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Accidents · NTSB WPR24FA196 · Final report

Lockheed 12A accident near Chino, California, June 15, 2024

On June 15, 2024 at about 7:36 pm local time, a 1939 Lockheed 12A, registered N93R, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Chino, California (Chino airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack during the initial climb, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at an altitude insufficient for recovery. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to ensure that the airplane was properly configured for takeoff.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 15, 2024 · about 7:36 pm local time
Place
Chino, California · Chino · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Lockheed 12A, built 1939 · all 12As on the register
Registration
N93R · no longer on the register · serial 1257
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The accident flight was conducted before a Father’s Day event to prepare for a planned three-airplane formation flight later that day. During the morning briefing, the pilot and co-pilot were assigned to the accident airplane. A representative of the operator believed that the co-pilot extended the flaps during a functional test as part of the preflight inspection. Ground crew members subsequently observed the flaps extended during engine start and warned the flight crew using hand and arm signals; however, the flight crew did not acknowledge the warning. Witness observations indicated that the flaps remained fully extended during taxi and takeoff, and video evidence showed that the flaps remained extended during the initial climb. The operator reported that crews commonly used reduced engine power on hot days to reduce engine oil temperatures and engine noise. After takeoff, the airplane climbed to approximately 200 to 300 ft above ground level (agl); it then pitched up, turned left, and entered a nose-down descent before impacting terrain. A postcrash fire ensued. A video study determined that both engines continued to operate until impact and that their speeds ranged from approximately 1,978 rpm to 2,098 rpm, somewhat below the 2,200- to 2,300-rpm takeoff speed. The pilot had cardiovascular disease, including moderate coronary artery disease, an implanted pacemaker/defibrillator, and obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) with continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) device use. The FAA issued the pilot an Authorization for Special Issuance for a Second-Class medical certificate with permanent pacemaker implantation, atrial fibrillation, obstructive sleep apnea treated with CPAP and the use of medication. The pilot’s cardiovascular disease was associated with an increased risk of sudden impairment or incapacitating cardiovascular event such as ventricular arrhythmia, heart attack, or stroke. No forensic evidence indicated that such an event occurred. However, such events do not leave reliable autopsy evidence if the event occurs just before death, and no data were available from the pilot’s implanted pacemaker/defibrillator. Thus, the investigation was unable to determine if sudden incapacitation or impairment was a factor in this accident. Postaccident examination found no evidence of preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Flight control continuity from the cockpit controls to the primary flight control surfaces was established; the observed flight control cable separations were consistent with damage sustained during the accident sequence. The airplane flight manual specified that the flaps should be in the Up position for takeoff. However, witnesses observed the airplane taxi and takeoff with the flaps fully extended. One witness reported that the airplane appeared to be moving extremely slowly after liftoff and that, although the landing gear retracted, the flaps remained fully extended. At an altitude of about 200 to 300 ft agl, the airplane pitched up, and the witness observed the left wing drop before the airplane entered a nose-down descent. The video study showed that the airplane flew approximately straight until about 4.7 seconds before impact, when it began a left turn, and that it impacted terrain in an approximately 90° left-wing-down attitude. The observed pitch increase, left-wing drop, and subsequent nose-low descent were consistent with the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and entering an aerodynamic stall at an altitude insufficient for recovery.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aerodynamic stall/spin during initial climb defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Capability exceeded
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › TE flap actuator › Incorrect use/operation
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot, flight engineer, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument airplane; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: balloon; rotorcraft: glider; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 16,400 hours in all
  • Last flight review: June 3, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (waiver time limited special)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
  • Flight time: 512 hours in all
  • Last flight review: September 2, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (waiver time limited special)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,321 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, March 1, 2024; 4 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 8,400 lb
  • Seats: 8
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: P&W R985-14B (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: P&W R985-14B (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Yanks Air Museum

The flight

  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 26R, 4,858 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 280° at 8 knots, gusting 15
  • Visibility: 8 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 91°F (33°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.81 inHg
  • Observation at 12:40 pm from KCNO, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KCNO 151940Z 28008G15KT 8SM CLR 33/16 A2981 RMK AO2 T03280161

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig2

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR24FA196.