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Accidents · NTSB WPR21FA283 · Final report

Siai-Marchetti SM-1019B accident near Lewiston, Idaho, July 24, 2021

On July 24, 2021 at about 6:52 pm local time, a 1977 Siai-Marchetti SM-1019B, registered N28U, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Lewiston, Idaho (Lewiston-Nez Perce County airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to remove the flight control lock before departure, which resulted in a loss of airplane control and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was his failure to perform an adequate preflight inspection and flight control check before takeoff.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 24, 2021 · about 6:52 pm local time · cases in 2021
Place
Lewiston, Idaho · Lewiston-Nez Perce County · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Siai-Marchetti SM-1019B, built 1977 · all SM-1019Bs on the register
Registration
N28U · no longer on the register · serial 06502002
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was attempting an intersection takeoff about midfield when, shortly after the airplane became airborne, it pitched up aggressively, rolled left, and descended into the ground in a nose-down attitude. Examination did not reveal any evidence of preaccident malfunctions or failures of the flight control system, and there was no evidence to indicate that the pilot’s seat had moved. Both the engine and propeller exhibited damage signatures consistent with high engine power at impact. The airplane was equipped with a flight control locking system that comprised a pivoting, U-shaped control lock tube mounted permanently to the rudder pedal assembly and a forward-facing locking arm mounted to the pilot’s control stick. The control lock immobilized the aileron and elevator controls but still allowed for near-full movement of the rudder and tailwheel. The cabin floor, where the control lock tube should have been mounted for flight, was severely deformed and compressed. Had the lock been stowed during impact, it would have been pinned under the flight control stick, crushed longitudinally, and its retaining clip would have been deformed; however, the control lock and its retaining clip were essentially undamaged, and the lock was found raised off the floor. The locking arm on the control stick also showed no evidence of deformation or impact damage but had rotated about 90° to the right of its normal position, as if forced into that position on impact while the control lock was still attached. Given this information, it is likely that the control lock was installed on the flight control stick during takeoff and impact. High-resolution security camera footage of the accident revealed no discernable movement of the elevators or ailerons, further suggesting that the flight controls were immobilized by the control lock. Although the control lock is painted red, its orientation when engaged results in the pilot viewing it directly down its length, at its narrowest profile. A pilot who owned a similar airplane stated that he had once become distracted during preflight checks and was able to taxi, initiate takeoff, and become airborne with the control lock engaged. He stated that, once he realized his mistake, removal of the lock was a struggle due to the forces imposed on the control stick during takeoff. The pitch trim was found in an almost full nose-down position, suggesting that the pilot may have been attempting to use the trim to arrest the airplane’s increasing nose-up attitude due to the locked control stick. Whether the pilot recognized that the control lock was engaged or believed he had a flight control problem could not be determined. Regardless, after takeoff during a dynamic and transitional phase of flight, there would have been minimal time to accurately diagnose the issue and disconnect the control lock. The intended purpose and destination of the flight was routine and there was no apparent time pressure present. The pilot was reported to be extremely thorough about performing preflight checks, and according to his wife, the expected duration of his normal preflight activities would not have allowed him to depart when he did. The pilot had limited experience in the accident airplane, which could explain why he did not remove the control lock during the preflight inspection. There was no video evidence to provide insight into the duration and scope of the pilot’s preflight inspection; however, omission of the preflight control check was uncharacteristic given his extensive flight experience, and the reason it was not performed could not be determined. While omission of the control check is consistent with a pilot rushing or distracted, and the short duration from taxi to takeoff would have reduced this pilot’s opportunity to detect his error, the investigation was not able to determine the reason it was not performed. Had the pilot completed a functional check of the controls before initiating takeoff, the presence of the lock would have been detected and the accident would have been prevented. Although the pilot’s autopsy demonstrated the presence of heart disease, which posed an increased risk of an impairing or incapacitating cardiac event, heart disease is unlikely to have caused inattention. It is also unlikely that the pilot was incapacitated by a cardiac event because his final radio transmission showed that he was aware and speaking after the onset of loss of control. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot’s heart disease contributed to the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during initial climb defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Gust lock or damper › Incorrect use/operation other cases naming the flight controls
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Pitch control › Attain/maintain not possible
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 6,500 hours in all; 20 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: condition inspection, May 3, 2021
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,800 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rolls Royce/Allison 250-B17B (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Jackson 50 LLC

The flight

  • Destination: 37ID Grangeville ID
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 12, 5,003 ft by 75 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 6,000 ft
  • Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.09 inHg
  • Observation at 11:56 am from KLWS

Weather report (METAR): METAR KLWS 241856Z 00000KT 10SM SCT060 30/02 A3009 RMK AO2 SLP177 T03000017

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

25 documents, released by the NTSB on July 6, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Materials Laboratory Factual Report 22-007 PDF, 15 pages · our copy View Download
2 Airport Cameras - Factual Report PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
3 NTSB Control Lock Study PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
4 Witness Statements PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
5 Lws-airport Diagram PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
6 Record of Conversation-flight Instructor PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
7 Record of Conversation-pilot's Wife PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
8 Record of Conversation-hewett PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
9 Record of Conversation-hillcrest Employee PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
10 Air Traffic Control Audio-ground Control audio View Download
11 Air Traffic Control Audio-local Control audio View Download
12 NTSB Accident Site and Follow-up Examination Summary PDF, 6 pages · our copy View Download
13 Rolls-royce Engine Report PDF, 13 pages · our copy View Download
14 Hartzell Propeller-review of Photos PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
15 Last Maintenance Logbook Entries PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
16 Autopilot Pitch Servo Examination PDF, 6 pages · our copy View Download
17 Fuel Order Form PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
18 Security Video-airline Backdoor View ASF file Download
19 Security Video-apron View ASF file Download
20 Security Video-ramp 1 View ASF file Download
21 Flight Manual Excerpts PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
22 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation-hartzell Propellers PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
23 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation-rolls Royce PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
24 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
25 Toxicology Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR21FA283.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.