Cessna 206 accident near Homer, Alaska, June 19, 2007
On June 19, 2007 at about 7:03 pm local time, a Cessna 206, registered N72067, was substantially damaged in an accident near Homer, Alaska. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 4 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A loss of engine power due to fuel starvation from the pilot's improper fuel selector positioning, and her failure to maintain adequate airspeed to preclude a stall. Contributing to the accident was an inadvertent stall.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 19, 2007 · about 7:03 pm local time
- Place
- Homer, Alaska · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 206 · all 206s on the register
- Registration
- N72067 · no longer on the register · serial 20601273
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot began her duty day by making three flights in another company airplane. Six minutes after parking the first airplane, she switched to the accident airplane, and departed on a round-robin flight that included 4 takeoffs and 3 landings. About 8 minutes after the last takeoff, she declared an emergency, and reported a loss of engine power. Ground witnesses, and the front seat passenger, heard the engine stop, restart for a moment, and stop again. The pilot made an emergency landing approach to a remote island beach. While maneuvering for landing, she banked sharply to the right, and the airplane stalled at low level, colliding with the ground in a right wing and nose low attitude. Examination of the airplane at the crash site by an FAA inspector revealed that the fuel selector was on the left fuel tank. The right wing fuel tank system appeared to have been breached. The left fuel tank system appeared to be intact, and contained about 1/2 gallon of fuel. The engine fuel manifold contained about a drop of fuel. The engine was placed on an engine test stand, where it produced full rated rpm. The accident airplane had been flown the previous day by another company pilot for about 72 to 90 minutes and then parked. The amount of fuel remaining in the airplane when it was parked is unknown. A company ramp employee said he saw the pilot with a fuel hose at the accident airplane, but the amount of fuel, if any, that the pilot put in the airplane is unknown. Also, that observation was 23 minutes before the pilot's time sheet indicated she landed in the first airplane. Consequently, the amount of fuel in the accident airplane when the pilot departed is unknown. The pilot flew the accident airplane about 41 minutes before her crash landing on the beach. The company does not require pilots to log the amount of fuel placed in each airplane before each flight. The airplane's owner's manual description of the procedure for engine restart, after running a fuel tank dry, states, in part: "To ensure a prompt engine restart in flight after running a fuel tank dry, switch to the tank containing fuel, and place the auxiliary fuel pump switch in the "HI" position momentarily (3 to 5 seconds) with the throttle at least 1/2 open. Excessive use of the "HI" position of the auxiliary pump can cause flooding of the engine as indicated by a short (1 to 2 second) period of power, followed by a loss of power. This can be detected by a fuel flow indication, accompanied by a lack of power. If flooding does occur, turn off the auxiliary fuel pump switch, and normal propeller windmilling should start the engine in 1 to 2 seconds." Due to the lack of fuel found in the left wing tank, the position of the fuel selector, and the absence of any mechanical problems with the engine, it is probable that the pilot inadvertently allowed the left tank to run dry, and was unable to restart the engine prior to the emergency landing. During the emergency landing, she allowed the airspeed to decay and stalled the airplane, adding to the severity of the crash.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,095 hours in all; 1,201 in this make and model; 133 in the last 90 days; 29 in the last 30 days; 2,895 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: June 1, 2006
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 12,384 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, June 1, 2007; 9 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Continental IO-520F (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: PASO Seldovia AK at 1:52 pm
- Destination: PAHO Homer AK
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 210° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 52°F (11°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
- Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
- Observation at 1:53 pm from PAHO, 8 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
