Agustawestland Spa AW109SP accident near Astoria, Oregon, April 5, 2014
On April 5, 2014 at about 6:18 am local time, a 2011 Agustawestland Spa AW109SP (helicopter), registered N361CR, was involved in an accident during maneuvering (hover) near Astoria, Oregon. It was an other work-use flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). 1 person was seriously injured; 3 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The decision by the ship pilot and the helicopter crew to lower the ship pilot to a location on the ship that did not provide the helicopter pilot with an adequate view of the ship. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate pre-mission coordination between the ship, the ship pilot agency, and the helicopter operator.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- April 5, 2014 · about 6:18 am local time
- Place
- Astoria, Oregon · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured; 3 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Agustawestland Spa AW109SP S, built 2011 · all AW109SPs on the register
- Registration
- N361CR · no longer on the register · serial 22243
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Other work-use flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The foreign-registered container ship was inbound to port, and the helicopter was delivering a ship pilot to the ship. Per normal procedures, the helicopter's crew planned to lower the ship pilot to the ship's deck via a cable hoist while the ship was underway. When the helicopter arrived at the ship, dark night conditions prevailed, rain was falling, and the relative wind was blowing onto the starboard (right) bow of the ship. The helicopter crew circled the ship to locate a suitable location to lower the ship pilot and settled upon a location close to the starboard bow. The ship pilot and the helicopter crew agreed that this was the best available location for the transfer. However, this location allowed the helicopter's pilot to see and use only a very small portion of the ship as a visual reference for maintaining the helicopter's position while lowering the ship pilot. Just as the ship pilot made contact with the deck, the ship's bow pitched down, and the helicopter pilot lost visual contact with the ship. Because the helicopter pilot was unable to see the ship, the helicopter began to move aft relative to the ship. The hoist operator was unable to release the hoist cable quickly enough to prevent pulling the ship pilot off the deck and had to cut the cable. The ship pilot fell a few feet to the deck and fractured his scapula. Ship pilots can be transferred to ships that are underway either by boat or helicopter. The transfer mode determination is made by the ship pilot agency and is typically not made until shortly before the transfer. In this case, neither the ship pilot nor the helicopter crew had complete and accurate knowledge of the ship's deck configuration, particularly with regard to the availability of a suitable location for the transfer, until they arrived at the ship. If a location had been available that would have afforded the helicopter pilot a more encompassing view of the ship, the likelihood of this accident would have been reduced because the helicopter pilot would likely not have lost his visual reference, which would have minimized or eliminated the resulting relative motion between the ship and the helicopter. The ship pilot agency published procedural guidance for ship operators on helicopter transfers, but that guidance contained only minimal information regarding deck configuration or location requirements for the transfer. There were no published requirements or guidance for the ship to provide information about its deck configuration and accommodations for a helicopter transfer to the ship pilot agency. The establishment of procedures and practices that require more complete advance notice and pre-coordination of any helicopter transfer arrangements could ensure a higher level of operational safety. Subsequent to the accident, the state's ship pilot board recommended better pre-coordination between ship crews and helicopter operators for any planned ship pilot transfers by helicopter.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- External load event (Rotorcraft) during maneuvering (hover) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Flight crew
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Other/unknown
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › (general) › Effect on operation
- factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Other institution/organization
- factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Operator
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 5,655 hours in all; 555 in this make and model; 63 in the last 90 days; 19 in the last 30 days; 5,366 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: March 29, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 7,115 hours in all; 14 in the last 30 days; 7,009 as pilot in command; 1,218 on instruments
- Last flight review: March 31, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,323 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, April 4, 2014; 1 hours since
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: P&W Canada PW207C (turboshaft); 1,323 hours total
- Engine 2: P&W Canada PW207C (turboshaft); 1,323 hours total
- Operator: Brim Aviation
The flight
- Departed from: KAST Astoria OR at 5:51 am
- Destination: Astoria OR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night, dark
- Wind: from 210° at 15 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast; not recorded
- Temperature: 50°F (10°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Altimeter: 30.07 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 3 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR14LA160.