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Accidents · NTSB WPR14LA225 · Final report

Amateur-built ROTORWAY 162F accident near Merced, California, June 4, 2014

On June 4, 2014 at about 2:03 am local time, a 2003 amateur-built ROTORWAY 162F (helicopter), registered N78291, was destroyed in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near Merced, California (Merced Rgnl/Macready Field). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The helicopter pilot/owner's decision to install a belt type not recommended by the kit manufacturer in the tail rotor drive system using the incorrect tension values, which led to the belt’s in-flight failure and the subsequent loss of tail rotor drive during a practice autorotation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 4, 2014 · about 2:03 am local time · cases in 2014
Place
Merced, California · Merced Rgnl/Macready Field · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Amateur-built ROTORWAY 162F, built 2003
Registration
N78291 · no longer on the register · serial 6109
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot, who was also the owner/builder of the experimental, amateur-built helicopter, reported that he was conducting a practice autorotation and that, during the landing flare and power recovery, the helicopter yawed left. The pilot applied the right antitorque pedal to correct; however, the helicopter did not respond. The helicopter then began to spin and subsequently landed hard and rolled onto its side. A postimpact fire ensued, which consumed most of the helicopter. Examination of the tail rotor drive system revealed that the aft tail rotor drive belt remained intact and connected between the tail rotor gearbox and aft pulley and that the majority of the forward belt had been consumed by fire. The center belt had fractured, and subsequent examination of the belt revealed that it exhibited signatures consistent with tensile overload failure. The pilot/owner reported that the helicopter's center tail rotor drive belt, which was a noncogged design in accordance with the kit manufacturer's recommendation, had failed previously. He chose to replace the failed belt with a cogged belt that had the same dimensions, and he had installed the cogged belt in the airplane less than 3 flight hours before the accident. The cogged belt had slightly different tensioning requirements; however, the owner installed the belt using the tension values required by the noncogged belt, which likely precipitated the cogged belt's tensile overload failure. The cogged belt was also not recommended for pulsation, shock loads, and high-tension configurations, all of which would have been present during the critical power recovery phase when the failure occurred and likely contributed to the belt's failure.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
  2. Flight control sys malf/fail during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event
  3. Dynamic rollover during landing (flare/touchdown)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Modification/alteration › Owner/builder
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor drive system › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor drive system › (general) › Failure
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Owner/builder

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 814.4 hours in all; 60.2 in this make and model; 10.6 in the last 90 days; 2.7 in the last 30 days; 626 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 45 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, October 2, 2013; 30 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,500 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rotortway RI 162FA (piston); 45 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: MCE Merced CA at 1:40 am
  • Destination: MCE Merced CA
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 330° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 88°F (31°C), dew point 45°F (7°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.78 inHg
  • Observation at 1:53 am from KMCE, 1 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

7 documents, released by the NTSB on October 27, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR14LA225.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.