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Accidents · NTSB ATL07LA028 · Final report

Amateur-built RV-4 accident near Hoschton, Georgia, December 17, 2006

On December 17, 2006 at about 7:54 pm local time, a amateur-built RV-4, registered N360WS, was substantially damaged in an accident near Hoschton, Georgia. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The failure of the manufacturer to safety wire the purge valve stop screw during maintenance resulting in a total loss of engine power in cruise flight due to fuel starvation. This resulted in a forced landing, on-ground collision with a berm/terrace, and subsequent nose over.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 17, 2006 · about 7:54 pm local time
Place
Hoschton, Georgia · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Amateur-built RV-4
Registration
N360WS · registry record · serial 3767
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot stated he was in cruise flight at 2,500 feet when the engine lost power. He attempted an engine restart with negative results, and made a forced landing in a field. During landing, the airplane collided with a terrain terrace/berm and nosed over. The airplane was recovered, and an engine run was conducted under the supervision of the FAA. The airplane's engine controls, propeller system, battery source, and electric fuel pump were used, and an alternate fuel source was supplied to the engine. Several attempts to start the engine were unsuccessful. An examination of the Airflow fuel injection system was found to be missing the necessary safety wire on the purge valve stop screw. The stop screw had migrated out of the purge valve housing approximately one-eighth of an inch. The purge valve was isolated from the fuel system by routing the fuel supply line directly to the fuel flow divider/distribution block. The engine was started, ran at idle power, advanced to a high power setting, and shut down with the mixture control. Examination of the airplane log books, additional documents maintained by the registered owner, and work orders from the manufacturer, revealed the purge valve and distribution block had been returned to the manufacturer as a complete assembly on two occasions by the registered owner. The purge valve and distribution block were repaired, sent back to the registered owner as a complete assembly, and installed on the airplane by the registered owner. The manufacturer's installation and service manual states, "Leak check all connections and plumbing before starting engine. Lock wire all hardware. Make sure to lock wire the stop screw. If removal of the valve is necessary make sure to relock wire the purge valve stop screw. Failure to do so will result in sudden stoppage of the engine if the screw backs out." The registered owner stated he did not remove the safety wire from the purge valve mounting bolts or stop screw. The manufacturer stated all components that left their shop were assembled, tested, and tested in limits, as well as lock wired. Review of the Work Order/Job Progress Sheet used by the manufacturer during the assembly of the purge valve on December 4, 2002, revealed the relock wire had been signed off by the technician as having been completed. The Work Order/Job Progress Sheet used by the manufacturer during the assembly of the purge valve by the technician during the last repair on January 13, 2005, was not signed off by the technician as having been safety wired as required by the manufacturer's installation and service manual.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 1,115 hours in all; 340 in this make and model; 17 in the last 90 days; 6 in the last 30 days; 1,038 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: May 1, 2005
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 340 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, June 1, 2006
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,600 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-360-A1D (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: KWDR Winder GA at 7:15 pm
  • Destination: GA27 Cumming GA
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 45°F (7°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.23 inHg
  • Observation at 8:51 pm from KAHN, 17 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.