The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily · Carbon Free Flight by 2050
Accidents · NTSB WPR24FA184 · Final report

Beech A45 accident near Deer Harbor, Washington, June 7, 2024

On June 7, 2024 at about 6:40 pm local time, a 1961 Beech A45, registered N268AF, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering (aerobatics) near Deer Harbor, Washington. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

Preview. This page is not yet listed for search engines.

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s decision to perform an aerobatic maneuver at low level, and his misjudged entry altitude for the maneuver, which resulted in impact with water.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 7, 2024 · about 6:40 pm local time
Place
Deer Harbor, Washington · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech A45, built 1961 · all A45s on the register
Registration
N268AF · registry record · serial G-828
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was performing a flight around an island archipelago where he used to live, with the intention of also performing a flyby of a friend’s home. He was familiar with the route of flight and had performed the same flyby multiple times before. The friend stated that, in the past, the pilot often rocked the airplane’s wings during his flybys, but had never performed aerobatics. She stated that, during the accident flight, the airplane was flying at a higher altitude than on previous occasions. The left wing then dropped, and she thought this was part of the pilot’s usual routine; however, the wing continued to drop as the airplane began to rapidly descend toward the water. The airplane began to pull out of the dive, but by the time it had recovered to an almost wings-level, upright attitude, the belly impacted the water. Video of the accident recorded by another witness in the vicinity showed the airplane inverted and diving, in what appeared to be the early stages of an aerobatic maneuver consistent with a splitS. Video analysis indicated that the airplane began the maneuver about 1,800 ft above the water. Its flight path followed a constantradius arc which, at its lowest point, extended 30 feet below the water’s surface. Examination of the airframe and engine showed no evidence of preaccident malfunction. Video footage indicated that the engine was operating during the descent and appeared to be producing power at impact. Damage to the airplane’s altimeter precluded a determination of its operating status at the time of the accident; however, its Kollsman window was set correctly for local atmospheric conditions. The pilot had an extensive and distinguished career in human spaceflight and aviation, and according to family members exhibited a lifelong pattern of maintaining high standards and conservative flying habits. Evidence suggests, however, that as he aged the pilot became less rigid in maintaining those standards. As an example, he was not wearing a personal floatation device during the accident flight despite his self-imposed rule of doing so when flying over water. Additionally, although it was reported that he never performed aerobatics without wearing a parachute, the pilot did perform a barrel roll the week before the accident without wearing one. According to the pilot’s son, performing a split-S maneuver at such a low altitude and with such little margin for error would have been out of character for the pilot. The pilot’s decision to perform the flyby at a higher altitude than usual suggests that he likely intended to perform the maneuver, but misjudged the entry altitude. The pilot’s medical profile included conditions typical for a 90-year-old, and evidence suggested that behaviorally he demonstrated impatience with other aircraft in the traffic pattern and was struggling with the communications equipment in another similar airplane. About 10 years before the accident, he voluntarily stopped flying aerobatics at airshows and flying higherperformance airplanes because he was concerned about damaging them. He shifted instead to simpler, seasonal flying in the accident airplane type—the airplane in which he originally learned to fly—and had recently stopped flying solo in congested airspace. Nevertheless, the pilot’s son stated that his flying skills were still excellent. Although regulations permit any authorized flight instructor to conduct a flight review, the pilot’s son served as the pilot’s exclusive reviewer and recurrent instructor. This resulted in a lack of independent oversight, and due to family dynamics and the power disparity associated with the pilot’s experience, this arrangement may have limited the candid identification of riskincreasing behaviors or degrading skills. The pilot’s autopsy report indicated his cause of death was a result of multiple blunt force injuries. The examination identified moderate coronary artery disease, but did not identify other significant natural diseases. As a result of his heart disease, the pilot was at some increased risk of a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiac event, such as chest pain, arrhythmia, or heart attack. However, such an event does not leave reliable autopsy evidence if it occurs immediately before death. The pilot also would have been experiencing the effects of elevated G-forces during the maneuver. Pilot tolerance to G-forces is affected by multiple factors, including magnitude and duration of the acceleration, the individual’s training and level of fitness, and other health factors. However, the coordinated manner in which the maneuver was performed indicated that the pilot was actively controlling the airplane throughout. Thus, it is unlikely that the effects of the pilot’s coronary artery disease or encounter with elevated G-forces contributed to the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during maneuvering (aerobatics)
  2. Attempted remediation/recovery during maneuvering (aerobatics)
  3. Low altitude operation/event during maneuvering (aerobatics) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot, military
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; multi-engine sea; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; instrument: powered-lift; rotorcraft: glider; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 10,000 hours in all; 1,000 in this make and model; 2.7 in the last 90 days; 2.7 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: June 1, 2024
  • Medical certificate: BasicMed
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 8,401.2 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, April 18, 2024; 4.2 hours since
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Cont Motor IO-520BB (piston); 1,084 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: BVS Burlington WA at 6:13 pm
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 350° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 9 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.05 inHg
  • Observation at 11:35 am from KORS, 7 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KORS 071835Z AUTO 35006KT 9SM CLR 14/11 A3005 RMK AO2=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR24FA184.