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Accidents · NTSB WPR23FA302 · Final report

Bell 407 and Sikorsky S-64E mid-air collision near Cabazon, California, August 7, 2023

On August 7, 2023 at about 1:44 am local time, 2 aircraft, Bell 407 (N555AS) and Sikorsky S-64E (N4037S), were involved in a mid-air collision near Cabazon, California (Banning Muni airport). 3 people were killed; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The Skycrane flight crew’s decision to enter the Fire Traffic Area’s 7-nm NOCOM ring at an altitude significantly above their maximum cleared altitude, which resulted in their need for an aggressive descent into congested airspace and subsequent failure to see and avoid the Bell 407.
The Skycrane flight crew’s decision to enter the Fire Traffic Area’s 7-nm NOCOM ring at an altitude significantly above their maximum cleared altitude, which resulted in their need for an aggressive descent into congested airspace and subsequent failure to see and avoid the Bell 407.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 7, 2023 · about 1:44 am local time · cases in 2023
Place
Cabazon, California · Banning Muni · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident · mid-air collision
Injuries
3 people were killed; 2 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Bell 407, built 2004 · all 407s on the register
Registration
N555AS · registry record · serial 53591
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Public-use flight (state) · public-use (government) rules
Aircraft 2
Sikorsky S-64E, built 1975 · all S-64Es on the register
Registration
N4037S · registry record · serial 64101
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Public-use flight (state) · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative for the Bell 407 final · quoted from the NTSB record

Two helicopters collided in a Fire Traffic Area (FTA) during cruise flight while responding to a fire. Both helicopters were dispatched from Hemet-Ryan Airport (HMT), about 16 nm miles southwest of the fire. The first helicopter dispatched was a Bell 407, as an instructional Helicopter Coordinator platform, and the other was a Skycrane helitanker, dispatched to support water dropping operations. The Bell 407 and Skycrane were dispatched and departed about 3 minutes apart. The Bell 407 travelled north, skirting and staying west of the San Jacinto Mountain range between HMT and the fire, while the Skycrane travelled northeast over the western section of the mountain range. Both helicopters were operating under FTA procedures overseen by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE). According to CAL FIRE’s procedures, inbound aircraft were required to contact the Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) for permission to proceed into both the 12-nm Initial Communication Ring as well as the 7-nm No Communication (NOCOM) Ring of the FTA. Likely due to the mountainous terrain, neither helicopter was able to receive a clear radio signal from ATGS before entering the 12-nm ring. Instead, both helicopter crews decided to maneuver to have a better line of sight for radio transmission before reaching the 7-nm ring. Flight track data and communication recordings showed that the Bell 407 flight crew initiated a 360° turn to establish communication with ATGS before crossing the 7-nm ring. Shortly after, they descended and leveled off at the maximum assigned altitude of 2,500 ft msl, about 5 nm from the fire, where they stayed in level flight until the collision. The Skycrane’s flight crew attempted to contact ATGS before entering the 7-nm ring; however, they continued about 1 nm, or 30 seconds, into the 7-nm ring before ATGS provided their clearance. After providing the Skycrane’s call sign and the altimeter setting, ATGS stated, “you are cleared in 2,500 [ft] and below, air attack [ATGS] is at 4,500, one tanker at 3,500 [ft], and you have multiple hazards in the area. I [ATGS] will orient you once you get on the scene.” The crew of the Skycrane, already in the FTA at about 4,000 ft msl, then acknowledged the clearance before climbing to about 4,300 ft, likely to avoid terrain. After both helicopters were cleared into the FTA and to the fire, no further position reports by either helicopter were recorded. After climbing, the crew of the Skycrane then initiated a rapid descent after it overflew mountainous terrain to get to the maximum clearance altitude of 2,500 ft, which they reached 3 seconds before the collision; they were in a slight right descending turn during the impact about 2 nm west of the fire at 2,450 ft msl. According to NWCG guidelines, the Skycrane pilot should have advised ATGS that the aircraft could not comply with the altitude clearance and should have informed ATGS of their aggressive descent, which falls into the definition of a non-standard maneuver and constitutes communication to aerial supervision. Surveillance footage showed that the Bell 407 was in level flight when it was impacted by the Skycrane's right wheel and tire assembly. The impact was immediately followed by an explosion and the separation of the Bell 407’s tail boom, main rotor, mast, and transmission. The remaining portion of the fuselage continued in the direction of the Bell 407's flightpath until it impacted terrain. The Skycrane’s right main wheel and tire assembly were damaged by the Bell 407’s main rotor blade during the collision. Postaccident examination of the Bell 407 revealed that all major structural components of the helicopter were present within the wreckage debris path. Wreckage and impact signatures were consistent with a midair collision. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. All on-board communication and video recordings within the Bell 407 were destroyed by the post-crash fire. CAL FIRE procedures stated that if any part of the clearance could not be complied with, “the inbound aircraft will remain outside the NOCOM ring until an amended clearance is received and understood.” However, the Skycrane’s crew did not remain outside of the 7-nm ring, did not report to ATGS that they were unable to comply with the altitude restriction, and did not inform ATGS of their intention to rapidly descend and follow mountainous terrain until they reached the clearance altitude. Toxicology results indicated that the Bell pilot had used the antihistamine medication cetirizine. Although his cetirizine levels indicate a possibility that the Bell pilot may have been experiencing some associated impairing effects, the circumstances of the accident do not suggest that the pilot’s impairment contributed to the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Sikorsky S-64E final · quoted from the NTSB record

Two helicopters collided in a Fire Traffic Area (FTA) during cruise flight while responding to a fire. Both helicopters were dispatched from Hemet-Ryan Airport (HMT), about 16 nm miles southwest of the fire. The first helicopter dispatched was a Bell 407, as an instructional Helicopter Coordinator platform, and the other was a Skycrane helitanker, dispatched to support water dropping operations. The Bell 407 and Skycrane were dispatched and departed about 3 minutes apart. The Bell 407 travelled north, skirting and staying west of the San Jacinto Mountain range between HMT and the fire, while the Skycrane travelled northeast over the western section of the mountain range. Both helicopters were operating under FTA procedures overseen by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE). According to CAL FIRE’s procedures, inbound aircraft were required to contact the Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) for permission to proceed into both the 12-nm Initial Communication Ring as well as the 7-nm No Communication (NOCOM) Ring of the FTA. Likely due to the mountainous terrain, neither helicopter was able to receive a clear radio signal from ATGS before entering the 12-nm ring. Instead, both helicopter crews decided to maneuver to have a better line of sight for radio transmission before reaching the 7-nm ring. Flight track data and communication recordings showed that the Bell 407 flight crew initiated a 360° turn to establish communication with ATGS before crossing the 7-nm ring. Shortly after, they descended and leveled off at the maximum assigned altitude of 2,500 ft msl, about 5 nm from the fire, where they stayed in level flight until the collision. The Skycrane’s flight crew attempted to contact ATGS before entering the 7-nm ring; however, they continued about 1 nm, or 30 seconds, into the 7-nm ring before ATGS provided their clearance. After providing the Skycrane’s call sign and the altimeter setting, ATGS stated, “you are cleared in 2,500 [ft] and below, air attack [ATGS] is at 4,500, one tanker at 3,500 [ft], and you have multiple hazards in the area. I [ATGS] will orient you once you get on the scene.” The crew of the Skycrane, already in the FTA at about 4,000 ft msl, then acknowledged the clearance before climbing to about 4,300 ft, likely to avoid terrain. After both helicopters were cleared into the FTA and to the fire, no further position reports by either helicopter were recorded. After climbing, the crew of the Skycrane then initiated a rapid descent after it overflew mountainous terrain to get to the maximum clearance altitude of 2,500 ft, which they reached 3 seconds before the collision; they were in a slight right descending turn during the impact about 2 nm west of the fire at 2,450 ft msl. According to NWCG guidelines, the Skycrane pilot should have advised ATGS that the aircraft could not comply with the altitude clearance and should have informed ATGS of their aggressive descent, which falls into the definition of a non-standard maneuver and constitutes communication to aerial supervision. Surveillance footage showed that the Bell 407 was in level flight when it was impacted by the Skycrane's right wheel and tire assembly. The impact was immediately followed by an explosion and the separation of the Bell 407’s tail boom, main rotor, mast, and transmission. The remaining portion of the fuselage continued in the direction of the Bell 407's flightpath until it impacted terrain. The Skycrane’s right main wheel and tire assembly were damaged by the Bell 407’s main rotor blade during the collision. Postaccident examination of the Bell 407 revealed that all major structural components of the helicopter were present within the wreckage debris path. Wreckage and impact signatures were consistent with a midair collision. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. All on-board communication and video recordings within the Bell 407 were destroyed by the post-crash fire. CAL FIRE procedures stated that if any part of the clearance could not be complied with, “the inbound aircraft will remain outside the NOCOM ring until an amended clearance is received and understood.” However, the Skycrane’s crew did not remain outside of the 7-nm ring, did not report to ATGS that they were unable to comply with the altitude restriction, and did not inform ATGS of their intention to rapidly descend and follow mountainous terrain until they reached the clearance altitude. Toxicology results indicated that the Bell pilot had used the antihistamine medication cetirizine. Although his cetirizine levels indicate a possibility that the Bell pilot may have been experiencing some associated impairing effects, the circumstances of the accident do not suggest that the pilot’s impairment contributed to the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Bell 407 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot of other aircraft
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 91 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 2,058 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 27, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,926.9 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, August 6, 2023
  • Maximum gross weight: 5,250 lb
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Honeywell HTS-900 (turboshaft); 1,975 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Air Shasta Rotor & Wing Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: HMT Hemet CA at 1:34 am

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 190° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 97°F (36°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.94 inHg
  • Observation at 5:53 pm from KBMT, 2 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KBMT 062250Z AUTO 19009KT 10SM CLR 36/22 A2994 RMK AO2 T03580222=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers2

The factual record for the Sikorsky S-64E from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Midair collision during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Flight crew
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Flight crew
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Flight crew
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
  • Ratings: rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 6,988 hours in all; 2,000 in this make and model; 20 in the last 90 days; 12 in the last 30 days; 6,019 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 27, 2023
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 8,800 hours in all; 287 in this make and model; 33 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days; 8,800 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 27, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 18,403.4 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, July 29, 2023
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: P & W JFTD12A-4A (turboshaft); 10,679 hours total
  • Engine 2: P & W JFTD12A-4A (turboshaft); 6,722 hours total
  • Operator: Siller Helicopters INC

The flight

  • Departed from: HMT Hemet CA at 1:37 am
  • A second pilot was aboard

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

17 documents, released by the NTSB on September 11, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Skycrane Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 13 pages · our copy View Download
2 Air Shasta Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages · our copy View Download
3 Witness Statements PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
4 Pilot Training Records PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
5 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
6 GPS Track (Plot) Skycrane map file · our copy Download
7 GPS Track (Plot) Skycrane Cvs File spreadsheet · our copy Download
8 GPS Track (Plot) Bell 407 map file · our copy Download
9 GPS Track (Plot) Bell 407 Csv File spreadsheet · our copy Download
10 Video File - Surveillance Recording MOV file Download
11 On-scene Examination Summary PDF, 13 pages · our copy View Download
12 Follow-up Examination Summary PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
13 Fta Procedures PDF, 36 pages · our copy View Download
14 Nwcg Tactical Operations Excerpt PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
15 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 7 pages · our copy View Download
16 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
17 Appareo Vision 1000 - Group Chair's Factual Report PDF, 35 pages · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR23FA302.json.

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Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.