Siai-Marchetti SM-1019B accident near Lewiston, Idaho, July 24, 2021
On July 24, 2021 at about 6:52 pm local time, a 1977 Siai-Marchetti SM-1019B, registered N28U, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Lewiston, Idaho (Lewiston-Nez Perce County airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s failure to remove the flight control lock before departure, which resulted in a loss of airplane control and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was his failure to perform an adequate preflight inspection and flight control check before takeoff.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 24, 2021 · about 6:52 pm local time
- Place
- Lewiston, Idaho · Lewiston-Nez Perce County · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Siai-Marchetti SM-1019B, built 1977 · all SM-1019Bs on the register
- Registration
- N28U · no longer on the register · serial 06502002
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was attempting an intersection takeoff about midfield when, shortly after the airplane became airborne, it pitched up aggressively, rolled left, and descended into the ground in a nose-down attitude. Examination did not reveal any evidence of preaccident malfunctions or failures of the flight control system, and there was no evidence to indicate that the pilot’s seat had moved. Both the engine and propeller exhibited damage signatures consistent with high engine power at impact. The airplane was equipped with a flight control locking system that comprised a pivoting, U-shaped control lock tube mounted permanently to the rudder pedal assembly and a forward-facing locking arm mounted to the pilot’s control stick. The control lock immobilized the aileron and elevator controls but still allowed for near-full movement of the rudder and tailwheel. The cabin floor, where the control lock tube should have been mounted for flight, was severely deformed and compressed. Had the lock been stowed during impact, it would have been pinned under the flight control stick, crushed longitudinally, and its retaining clip would have been deformed; however, the control lock and its retaining clip were essentially undamaged, and the lock was found raised off the floor. The locking arm on the control stick also showed no evidence of deformation or impact damage but had rotated about 90° to the right of its normal position, as if forced into that position on impact while the control lock was still attached. Given this information, it is likely that the control lock was installed on the flight control stick during takeoff and impact. High-resolution security camera footage of the accident revealed no discernable movement of the elevators or ailerons, further suggesting that the flight controls were immobilized by the control lock. Although the control lock is painted red, its orientation when engaged results in the pilot viewing it directly down its length, at its narrowest profile. A pilot who owned a similar airplane stated that he had once become distracted during preflight checks and was able to taxi, initiate takeoff, and become airborne with the control lock engaged. He stated that, once he realized his mistake, removal of the lock was a struggle due to the forces imposed on the control stick during takeoff. The pitch trim was found in an almost full nose-down position, suggesting that the pilot may have been attempting to use the trim to arrest the airplane’s increasing nose-up attitude due to the locked control stick. Whether the pilot recognized that the control lock was engaged or believed he had a flight control problem could not be determined. Regardless, after takeoff during a dynamic and transitional phase of flight, there would have been minimal time to accurately diagnose the issue and disconnect the control lock. The intended purpose and destination of the flight was routine and there was no apparent time pressure present. The pilot was reported to be extremely thorough about performing preflight checks, and according to his wife, the expected duration of his normal preflight activities would not have allowed him to depart when he did. The pilot had limited experience in the accident airplane, which could explain why he did not remove the control lock during the preflight inspection. There was no video evidence to provide insight into the duration and scope of the pilot’s preflight inspection; however, omission of the preflight control check was uncharacteristic given his extensive flight experience, and the reason it was not performed could not be determined. While omission of the control check is consistent with a pilot rushing or distracted, and the short duration from taxi to takeoff would have reduced this pilot’s opportunity to detect his error, the investigation was not able to determine the reason it was not performed. Had the pilot completed a functional check of the controls before initiating takeoff, the presence of the lock would have been detected and the accident would have been prevented. Although the pilot’s autopsy demonstrated the presence of heart disease, which posed an increased risk of an impairing or incapacitating cardiac event, heart disease is unlikely to have caused inattention. It is also unlikely that the pilot was incapacitated by a cardiac event because his final radio transmission showed that he was aware and speaking after the onset of loss of control. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot’s heart disease contributed to the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during initial climb defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Gust lock or damper › Incorrect use/operation
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Pilot
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Pitch control › Attain/maintain not possible
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 6,500 hours in all; 20 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Last inspection: condition inspection, May 3, 2021
- Maximum gross weight: 2,800 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rolls Royce/Allison 250-B17B (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Jackson 50 LLC
The flight
- Destination: 37ID Grangeville ID
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 12, 5,003 ft by 75 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 6,000 ft
- Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
- Altimeter: 30.09 inHg
- Observation at 11:56 am from KLWS
Weather report (METAR): METAR KLWS 241856Z 00000KT 10SM SCT060 30/02 A3009 RMK AO2 SLP177 T03000017
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR21FA283.
