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Accidents · NTSB WPR20LA130 · Final report

Bell UH 1H accident near Mesa, Arizona, April 24, 2020

On April 24, 2020 at about 11:00 pm local time, a 1941 Bell UH 1H (helicopter), registered N3276T, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Mesa, Arizona. It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

An in-flight separation of the tail rotor gearbox from the airframe due to fatigue failure of the gearbox attachment studs, resulting in a loss of directional control and subsequent ground impact. Contributing to the accident were 1) the improper application of paint on the clamping surfaces between the tail rotor gearbox and the vertical stabilizer that led to the initiation of fatigue fractures on the gearbox attachment studs and 2) the lack of a requirement to check the torque of the gearbox attachment hardware after installation of a gearbox onto the airframe.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 24, 2020 · about 11:00 pm local time
Place
Mesa, Arizona · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Bell UH 1H No Series, built 1941 · all UH 1Hs on the register
Registration
N3276T · no longer on the register · serial 69-15911
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Witnesses reported they observed the helicopter flying low with white smoke emitting from the rear rotor area. Suddenly, the tail rotor separated from the helicopter and landed in a dirt lot below. The helicopter continued northeast as it started to spin and impacted the ground. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed no preimpact anomalies. The top of the vertical stabilizer, tail rotor assembly, tail rotor gearbox, input quill assembly, and mounting studs were examined. Progressive crack growth was noted on the mounting studs within the tail rotor gearbox housing. The fracture surfaces were relatively rough, consistent with low-cycle fatigue or cyclic overstress crack growth under relatively high cyclic stresses. Additionally, multiple layers of primer, paint, and sealant were observed on the input quill assembly, including paint on the flange clamping surface where it had mated to the vertical stabilizer. Paint was also observed on the vertical stabilizer support casting where it had mated to the input quill as well as the washers for the tail rotor gearbox attachment hardware. In 2012, the gearbox was removed from another helicopter, repaired, painted, and installed on the accident helicopter. There was no other information regarding the installation. In January 2019, the helicopter was painted and photographs that were taken during this process indicated that the tail boom, tail rotor gearbox, and tail rotor assembly remained installed during the painting process. In addition, the tail rotor assembly and tail rotor gearbox were masked. Therefore, the paint found on the contact mounting surfaces was likely applied during the gearbox installation in 2012; however, the maintenance logs did not provide detailed information of the painting process. In April 2019, the tail rotor gearbox was removed from the vertical stabilizer for a corrosion inspection; no defects were noted in the maintenance logs. A retorque and/or torque stabilization check was not completed after the gearbox was installed, nor was it required to be according to applicable technical manuals. The presence of paint on the contact surfaces between the tail rotor gearbox and vertical stabilizer can lead to excessive relaxation of clamping forces due to compressive creep deformation of the paint. Therefore, the improper application of paint on the contact surfaces, which would have been disturbed during the last tail rotor gearbox removal about 39 flight hours prior to the accident, was likely a factor in the eventual reduction in clamping force of the tail rotor gearbox installation onto the vertical stabilizer. However, improper torque of the retaining nuts would also affect the clamping force between the tail rotor gearbox and the vertical stabilizer, but it could not be determined if the retaining nuts were properly torqued during the tail rotor gearbox’s reinstallation after the corrosion inspection in April 2019. The reduction in clamping force on the installation led to the initiation of fatigue fractures on the attachment studs and subsequent separation of the tail rotor gearbox from the vertical stabilizer in flight. The separation of the tail rotor gearbox resulted in a loss of directional control of the helicopter. Had a retorque and/or torque stabilization check of the gearbox retaining nuts been required, it could have identified the reduction in clamping force of the tail rotor gearbox’s installation onto the vertical stabilizer prior to the accident. The detected levels of oxycodone and its psychoactive metabolite oxymorphone in the pilot’s specimen are most consistent with some degree of tolerance to the effects of oxycodone, indicating regular use. Although it is likely that the pilot was impaired to some degree by the effects of oxycodone at the time of the accident, pilot impairment is unlikely to have contributed to the accident circumstances given that the tail rotor assembly separated in flight.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Part(s) separation from AC during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Modification/alteration › Maintenance personnel
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › Fasteners › Not specified
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › (general) › (general) › Fatigue/wear/corrosion

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 11,550 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 714 hours in all; 32 in this make and model; 52 in the last 90 days; 11 in the last 30 days; 543 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
  • Last flight review: March 15, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 11,931 hours
  • Last inspection: inspection type not recorded; 3.5 hours since
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Honeywell T53-L-703 (turboshaft); 529 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: TRM Palm Springs CA
  • Destination: FFZ Mesa AZ
  • Flight plan: none
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 280° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 95°F (35°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.85 inHg
  • Observation at 10:50 pm from IWA, 9 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

21 documents, released by the NTSB on April 19, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 NTSB Medical Specialist Factual Report PDF, 3 pages View Download
2 Materials Laboratory Factual Report 20-017 PDF, 10 pages View Download
3 Helicopter Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 5 pages View Download
4 Helicopter Specialist's Factual Report - Attachment 1 PDF, 13 pages View Download
5 Helicopter Specialist's Factual Report - Attachment 2 PDF, 1 page View Download
6 Google Earth Map - Wreckage Debris Path with Flight Track PDF, 1 page View Download
7 Witness Statements PDF, 2 pages View Download
8 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 9 pages View Download
9 Record of Conversation - Second Pilot PDF, 1 page View Download
10 Record of Conversation - FAA Inspector Regarding on Scene (Photos Included) PDF, 13 pages View Download
11 Record of Conversation - Federal Aviation Administraton Regarding Initial Overview Exam of Tail Rotor Components. PDF, 6 pages View Download
12 Airframe and Engine Examination Observations PDF, 10 pages View Download
13 radar Data - Google Earth map file Download
14 radar Data - Tabular data file Download
15 Record of Memorandum - Autopsy PDF, 1 page View Download
16 Record of Email - FAA Regarding Toxicology PDF, 1 page View Download
17 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 1 page View Download
18 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page View Download
19 Evidence Control Forms PDF, 6 pages View Download
20 Video - the Helicopter's Descent video View Download
21 Video - Helicopter's Impact MOV file Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Other NTSB records under N3276T the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2008-07-15LAX08LA230 · accident near Rock Springs, WY · substantial damage · minor injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.