Hughes 369 accident near Majuro, July 4, 2018
On July 4, 2018 at about 9:14 pm local time, a 1978 Hughes 369 (helicopter), registered N8648F, was destroyed in an accident during initial climb near Majuro. It was an aerial observation flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's failure to maintain clearance above the surface of the ocean.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 4, 2018 · about 9:14 pm local time
- Place
- Majuro · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Hughes 369 D, built 1978 · all 369s on the register
- Registration
- N8648F · registry record · serial 180257D
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Aerial observation flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was employed by a US company that leased the helicopter and the pilot's services to a Taiwanese fishing ship. The pilot and the turbine-powered, float-equipped helicopter were stationed on the ship, and a Taiwanese observer provided fish-spotting services. No helicopter maintenance personnel were stationed on the ship. Most of the brief flight was captured by a shipboard surveillance camera. The camera faced forward, with a field of view that included the helicopter on the landing platform, as well as the ocean surface forward of and on both sides of the ship. The ocean surface appeared glassy, with only slight swells and no waves. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the visual aspects of glassy water make it difficult to judge an aircraft's height above the water, and the smooth, reflecting surface can lead to confusion. The helicopter lifted off and immediately entered a right descending turn, flying out of view on the right side of the image. Several seconds later, the helicopter re-entered the field of view via the upper right image frame. The helicopter was traveling nearly horizontal from right to left at an altitude that was sufficiently low for visible ripples to form on the water surface behind the helicopter. The helicopter struck the water, overturned, and remained afloat inverted. Skiff boats responded to the accident location within minutes, and both helicopter occupants, who were still strapped into their seats, were recovered but unable to be resuscitated Most of the helicopter, absent the tail boom and several main rotor blades, was recovered from the water, transported to shore, and examined two months later. Subsequent recovery and examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have prevented continued flight above the water surface. Main rotor blade damage signatures indicated that the engine was providing significant power at the time of water impact. Two days before the accident, the helicopter, which had been parked outside on the ship's landing platform, was exposed to a significant storm. Afterward, the pilot initially had some difficulty starting the engine because it had too much water in it. These difficulties, which included the expulsion of oil and smoke from the engine during the start attempts were resolved, and the pilot conducted a subsequent flight (before the accident flight) that lasted 1.5 hours. The oil and smoke were likely the result of a stuck check valve in the engine oil system, which would not have affected engine operation. The pilot's toxicology results indicated the presence of a sedating antihistamine that can reduce reaction time. The pilot's impairment, if any, from this medication could not be determined given the detected level of medication. However, it is possible that the medication affected the pilot's reaction time, which was especially critical given that the glassy, nearly featureless ocean surface could have hampered the pilot's ability to visually determine the helicopter's height above the water surface. This ocean surface condition, either alone or along with a decreased reaction time, could have compromised the pilot's ability to recognize and correct the helicopter's descent toward the water.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Unknown or undetermined during initial climb defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring environment › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Water › Effect on operation
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Water › Contributed to outcome
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 650 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Other crew
- Flight time: 9,999 hours in all; 9,999 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: None
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 17,560 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, June 30, 2018; 2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,000 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rolls-Royce 250-C20B (turboshaft); 15,645 hours total
- Operator: Vertol Systems Co Inc
The flight
- Departed from: Majuro at 9:14 pm
- Destination: Majuro
- Flight plan: not recorded
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 270° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
11 documents, released by the NTSB on April 21, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Medical Factual Report | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Ship Captain's Report | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Examination Report | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Engine Examination Report | PDF, 14 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Report Verbiage Resolution | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 7 | Maintenance Support Information | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Pilot's Text Messages | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 10 | Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 11 | Operator Pictures from Ship | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
