Amateur-built Lancair Evolution accident near Mesa, Arizona, July 17, 2017
On July 17, 2017 at about 11:52 pm local time, a 2011 amateur-built Lancair Evolution, registered N571JM, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Mesa, Arizona (Falcon Fld airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed while maneuvering for landing, which resulted in an exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and a subsequent stall/spin. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's distraction due to a failure with the airplane's electrical system, failure to follow emergency procedures and to continue with a known electrical problem.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 17, 2017 · about 11:52 pm local time
- Place
- Mesa, Arizona · Falcon Fld · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Amateur-built Lancair Evolution, built 2011
- Registration
- N571JM · no longer on the register · serial EVO-019
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in his recently purchased high-performance experimental amateur-built airplane. About 25 minutes after takeoff, the pilot informed an air traffic controller that he was experiencing electrical problems and requested to divert to the airport where his maintenance facility was located. The pilot further stated that his electrical system was not charging and that he expected he may lose radio communications due to the loss of electrical power. The pilot continued about 30 minutes to the diversion airport. Radar data revealed that, about 1 minute after being cleared for landing, the airplane's transponder stopped sending altitude information, consistent with electrical power decreasing below the 18 volts required to power the radio system. The pilot performed a low pass over the runway, presumably for the tower controller to confirm that the landing gear were extended; although the pilot was not in communication with the controller, the controller transmitted that the gear appeared to be down. The airplane continued on a close-in downwind leg and turned onto the base leg of the traffic pattern; witnesses saw it enter a steep left turn followed by a near-vertical descent consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation; however, the electrical system was consumed by fire, precluding functional testing or examination of its components. The starter-generator drive shaft was fractured in overload, consistent with it turning at the time of impact. The pilot had owned the airplane about 3 months, during which time he logged about 40 hours of flight experience in it, including transition training with a provider who specialized in the accident airplane make and model; however, the pilot's most recent experience was flying about 35 hours in his other airplane, which operated at much lower airspeeds. The transition between the airplanes may have contributed to the pilot's failure to identify that he had let the airspeed drop below stall speed during the landing approach. The accident airplane had experienced electrical problems several days before the accident; however, the pilot's handling of that situation suggested a lack of familiarity with the airplane and its emergency procedures. During that event, he allowed the airplane to become slow at low altitude while troubleshooting, and he attempted to activate the emergency landing gear extension system, but instead pulled the parking brake handle. Despite the fact that the airplane's published generator failure checklist included recycling the generator switch, the pilot was only able to remedy the electrical problem after an individual at the maintenance facility instructed him via cell phone to recycle the generator switch, which he did. After restoring electrical power and landing without incident, the pilot admitted that he had forgotten to turn the generator switch on in the first place, an item that was included in the airplane's after-start procedures. During the accident flight, the pilot displayed similar evidence of failure to follow the airplane's published emergency procedures, which, for a generator failure, included reducing the electrical load by turning off nonessential equipment and landing at the nearest suitable airport. Onboard photos of the instrument panel during the flight indicated that the air conditioner, a nonessential item, remained on after the pilot initially reported electrical problems to the air traffic controller. Additionally, the pilot chose to continue the flight for 30 minutes to his maintenance facility, overflying other airports at which he could have landed. (The emergency procedures noted that battery power would last about 30 minutes with all nonessential equipment off.) Finally, the pilot was likely distracted from his primary task of flying the airplane as he was text messaging the maintenance facility about 8 minutes before the accident and placing a phone call within the 3 minutes before the accident, which may have been an attempt to reach the tower controller to confirm the status of the landing gear. Due to the postcrash fire, the origin of the electrical system failure could not be determined. Based on the available evidence, the accident is consistent with the pilot's failure to maintain airspeed while maneuvering for landing, which resulted in an exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall/spin.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Electrical system malf/failure during enroute (cruise)
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Electrical power system › (general) › Not specified
- factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring equip/instruments › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,700 hours in all; 41 in this make and model; 80 in the last 90 days
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 376.2 hours
- Last inspection: condition inspection, May 8, 2017; 55 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 4,550 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: P&W Canada PT6A-135A (turboprop); 431 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: DVT Phoenix AZ at 10:56 pm
- Destination: FFZ Mesa AZ
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 22L, 5,100 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 210° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 40 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 15,000 ft
- Temperature: 97°F (36°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
- Altimeter: 29.80 inHg
- Observation at 11:57 pm from KFFZ, 1 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
9 documents, released by the NTSB on January 9, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Non-volatile Memory Devices - Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 10 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Video Study | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Records of Conversation | PDF, 8 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Records Review - Excerpts of Logbooks | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Tests and Research | PDF, 8 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Air Traffic Control Excerpts of Transcripts | PDF, 18 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Raw radar Data | PDF, 112 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Air Traffic Control radar Data Plotted | PDF, 12 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Toxicological Report - Pilot | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
