departed from
- Accidents and incidents in Wisconsin 1,622 since 1982 · 225 in the last ten years
- Wisconsin 6,161 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/CEN10FA443.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
