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Accidents · NTSB ANC04LA053 · Final report

Aerospatiale AS-350B2 accident near Skagway, Alaska, May 11, 2004

On May 11, 2004 at about 10:10 pm local time, a Aerospatiale AS-350B2 (helicopter), registered N60618, was substantially damaged in an accident near Skagway, Alaska. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A loss of engine power during cruise flight for an undetermined reason, which resulted in a ditching and submersion of the helicopter when the emergency float system did not deploy. Factors contributing to the accident were improper rigging of the mechanical activation mechanism for the emergency floats by company maintenance personnel, and the failure of the pilot to utilize the electrical firing system to activate the emergency floats.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 11, 2004 · about 10:10 pm local time
Place
Skagway, Alaska · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Aerospatiale AS-350B2 · all AS-350B2s on the register
Registration
N60618 · no longer on the register · serial 2565
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The commercial certificated helicopter pilot, with 4 passengers aboard a single-engine, emergency float-equipped helicopter, was returning to its base after departing a remote glacier during an air tour flight. The helicopter was flying along the edge of a fjord, adjacent to steep terrain. About 2,200 feet msl, the engine lost power, and the pilot entered an autorotation. The pilot selected an emergency landing area at the rocky edge of the fjord. During the autorotation, the pilot pulled the manual activation handle to deploy the emergency floats, but they did not deploy. The pilot did not use the electrical emergency float deployment switch. Postaccident examination of the helicopter's emergency float system disclosed that the manual activation cable was improperly rigged. The pilot landed the helicopter in the water, on a rocky shelf. The pilot and passengers exited the helicopter into waist-deep water and gathered on the rocks. The helicopter remained upright for a short time, but then sank. The pilot reported that the helicopter was fueled before his departure, and the fuel quantity was 50 to 55 percent at takeoff. When the pilot departed the glacier on the accident flight, he said the fuel quantity was 30 to 35 percent. The flight from the glacier to the operator's base should have taken about 20 minutes. The pilot reported that the operator records a total daily use of fuel for its fleet of helicopters, but does not maintain individual fuel records for each helicopter. After the helicopter's recovery, an examination revealed that the fuel tank contained about 32 percent fluid. The fluid was sea water, except for about 1.5 quarts of fuel. Fuel was found in the airframe fuel filter, and in the fuel line from the filter to the engine fuel control. The fuel tank has an internal, resistor type fuel probe which incorporates a float, and a low fuel level position, which when reached, should illuminate a low fuel annunciator. The fuel tank incorporates a vent tube at the top of the tank to allow atmospheric air pressure to enter the tank. The operator had marked fuel quantity level lines on the exterior of the tank depicting fuel level, and percent of fuel at each line. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed no mechanical abnormality. A functional test of the fuel probe was not completed due to damage received in the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 1,159 hours in all; 17 in this make and model; 57 in the last 90 days; 17 in the last 30 days; 1,090 as pilot in command; 879 on instruments
  • Last flight review: April 1, 2004
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,512 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, October 17, 2003; 45 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,961 lb
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Turbomeca Arriel 1D1 (turboshaft); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: PAGY Skagway AK at 5:00 pm
  • Destination: PAGY Skagway AK

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 205° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.22 inHg
  • Observation at 4:53 pm from PAGY, 6 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew1
Passengers4

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Other NTSB records under N60618 the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

1995-05-31ANC95LA062 · accident near Skagway, AK · substantial damage · no injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.