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Accidents · NTSB ANC06FA020 · Final report

Robinson R22 accident near Scottsdale, Arizona, February 22, 2006

On February 22, 2006 at about 6:35 pm local time, a Robinson R22 (helicopter), registered N7512G, was destroyed in an accident near Scottsdale, Arizona. It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A loss of engine power during cruise flight for an undetermined reason, and the pilot's failure to maintain rotor rpm, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and collision with terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 22, 2006 · about 6:35 pm local time
Place
Scottsdale, Arizona · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Robinson R22 · all R22s on the register
Registration
N7512G · no longer on the register · serial 3315
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The certificated helicopter flight instructor was conducting an introductory flight instruction lesson under Title 14, CFR part 91 with a prospective student. A witness, about 1 mile south of the accident site, estimated that the helicopter was about 1,000 feet above the ground as it passed over him. Shortly afterwards, he heard a "pop", and the helicopter started a shallow, controlled turn to the left, followed by two or three more popping sounds. The helicopter then began to descend rapidly, and started spinning counter-clockwise. As the helicopter's descent rate increased, the main rotor blades stopped turning, and the helicopter entered a vertical descent. The witness said he could no longer hear any engine sounds during the accident helicopter's vertical descent. The helicopter crashed in a residential area, and came to rest between two houses. The helicopter sustained damage consistent with a high speed, fuselage level, vertical impact. Postaccident inspection of the engine core and airframe disclosed no evidence of any preimpact anomalies. Impact damage prevented testing of the engine's carburetor and ignition wiring harness assemblies. A review of the accident pilot's historical training records revealed a series of failed check rides and overall substandard performance. The NTSB IIC interviewed both previous and prospective employers, which disclosed that the accident pilot had either been dismissed or not hired due to his lack of academic and/or flight skills. The FAA approved flight manual for the accident helicopter, emergency procedures section, states that at the first indication of an engine failure, the pilot's required emergency action is, in part: 1) Lower collective immediately to maintain rotor rpm, and enter a normal autorotation. 2) Establish a steady glide at approximately 65 knots. The helicopter manufacturer published a safety notice, which addressed the dangers of a low rotor rpm conditions, stating in part: "A primary cause of fatal accidents in light helicopters is the [pilots] failure to maintain rotor rpm. To avoid this, every pilot must have his reflexes conditioned so he will instantly add throttle and lower the collective to maintain rpm in any emergency." Additionally, the safety notice states, in part: "If the pilot not only fails to lower the collective, but instead pulls up on the collective to keep the ship [helicopter] from going down, the rotor will stall almost immediately. When it stalls, the blades will either "blow back" and cut off the tail cone or it will just stop flying, allowing the helicopter to fall at an extreme rate. In either case, the resulting crash is likely to be fatal. No matter what causes the low rotor rpm, the pilot must first roll on the throttle and lower the collective simultaneously to recover rpm BEFORE investigating the problem. It must be a conditioned reflex. In forward flight, applying aft cyclic to bleed off airspeed will also help recover lost [rotor] rpm."

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 1,191 hours in all; 850 in this make and model; 1,111 as pilot in command; 873 on instruments
  • Last flight review: January 1, 2006
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 563.8 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, January 1, 2006; 18.4 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,370 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-360-J2A (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: SDL Scottsdale AZ at 6:29 pm
  • Destination: SDL

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 210° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 55°F (13°C), dew point 19°F (-7°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.09 inHg
  • Observation at 5:53 pm from SDL, 8 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.