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Accidents · NTSB WPR18FA247 · Final report

Schempp-Hirth Duo Discus T accident near New Washoe City, Nevada, September 2, 2018

On September 2, 2018 at about 8:36 pm local time, a 2003 Schempp-Hirth Duo Discus T (glider), registered N22XC, was destroyed in an accident during maneuvering near New Washoe City, Nevada (Truckee-Tahoe airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s delayed recovery from an inadvertent spin and/or spiral dive and an exceedance of the glider’s design limit load during recovery, which resulted in an overload failure of both wings.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 2, 2018 · about 8:36 pm local time · cases in 2018
Place
New Washoe City, Nevada · Truckee-Tahoe · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Schempp-Hirth Duo Discus T NO SERIES, built 2003 · all Duo Discus Ts on the register
Registration
N22XC · no longer on the register · serial 72
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The two pilots onboard the motorized glider, one of whom was an owner of the glider, were participating in an informal competition, the goal of which was to fly between two predetermined locations in the shortest time. The takeoff, tow to altitude, and initial stages of the flight appeared uneventful. A low-resolution track of the glider’s flightpath indicated that the glider was likely flying around 14,500 ft mean sea level (msl) and circling in thermal lift just before the accident. A group of paraglider pilots was preparing to launch from an 8,700-ft-high bluff on the mountain over which the accident glider was circling. Their attention was drawn to the glider, which appeared to be performing a series of tight maneuvers that they described as “loops.” After a couple of “loops,” the glider’s wings began to flex upward almost vertically before one wing broke away and impacted the tail, and the glider descended to the ground. Ballistic trajectory analysis indicated that the glider likely broke up at about 11,500 ft msl while traveling in a steep descent toward the witnesses. Most of the glider was consumed by fire on impact, with only the separated portion of the left wing and a series of control surface, skin, and cabin components strewn over a 1,500-ft-long debris path escaping thermal damage. Although sections of the horizontal stabilizer broke away during the breakup, the horizontal stabilizer mount and elevator control structure remained attached to the glider at impact. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Given that the purpose of the flight was a timed competition and that performing aerobatics would have been out of character for the pilot/owner, it is highly unlikely that the pilots were intentionally performing aerobatic loops as described by the paraglider pilots, particularly over a mountain ridge. Due to the witnesses’ location relative to the glider, it is more likely that the witnesses were observing the glider in either a spin or a spiral dive rather than a loop. The position of the sun, which would have been generally behind the glider and to the right relative to their position, would have presented it in a high-contrast environment and could also have hindered their frame of reference. G-loading calculations revealed that a loop of the radius and period observed by the witnesses was not physically possible because the glider would have been subject to stress significantly beyond its ultimate design limit load and would have experienced structural failure well before completion of the first maneuver. The published stall recovery technique requires that the pilot firmly ease the control stick forward and, if necessary, apply opposite rudder and aileron. With a more forward center of gravity, as was the case with the two occupants onboard, should the stall develop into a spin, the glider will enter a spiral dive after recovery, which is accompanied by a rapid increase in speed and acceleration that can quickly exceed limitations. The glider’s airbrakes can be extended at speeds approaching the never-exceed speed (Vne); however, damage to the left airbrake was consistent with an inflight separation, suggesting that the pilot had extended the airbrakes in an attempt to slow the glider and that the glider exceeded Vne. Excessive elevator control input during the attempted recovery from a high-speed dive would have resulted in the witness-observed upward bending of the wings and the subsequent failure of the wings due to overload. Such upward loading of the wings would not have been possible without the presence of the horizontal stabilizer and pilot input via the elevator. Evidence of electrical arcing was present in wiring that would only have been energized if the retractable engine was in transit. Those wires were protected by circuit breakers and the engine was stowed; therefore, the arcing was likely the result of an electrical short circuit that occurred on impact or as the glider broke apart in flight. Additionally, the glider’s FLARM collision avoidance system operated throughout the flight, further indicating that some form of electrical fire was unlikely. No evidence of bird strike was observed to any of the recovered components, and radar information revealed no evidence of any conflicting traffic in the immediate vicinity of the accident glider before the accident. The canopy was closed at impact; although both occupants were wearing parachutes, and one of them was not wearing the shoulder straps of his harness, there were no other obvious indications that they attempted to egress. Postaccident medical evaluation of the two pilots was limited due to the extent of injury. Whether a medical condition of either occupant contributed to the circumstances of the accident could not be determined. Given the lack of mechanical anomalies, the overload failure of the left wing, and the glider’s rapid descent before the accident, it is likely that the glider entered an inadvertent spin or spiral dive while maneuvering and that the pilot’s delayed recovery resulted in a rapid increase in speed. It is likely that, during recovery, the pilot either used excessive pitch control beyond the glider’s published maneuvering speed (Va) or the pilot exceeded the glider’s Vne during the subsequent steep descent.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during maneuvering defining event
  2. Attempted remediation/recovery during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Capability exceeded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Wing structure › (general) › Capability exceeded other cases naming the airframe structure
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 1,000 hours in all; 400 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: March 31, 2018
  • Medical certificate: None
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 1,000 hours in all; 100 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: None
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 300 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, May 31, 2018; 20 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,543 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Solo 2350 D (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: TRK Truckee CA at 7:58 pm
  • Destination: TRK Truckee CA
  • Flight plan: none
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 090° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
  • Observation at 12:45 pm from KTRK, 13 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KTRK 021945Z 09004KT 10SM SKC 27/M03 A3012=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Photographs from the investigation 8 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

20 documents, released by the NTSB on February 24, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Airworthiness Group Chairman's Factual Report PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
2 Ballistic Study PDF, 13 pages · our copy View Download
3 Medical Factual Report PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
4 Weather Study PDF, 22 pages · our copy View Download
5 Witness Statements - Paraglider Group PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
6 Witness Statements - Truckee Tahoe Soaring Association Pilots PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
7 Witness Statements - Provided by Washoe County Sheriffa��s Office PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
8 Estimation of Glider G-loading Based on Witness Statements PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
9 Flarm Data A�� Provided by Ben Hirashima text file · our copy View Download
10 Raw Primary radar Data for FAA Rno Sensor from 1955.00Z Through 2041.58Z data file · our copy Download
11 Raw Primary radar Data for FAA Rno Sensor Matching Possible N22XC Flight Path from 2022.42Z Through 2037.10Z data file · our copy Download
12 Frames from Video Taken at Slide Mountain Courtesy of Alertwildfire.org zip file Download
13 Maintenance Records PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
14 Airworthiness Directives PDF, 31 pages · our copy View Download
15 Oxygen Receipt PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
16 Duo Discus T Maintenance Manual PDF, 122 pages · our copy View Download
17 Duo Discus T Flight Manual PDF, 162 pages · our copy View Download
18 Supplemental Photographs PDF, 8 pages · our copy View Download
19 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
20 Toxicological Reports PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR18FA247.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.