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Accidents · NTSB WPR13FA037 · Final report

Cessna 421C accident near Shaver Lake, California, November 11, 2012

On November 11, 2012 at about 3:20 am local time, a 1980 Cessna 421C, registered N700EM, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Shaver Lake, California (Salinas Muni airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to regain airplane control following a sudden rapid descent during cruise, which resulted in an in-flight breakup. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to make the flight with a failed vacuum pump, particularly at high altitude in night conditions.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 11, 2012 · about 3:20 am local time · cases in 2012
Place
Shaver Lake, California · Salinas Muni · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 421C, built 1980 · all 421Cs on the register
Registration
N700EM · no longer on the register · serial 421C1010
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot departed about 90 minutes after sunset in the high-performance multiengine airplane on the cross-country flight. The climb and level off at cruise altitude were uneventful and, based on the radar data, appeared to have been accomplished with the use of the autopilot. The cruise altitude of 27,000 feet was the highest the airplane had been flown in recent history, and the highest altitude it had been operated at with the pilot flying. The pilot made a routine radio exchange with air traffic control personnel shortly after levelling for cruise. Five minutes later, the airplane, with no further radio transmissions, rolled to the right and rapidly descended 10,000 feet, where it subsequently broke apart. Both wings, along with the horizontal stabilizer and elevators, separated during the breakup sequence. Analysis of their fracture surfaces, along with the debris field distribution and radar data, revealed that the breakup sequence was most likely inadvertently induced by the pilot, as he attempted to recover control of the airplane during the dive. The airplane sustained extensive thermal damage after ground impact, and examination of the engine components, surviving primary airframe components, the cabin heater, and the autopilot system remnants did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. There was no evidence of bird strike, inflight fire, or that the engine fire extinguisher system had been activated. The airplane was flying toward an uninhabited mountain range and a largely unpopulated desert area at the time of the upset. The moon had set, and the pilot would have had limited reliable external visual cues should the airplane have experienced a failure of either the flight instruments or autopilot. The pilot was instrument rated, however the majority of his flight experience was garnered in aircraft equipped with modern "glass cockpit" avionics, as opposed to the traditional flight instruments installed in the accident airplane (which he had recently purchased). The airplane was equipped with a dual vacuum pump system, which drove the primary flight instruments and, in turn, the autopilot. One of the vacuum pumps had failed on the previous flight, and the pilot was unable to get it repaired in time for the accident flight. The dual nature of the vacuum system allowed for flight with a single failed pump, however failure of the remaining pump or associated vacuum system components would have left the pilot to hand fly the airplane, using backup flight instruments, at an altitude perilously close to the limit of the airplane's flight envelope (the maximum altitude was 30,200 feet). Examination revealed that the second pump was most likely operational; however, fire damage precluded an accurate assessment of the operability of the remaining vacuum system components. Although operation of the airplane did not require adherence to a minimum equipment list, the airplane's FAA Master Minimum Equipment List stated that one of the vacuum pumps can be inoperative, provided the airplane is operated under VFR and not operated at night. Given the pilot's overwhelming experience with "glass cockpit" instruments, as opposed to the traditional type in the accident airplane, along with the failure of one of the vacuum pumps, he should have reconsidered making the flight, particularly during night conditions. The airplane had experienced multiple anomalies with the autopilot and vacuum system prior to the accident flight. Maintenance records indicated that these discrepancies had been resolved; however, damage to the airplane precluded a substantive confirmation of their operation. Additionally, an oversight by an avionics repair facility 1 week before the accident resulted in the airplane's pitot/static system being inadvertently tested and certified to 20,000 feet, rather than the airplane's service ceiling of 30,200 feet. The relevance of this finding, if any, could not be determined. The airplane was equipped with a supplemental oxygen system; however, maintenance records indicated that the pilot's mask, while operational, had degraded. Additionally, the mask had been relocated to a position behind the pilot's seat, which would have been hard to reach in the event of a rapid decompression. Ultimately, the NTSB was unable to determine the cause of the rapid descent because of the postcrash damage to the airplane systems and components.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Unknown or undetermined during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Loss of control in flight during enroute (cruise)
  3. Attempted remediation/recovery during uncontrolled descent
  4. Aircraft structural failure during uncontrolled descent
  5. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Directional control › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › (general) › (general) › Capability exceeded other cases naming the airframe structure
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Vacuum system › (general) › Inoperative other cases naming the heating, ice protection and utility systems
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Response/compensation
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Indicating/recording systems › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the instruments and avionics
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 637.7 hours in all; 102 in this make and model; 41 in the last 90 days; 14.3 in the last 30 days; 629.2 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: June 13, 2012
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,118 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 8, 2012; 135 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 7,450 lb
  • Seats: 8
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Cont Motor GTSIO-520-N (piston); 274 hours total
  • Engine 2: Cont Motor GTSIO-520-N (piston); 883 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: KSNS Salinas CA at 2:37 am
  • Destination: KOMA Omaha NE
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 26, 6,004 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 43°F (6°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
  • Altimeter: 31.17 inHg
  • Observation at 2:53 am from KMAE, 42 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

38 documents, released by the NTSB on June 2, 2014. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Aircraft Performance 13 - Performance Study PDF, 14 pages View Download
2 Airworthiness Factual Report of Group Chairman PDF, 7 pages View Download
3 Appendix A to Airworthiness Factual Report of Group Chairman PDF, 9 pages View Download
4 Witness Records of Conversation PDF, 11 pages View Download
5 Debris Field and Search Area PDF, 1 page View Download
6 Flight Plan and Wx Briefing from Iad Duats (ForeFlight) PDF, 45 pages View Download
7 FAA (Sns-salinas) Clearance Delivery Audio (Dvd) PDF, 1 page View Download
8 FAA Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center Audio (Dvd) PDF, 1 page View Download
9 FAA Northern California Terminal radar Approach Control Audio (Dvd) PDF, 1 page View Download
10 Fuel Receipt and Correspondence with Salinas Airport Manager PDF, 2 pages View Download
11 Pilot Logbook Excerpts PDF, 14 pages View Download
12 FAA Cessna 414-421 Master Minimum Equipment List PDF, 46 pages View Download
13 Cessna 421C Information Manual Excerpts PDF, 1 page View Download
14 Airframe Maintenance Records Excerpts PDF, 37 pages View Download
15 Left and Right Engine Maintenance Records Excerpts PDF, 11 pages View Download
16 NTSB On-scene Examination Report PDF, 4 pages View Download
17 NTSB Airframe Examination Report PDF, 5 pages View Download
18 NTSB Engine Examination Reports (Conducted at Plain Parts) PDF, 5 pages View Download
19 NTSB Engine Examination Reports (Conducted at Continental Motors, Inc.) PDF, 5 pages View Download
20 NTSB Autopilot Components Examination Report (Conducted at Sigmatek) PDF, 9 pages View Download
21 NTSB Autopilot Components Examination Report (Conducted at Mid Continent) PDF, 7 pages View Download
22 NTSB Pitch Trim Actuator Gear Report Email PDF, 2 pages View Download
23 NTSB Heater Examination Report PDF, 6 pages View Download
24 NTSB Left Engine Turbocharger Examination Report PDF, 20 pages View Download
25 Airplane Flight History (Provided by Flightaware) data file Download
26 FAA Fat Sensor radar Data Code 3272 (Google Earth .Kmz Format) PDF, 1 page View Download
27 FAA Fat Sensor radar Primary Data (Google Earth .Kmz Format) PDF, 1 page View Download
28 FAA Prb Sensor radar Primary Data (Google Earth .Kmz Format) PDF, 1 page View Download
29 Evidence Control Forms PDF, 6 pages View Download
30 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 4 pages View Download
31 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page View Download
32 Toxicological Report - Pilot PDF, 1 page View Download
33 Photo 1. Wreckage from Above PDF, 1 page View Download
34 Photo 2. Wreckage at Accident Site PDF, 1 page View Download
35 Photo 3. Wreckage at Accident Site PDF, 1 page View Download
36 Photo 4. Wreckage at Accident Site PDF, 1 page View Download
37 Photo 5. Left Wing PDF, 1 page View Download
38 Photo 6. Right Wing PDF, 1 page View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR13FA037.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.