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Accidents · NTSB WPR13FA072 · Final report

Piper PA-31-350 accident near Payson, Arizona, December 19, 2012

On December 19, 2012 at about 1:25 am local time, a 1976 Piper PA-31-350, registered N62959, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Payson, Arizona (Payson airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The airplane’s inadvertent encounter, in night instrument meteorological conditions, with unforecast strong up- and downdrafts and possibly severe airframe icing conditions (which likely included supercooled large droplets that the airplane was not certificated to fly in) that led to the pilot's loss of airplane control.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 19, 2012 · about 1:25 am local time · cases in 2012
Place
Payson, Arizona · Payson · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Piper PA-31-350, built 1976 · all PA-31-350s on the register
Registration
N62959 · no longer on the register · serial 3107752008
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot began flying the twin piston-engine airplane model for the cargo airline about 11 months before the accident. Although he had since upgraded to one of the airline's twin-turboprop airplane models, due to the airline's logistical needs, the pilot was transferred back to the piston-engine model about 1 week before the accident. The flight originated at one of the airline's outlying destination airports and was planned to stop at an interim destination to the southwest before continuing to the airline's base as the final destination. The late afternoon departure meant that the flight would arrive at the interim destination about 10 minutes after sunset. That interim destination was situated in a sparsely populated geographic bowl just south of terrain that was significantly higher, and the ceilings there included multiple broken and overcast cloud layers near, or lower than, the surrounding terrain. Although not required by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, the airline employed dedicated personnel who performed partial dispatch-like activities, such as providing relevant flight information, including weather, to the pilots. Before takeoff on the accident flight, the pilot conferred briefly with the dispatch personnel by telephone, and, with little discussion, they agreed that the flight would proceed under visual flight rules to the interim destination. Information available at the time indicated that the cloud cover almost certainly precluded access to the airport without an instrument approach; however, the airplane was not equipped to conduct the only available instrument approach procedure for that airport. Additionally, the pilot did not have in-flight access to any GPS or terrain mapping/database information to readily assist him in either locating the airport or remaining safely clear of the local terrain. Although the airplane was not being actively tracked or assisted by air traffic control (ATC) early in the flight, review of ground tracking radar data showed that the flight initially headed directly toward the interim destination but then began a series of turns, descents, and climbs. The airplane then disappeared from radar as the result of radar coverage floor limitations due to high terrain and radar antenna siting. The airplane reappeared on radar about 24 minutes after it disappeared and about 9 minutes after the FAA-defined beginning of night. Based on the flight track, it is likely that the pilot made a dedicated effort to access the airport, while concurrently remaining clear of the clouds and terrain, strictly by visual means. This task was made considerably more difficult and hazardous by attempting it in dusk conditions, and then darkness, instead of during daylight hours. About 15 minutes after the airplane reappeared on radar, when it was at an altitude of about 13,500 ft, the pilot contacted ATC and requested and was granted an instrument flight rules clearance to his final destination. About 3 minutes later, the controller cleared the flight to descend to 10,000 ft, and the airplane leveled off at that altitude about 6 minutes later. However, upon reaching 10,000 ft, the pilot requested a lower altitude to escape "heavy" up- and down-drafts, but the controller was unable to comply because the ATC minimum vectoring altitude was 9,700 ft in that region. About 1 minute later, radar contact was lost. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted terrain in a steep nose-down attitude in a near-vertical trajectory. Although examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical deficiencies that would have prevented normal operation and continued flight, the extent of the damage precluded, except on a macro scale, any determination of the preimpact integrity or functionality of any systems, subsystems, or components, including the ice protection systems, autopilot, and nose baggage door. Analysis of the radar data indicated that the airplane was above 10,000 ft for at least 41 minutes (possibly in two discontinuous periods) and above 12,000 ft (in two discontinuous periods) for at least 18 minutes. Although the airplane was reportedly equipped with supplemental oxygen, the investigation was unable to verify either its presence or its use by the pilot. Lack of supplemental oxygen at those altitudes for those periods could have contributed to a decrease in the pilot's mental acuity and his ability to safely conduct the flight. Analysis of air mass data revealed that mountain-wave activity and up- and downdrafts with vertical velocities of about 1,000 ft per minute (fpm) were present near the accident site and that the largest and most rapid transitions from up- to down-drafts occurred near the accident site, which was also supported by the airplane's altitude data trace. The analysis also indicated that the last radar target from the airplane was located in a downdraft with a velocity of between 600 and 1,000 fpm. Other meteorological analysis indicated that the airplane encountered icing conditions, likely in the form of supercooled large droplets (SLD), several minutes before the accident. Aside from pilot reports from aircraft actually encountering SLD, no tools currently exist to detect airborne SLD. Further, the tools and processes to reliably forecast SLD do not exist. SLD is often associated with rapid ice accumulation, especially on portions of the airplane that are not served by ice protection systems. Airframe icing, whether due to accumulation rates or locations that exceed the airplane's deicing system capabilities, mechanical failure, or the pilot's failure to properly use the system, can impose significant adverse effects on airplane controllability and its ability to remain airborne. Because of the pilot's recent transition from the Beechcraft BE-99, in which the pitot heat was always operating during flight, he may have forgotten that the accident airplane's pitot heat procedures were different and that the pitot heat had to be manually activated when the airplane encountered the icing conditions. If the pitot heat is not operating in icing conditions, the airspeed information becomes unreliable and likely erroneous. Erroneous airspeed indications, particularly in night instrument meteorological conditions when the pilot has no outside references, could result in a loss of control. The investigation was unable to determine whether the pitot heat was operating during the final portion of the flight. The investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot used the autopilot during the last portion of the flight. If he was using the autopilot, it is possible that, at some point, he was forced to revert to flying the airplane manually due to the unit's inability and to a corresponding Pilot's Operating Handbook prohibition against using it to maintain altitude in the strong up- and downdrafts, which would increase the pilot's workload. Another possibility is that the autopilot was unable to maintain altitude, and, instead of disconnecting it, the pilot overpowered it via the control wheel. If that occurred and the pilot overrode the autopilot for more than 3 seconds, the pitch autotrim system would have activated in the direction opposite the pilot's input, and, when the pilot released the control wheel, the airplane could have been significantly out of trim, which could result in uncommanded pitch, altitude, and speed excursions and possible loss of control. Whether the pilot was hand-flying the airplane or was using the autopilot, the encounter with the strong up- and downdrafts and consequent altitude loss likely prompted the pilot to input corrective actions to regain the lost altitude, specifically increasing pitch and possibly power. Such corrections typically result in airspeed losses; those losses can sometimes be significant as a function of downdraft strength and the airplane's climb capability. If that capability is compromised by the added weight, drag, and other adverse aerodynamic effects of ice, aerodynamic stall and a loss of control could result. Radar tracking data and ATC communications revealed that another, similar-model airplane flew a very similar track about 6 minutes behind the accident airplane, except that that other airplane was at 12,000 ft not 10,000 ft. The 10,000-ft ATC-mandated altitude placed the accident airplane closer to the underlying high terrain and into the clouds with the icing conditions and the strong vertical air movements. In contrast, the pilot of the second airplane reported that he was in and out of the cloud tops and did not report any weather-induced difficulties. The accident pilot did not have any efficient in-flight means for accurately determining the airborne meteorological conditions ahead, and the ATC controller did not advise him of any adverse conditions. Therefore, the pilot did not have any objective or immediate reason to refuse the ATC-assigned altitude of 10,000 ft. Ideally, based on both the AIRMET and the ambient temperatures, the pilot should have been aware of the likelihood of icing once he descended into clouds. That, particularly combined with his previously expressed lack of confidence in the airplane's capability in icing conditions, could have prompted him to request either an interim stepdown altitude of 12,000 ft or an outright delay in a direct descent to 10,000 ft, but, for undetermined reasons, the pilot did not make any such request of ATC. Based on the available evidence, if the ATC controller had not descended the airplane to 10,000 ft when he did, either by delaying or by assigning an interim altitude of 12,000 ft, it is likely that the airplane would not have encountered the icing conditions and the strong up- and downdrafts. In addition, if the presence of SLD and/or strong up- and downdrafts had been known or explicitly forecast and then communicated to the pilot either via his weather briefing, his onboard equipment, or by ATC, it is likely that the pilot would have opted to avoid those phenomena to the maximum extent possible. The flight's encounter with airframe icing and strong up-and downdrafts placed the pilot and airplane in an environment that either exacerbated or directly caused a situation that resulted in the loss of airplane control.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Structural icing during enroute (cruise)
  3. Turbulence encounter during enroute (cruise)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to structural icing › Effect on operation
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Turbulence › (general) › Effect on operation
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Effect on personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,908 hours in all; 346 in this make and model; 185 in the last 90 days; 54 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: unk
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 19,188 hours
  • Last inspection: approved inspection programme, December 17, 2012; 0 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 7,600 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Lycoming TIO-540 (piston); 11,222 hours total
  • Engine 2: Lycoming TIO-540 (piston); 9,750 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: P14 Holbrook AZ
  • Destination: PAN Payson AZ
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 170° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 3,300 ft; scat at 2,300 ft
  • Temperature: 43°F (6°C), dew point 37°F (3°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.78 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

60 documents, released by the NTSB on May 14, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 9 pages View Download
2 Meteorology 5 - Factual Report of Group Chairman PDF, 45 pages View Download
3 ATC 3 - ATC Filed Mor - Zab PDF, 4 pages View Download
4 ATC 3 - ATC Certified Audio - Zab audio View Download
5 radar Study Specialist's Report PDF, 7 pages View Download
6 Airplane Cargo Load Manifest PDF, 1 page View Download
7 Witness Statements PDF, 3 pages View Download
8 Amf Operations Manager Statement PDF, 2 pages View Download
9 Amf Dispatcher Statement PDF, 1 page View Download
10 FAA Notification Record PDF, 1 page View Download
11 FAA Daily Record PDF, 2 pages View Download
12 FAA Report of Aircraft Accident PDF, 2 pages View Download
13 FAA Personnel Statements PDF, 5 pages View Download
14 FAA ATC Transcripts PDF, 18 pages View Download
15 radar Track Annotated from FAA PDF, 1 page View Download
16 FAA Record of Conversation – Weiser PDF, 1 page View Download
17 radar Track Overlays PDF, 4 pages View Download
18 radar Data File spreadsheet Download
19 radar Track – (.Kml File Open with Google Earth) map file Download
20 En Route Low IFR Chart PDF, 1 page View Download
21 Pan Rna GPS Iap PDF, 1 page View Download
22 Other Ameriflight Pilot’s Event Reports PDF, 4 pages View Download
23 Gila County Sheriff’s Notification Call PDF, 2 pages View Download
24 Initial and on Scene Information PDF, 23 pages View Download
25 Recovery Facility Examination Information PDF, 24 pages View Download
26 Engine Examination Information PDF, 28 pages View Download
27 Hartzell Propeller Exam Report PDF, 13 pages View Download
28 Pitot Tube Information PDF, 8 pages View Download
29 Pitot Tube Manufacturer’s Information PDF, 3 pages View Download
30 Materials Laboratory Factual Report PDF, 5 pages View Download
31 Computed Tomography Specialist’s Factual Report PDF, 26 pages View Download
32 Systems Group Email re Materials Lab Report PDF, 3 pages View Download
33 Autopilot Components PDF, 1 page View Download
34 Selected Maintenance Items PDF, 18 pages View Download
35 Amf Email re SB1194 Compliance PDF, 1 page View Download
36 Amf Corporate Interview Summaries PDF, 11 pages View Download
37 Amf Phoenix Based Interview Summaries PDF, 8 pages View Download
38 Amf Director of Safety Interview Summary PDF, 6 pages View Download
39 Amf Q&a Email re Departure Times PDF, 3 pages View Download
40 Amf Responses to NTSB January 2015 PDF, 45 pages View Download
41 Amf Responses to NTSB Feb 2015 PDF, 4 pages View Download
42 PA-31 SOP Unusual Attitude Training PDF, 1 page View Download
43 POH Autopilot Supplement Excerpt PDF, 2 pages View Download
44 General Operations Manual Excerpt re Flight Locating PDF, 2 pages View Download
45 General Operations Manual Excerpt re Overdue Flights PDF, 2 pages View Download
46 General Operations Manual Excerpt re Supplemental Oxygen PDF, 1 page View Download
47 Ameriflight Email re Ice Protection PDF, 2 pages View Download
48 POH Icing Supplement Excerpt PDF, 1 page View Download
49 PA-31 SOP Flight in Icing PDF, 1 page View Download
50 Air Safety Alert on Aircraft Iciing PDF, 2 pages View Download
51 Aopa Safety Alert on Aircraft Icing PDF, 16 pages View Download
52 Selected NASA ASRS Reports PDF, 10 pages View Download
53 FAA Weather Data Package PDF, 4 pages View Download
54 Record of Communication PDF, 2 pages View Download
55 General Operations Manual Excerpt Approved Weather Sources PDF, 1 page View Download
56 Solar and Lunar Times PDF, 1 page View Download
57 Pilot Times Email PDF, 3 pages View Download
58 Pilot’s Father Recount of Chieftain Switch PDF, 1 page View Download
59 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 7 pages View Download
60 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR13FA072.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.